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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Supreme Court Case No. 47884

Plaintiff- Respondent,
V.

VERNON K. SMITH, III, an individual
Defendant- Appellant.
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE PETER BARTON

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ALEXANDERP.MCLAUGHLIN
JACKW.RELF
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

Page 1

ADA Co NTY DISTRICT COITRT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CVOl-19-10367
§
§
§

oah Hillen
PL-tintiff,

s.

. .eroon Smith, rn
Hefendant.

·~
§

ocation;
da Comity District Court
Judicia] Officer : Hoagland, ; amuel
Filed on: 06/07/2019
Case umber 1° i tory :
Appellate
se Numbe1: 47884-2020

Ca e T pe:
as
tat11 :

AA- AU l1titial District Coul't
Filing~ (Not E, F and Hl)

03/16/2020 Appealed .ase> Supren1e Court Appeal

DATE

l!lrrent C11s,e

ssigmneuf

Ca eNumber
Cou rt
Date Assigned
Judic ial Offic,er

CVO l -19- 1036 7
Ada County D istrict Collrt
07/30/2019
Hoagland, amuel

Lead Attorneys
Plaintiff

Hillen,

Petei-ntan, R.and:dl
Retained

oah G.

208-:188 - l 228{W)

, 111.itb,

er11011

K., III

Smith,

ernm1 Kenneth, Jr

Retained
208-345-1I 25(W)
DATE

06/07/20 19
06/07/20 19

06/07/20 19

ew Ca c - District C ivil
Cornp lai.i1LFiled
Ejeclmenl ond 01her Relief

Summons ]ssued

And iled
06/07/20 19

~ C ivil Ca e Information "hect

06/07/20 19

nmrnons

mith, Verno n K_ , Ill
erved: 06/1 0/2019
06/1 8/20 19

t:I Mo tion to D isqua lify Judge
Witho11J Caus

06/1 9/20 19

t::J Affidavit of

erv1ce

06/10/ 2019

06/28/20 19

ot ice o f Ao ne.arance

General Pagl?age 2

ADA Co NTY DISTRICT COITRT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CVOl-19-10367
06/28/20 19
07/02/2019

07/02/20 19

07/03/ 2019
07/03/20 19

• ' Civil Ca e Information 'hect
Order
Graming lvfolion for Disqualijka!ion Withouf
i oticc
Three Day Nolie ojlnteuf to Take De:fa11/f

t:J Order of Rea signment - Adm inistrative
Certificate of lail'ng

07/03/20 19

otice
of Reassignment

07/03/20 19

Answer
An wer ro Verified Complaint

07/23/2019

ause

t:l order
of Disqualification Pursuant to I.R. .P. 40(d)(4)

07/30/20 19

07/" 1/2019

otice
of Reassignme11t
otice of Hearing

Sched11iing Conference
08/30/20 19

CANCELED
~cleared

thedulfa~, Con fe1·ehce (4-:00 PM (Jndicial otli -~r: 1-loaghmd, Samuel)

08/30/20 19

._tipulation for Sche luling and Planning

08/30/20 19

Scheduling Order

09/16/20 19

otion
to Amend Sched11ling 01t:ler

10/09/2019

otion
lvloh on for Parlia! Judgment o:n the Pleadings and Mo/ion IO Certifj 1 Jndgwenl Under LR. C. P.
54fB)

10/09/2019

emonmdmn Tn . u11port of Motion
Jvfemorammm in Support of Morion for Pm·'ffal .J11dg me11! on the Pleadings and Mo/ion
Certify Judgment U11da I.R. C.P. 54(B)

10/09/20 19

lo

1:j Decl arn1ion
Declaration of Noah G Hillen in S11pporJ of Mofionfor Partial J11dgmenl 011 the Pleadings
and Motfon lo 'ertifj1Judgme11t Under /.R C.P. 54(B)

10/09/2019

r:J Notice of Hearing
JJ /J_/19 at 330 pm Partial Judgment

PAGE 2 0

General Pagl?age 3

5

Pri111ed on 06/ J 712020 at 10. J2 AM

ADA Co NTY DISTRICT COITRT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CVOl-19-10367
10/1 0/20 19

Amended

Norice o.lHearing 1113/19' at 4 pm (ParlialJ11dg111enf)
l 1/05/20 19

Witne s Dis.closure

Plaintiff. WUnes · Di clo
11/05/20 19

t:l

11re

otic of Hearing

J _/3/ 19 at 4pm - Jvfotion to Amend Scheda!ing Order

11/08/20 19

11/ 12/2019

Oppo. ition to
1emorandnm i11 Oppnsilion fo Motion for Partial Judgment

CA.i CELED Motion Ileadng (3:30 PM (Judicial Officer: Hongland, ·a mud)
Vacated
.for Partial Judgment on Pleadings { Motion to Cerlify Judgment

11/27/20 19

Reply

Memora11dnm in upport of JWofion
l2/03/20 19

l\·l otio11 Hea1i ng - CiviJ (4 :00 PM) (Judicial Offic•er: Hoag,hmd, amuel)
Partial Judgment

12/03/20 19

r:J Cm.1rt Minute

12/04/20 19

t:J · otice of Hea1ing

· Judicial Officer: Hoagland. ~anmel)

Second Amended (1 / 14/ _0_0

12/ Il/20 19

12/1 3/20 19

3:00pm)

otice
of Entry ofMemonmdum Decision and Order by Judge Hippler

t:J order
Granting Motion to Am nd Scheduling Order

12/13/20 19'
12/ 17/20 19

12/31/2019

chedul i□g

Order

emorandutu
Supplernental kie.morandum In Opposition to ,\lotion for Partial Judgment on tire Pleadings
Objection

and R -:pon e to Defendant's Suppl ,.,mmtal Memoraudum
0 1/1 4/2020

01/1 4/2020

01/29/2020

umtmH") .Judgment (3:00 PM) (Judi.:ial Officer: Hoagl.aml. mnuel)
Parlial Summary J11dgmenl

Motitliil for

ourl Minutes , Judicial Oflicer: Hoagland, mnuel J
CANCELED Statu s ConfeN nce (3 :00 PM) (Judic ial Officer: Hoagland, amuel ,

Vacared
Jnfbrmal
Q_/ 10/2020

Writ I.sued
Assistance ~ Ada County

PAGE 3 0

General Pagl?age 4

5

Pri111ed on 06/ J 712020 at 10. J2 AM

ADA Co NTY D I TRICT COURT

CASE S UMMARY
CASE No. CVOl-19-10367
02/ 10/2020

02!]9/2020

Order
Graming l\llotion jbr Partial Judgmenl on the Pleadings, Ru1e 54(B): and Writ o/Assislance
CAN('ELED Pre-trial O rn ference (3:00 PJv{) (Judicial onicer: Hoagland,. mime))

Vacared
02/24/2020

02/24/2020

emonmdmn of Co

1"

& Auomey Fees

Decimation
ofAfe.m nder P. Mclaughlin in upport ofMemomndum ofA1torneys' Fee and Costs

02/28/2020

Ord r

Parlial Jiidgmenl

03 /02/2020

CANCELED Statu Confe1·ence (8:30 AM) • Judicial < ffic•er; Ho, gland. , ·amuel)
Vacated

03 /02/2020

CANCELED .lm·y T1·h1 l (9 00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland, Samuel
Vacared

1day
03 /03/2020

03 /05/2.020

olice of ervict: ol Disco ery Reque ts
otice of Se.nice of Plaint if}' Firs/ Se/ of Discovery Requests ro De.fendant
emorandum In upport of Motion
Defimdanr5 Memorcmdmn In Si!pporl oflvlofion In Opposition lo Plaiufijj's Af.,mora11d11m of

Fees and Costs
03 /05/20..:0

otion

Defendant's Motion fn OpJ')(}8i/ion lo I'laintiff.1· Memora/ldum ofAflorne_y~'i Fees and Costs
03/16/2020

Appeal Filed in upreme Court

03 / 16/2020

oli.:e of Appeal

03 /27/2020

R quet
fo r Addihonal Transcript and Record

04/01/2020

t:J

Tder

Deferring R11ling on Attorney Fees c Co ts
04/07 . 020

t:J order
Conditionally Di mis ing Appeal - Supreme Court

04/08/2020

o. 47884

Motion
Src~J' Proceedings Pending Appeal

lo

04/10/2020

t:J order
Re: Motion

05/0 "/2020

lo

Stay Proceedirws Pending App al

'A11/CELED Status ConfeTence (3:00 PM) Judicial Officer: Hoagland, amuel
Vacated
lnfurmal

PAGE4 0

General Pagl?age 5

5

Pri111ed on 06/17/2020 l1! 10. 11 AM

ADA Co

1

'TY DI 'TRICT COl,"RT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CVOl-19'- 10367
0.S /0S/2020

rder
Rein rating Appeal - Supreme Court No. 4 884

05/19/2020

CANCELED Pre-trfal ' 'onference (3 :00 PM) (Judicial Oftlcer: Hoagland, amuel)
Vacared

06/01 /2020

CANCELED Status Confe1·encc {8:30 AM) , Judicial Officer: Hoagland, ~amucl)
Vacated

06/01/2020

CANCELED .Jui-y Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Hoagland. amuel)
Vacared

06/ 11/2020

06/11/2020

Appeal Cover itle Page- Supreme Court ro. 47884
lerk's C. rtifica1e of ervice

- S11pteme Court No_ 4 884
06/1 6/2020

06/17/202

06/ 17/2020

Reporter's otice of Transcript(s) Lodged
- Sllpreme Court No_ 47884
' ranscript Lodged
- Supreme Court No. 4 884

Ca. e Summary

DAT

Defend1n1t mith, Vernon K , HI
otal Charge,Total Payments and Credit,Bala11,ce Utte as ol' 6/17/2020

Plai11tiff lillen,

365.00
365_00
0.00

oah G.

32LOO

Total barges
Total Pa ment and Credits
Balance D'tte as of 6/1 7/2020

321_00
0.00

PAGE 5 0

General Pagl?age 6

5

Prinled on ()6/1712020 a/ JO. 12 AM

Electronically Filed
6/7/2019 12:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Gena Foley, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
013683-0002

Signed: 6/7/2019 04:09 PM

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

CV01-19-10367
Case N o. - - - - - - - - Category: A. A.
Fee: $221.00

Plaintiff,
vs.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF

VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly appointed
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and hereby alleges a Verified Complaint for Ejectment and other relief as follows:

I.
1.

PARTIES

Noah G. Hillen ("Plaintiff') is the Personal Representative of the Estate of

Victoria H. Smith (the "Estate"), pursuant to that certain Decision Re: Multiple Motions (the
"Order"), entered in In re Estate of Victoria H Smith, Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, in the District
Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the state of Idaho, in and for the county of Ada.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 1
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2.

On or about June 2, 201 7, the Honorable Judge Cheri C. Copsey entered an

Order on Motion Under Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Vesting All Real and
Personal Property of the Estate in the Personal Representative ("Rule 70 Order") under which the
Court transferred to Plaintiff any and all personal property or real property which had been
transferred by the Estate to Vernon K. Smith, Jr. ("Vernon") since July 4, 2012. A true and correct
copy of the Rule 70 Order and subsequent judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3.

Upon information and belief, Vernon K. Smith III ("Defendant") is an

individual residing in the state of Idaho, county of Ada.
4.

This action is being pursued against Defendant, who is subject to these

proceedings given his status as a possessor and/or occupier of real property owned by Plaintiff.
II.
5.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for the causes of action

set forth herein.
6.

This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's causes of action against

7.

The damages and/or property claimed herein and/or at issue here exceed the

Defendant.

minimum jurisdictional requirements of this Court.
8.

Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-401, et. seq.

in that Ada County is the county in which the Premises (defined below) is located.

III.
9.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is the owner and the party with legal standing to care for and

otherwise maintain certain real property located in Ada County commonly known as 2001 N.
Raymond Street, Boise, Idaho (the "Premises"), which property is less than five (5) acres.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 2
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10.

The value of the Premises is greater than $10,000.00.

11.

Defendant is in possession of that portion of the Premises identified above.

12.

Defendant has failed to timely pay the demanded monthly rent.

13.

On December 11, 2018, Plaintiff caused to be served via certified mail upon

Defendant, at the Premises, a Thirty (30) Day Notice of Termination of Lease (the "Termination
Notice") which terminated whatever right Defendant had, if any, to occupy or otherwise possess
the Premises effective January 31, 2019, and which demanded Defendant vacate the premises no
later than January 31, 2019. A true and correct copy of the Termination Notice is attached hereto
as Exhibit B.
14.

Defendant refused to vacate or otherwise surrender possession of the

Premises by January 31, 2019, and continues to occupy and possess the same.
15.

Defendant's occupation of the Premises beyond January 31, 2019 was and

continues to be unlawful and without the permission of Plaintiff.
16.

Plaintiff, as the rightful owner of the Premises, is entitled to possession

thereof.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF:
COUNT ONE: EJECTMENT
17.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

18.

Plaintiff owns the Premises.

19.

Defendant is in possession of the Premises.

20.

Defendant has refused to surrender possession of the Premises to Plaintiff

full.

following demand via the Termination Notice.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 3
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21.

Defendant's continued holding of the Premises entitles Plaintiff to

immediate possession of the Premises via ejectment of Defendant.
COUNT TWO: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT/QUIET TITLE

22.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

23.

Idaho Code Section 6-401 provides for "[a]ctions to quiet title" and states,

full.

in pertinent part, that "[ a]n action may be brought by any person against another who claims an
estate or interest in real property ... adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse
claim."
24.

Idaho Code Section 10-1202 provides that "[a]ny person interested under a

deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or
franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or
other legal relations thereunder."
25.

Idaho Code Section 10-1201 provides for "[d]eclaratory judgments" and

goes on to state that "[ c]ourts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or
decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and
such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree." Idaho Code Section
10-1205 provides that "[t]he enumeration in Sections 10-1202, 10-1203 and 10-1204, does not
limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in Section 10-1201, in any proceedings

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 4
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where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or
remove an uncertainty."
26.

Idaho Code Section 10-1208 provides that "[f]urther relief based on a

declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper."
27.

Defendant, who once held possession of the Premises with permission of

one of the Estate's heirs which Plaintiff believes was wrongful, now remains in possession of the
Premises with no legal right thereto, and is claiming an interest in real property owned by Plaintiff.
28.

Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment decreeing and declaring that

Defendant has no right to occupy or possess the Premises and for such other and further relief as
this Court deems appropriate.
COUNT THREE: TRESPASS

29.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

30.

Plaintiff is the lawful owner of the Premises.

31.

Plaintiff has made demand upon Defendant to cease and desist from his

full.

trespassing on and unlawful occupation of the Premises.
32.

Defendant has failed and refused to cease and desist from his trespassing on

and unlawful occupation of the Premises.
33.

Defendant's continued and unauthorized trespass upon and use of the

Premises has caused and will cause damage to Plaintiff because it interferes with Plaintiffs use
and enjoyment of the Premises.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 5
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34.

Defendant's continued and unauthorized trespass upon and use of the

Premises has caused and will cause further damage to Plaintiff because Plaintiff is unable to lease
the Premises to a paying tenant.
35.

Plaintiff has been damaged by Defendant's trespass in an amount to be

proven at trial.
COUNT FOUR: UNJUST ENRICHMENT

36.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

37.

Defendant has incurred a benefit by remaining in possession of the Premises

full.

with no lawful right thereto and without paying remuneration.
38.

Defendant has appreciated that benefit by possessing the Premises and

remaining in such possession despite demand to vacate from Plaintiff.
39.

Defendant's acceptance of his benefit of possession of the Premises is

inequitable because has not paid for his past and continued use of the premises.
40.

Plaintiff is entitled to the amount by which Defendant has been unjustly

enriched.
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

41.

In order to prosecute this action it has become necessary for Plaintiff to

retain the services of the law firm of Givens Pursley LLP. A reasonable fee for said firm's services
in the event that Defendant fails to appear and contest this matter would be the sum of $1,000, and
such further amounts as the Court may deem reasonable should Defendant appear and contest this
matter.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 6
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42.

Pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120, 6-324, and/or 6-31 lA, and any

other applicable statutes, rules, regulations, or law, Plaintiff is entitled to recover his costs and
attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting this action.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
1.

For a Judgment in favor of Plaintiff on all counts of the foregoing

2.

For the specific relief sought in each Count of the foregoing Complaint;

3.

For and order of restitution of the Premises to Plaintiff, free of any and all

Complaint;

claims thereto by Defendant;
4.

For an Order of this Court directing that a Writ be issued, without further

notice, to the Sheriff of Ada County, to accomplish the restitution;
5.

For an award of Plaintiffs costs and attorney fees incurred herein, such

attorney's fees to be the sum of $1,000 if Judgment is entered by default or a reasonable amount
if the matter is contested; and
6.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 7th day of June, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman- Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 7
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

NOAH G. HILLEN, being first duly sworn deposes and says:
I have read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND
OTHER RELIEF, know the cont nts thereof and that the same are true to the best of my
knowledge, information, and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~.JAaay of June 2019.

TAY

N
PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Resid ing at ,BoJ'«w T ~
My Commission Expfres ::;I~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH,

Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352
ORDER ON MOTION UNDER RULE
70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE

Deceased.

THIS MATTER came before the Court upon the Motion for Relief under Rule
70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("Motion"), filed by Noah Hillen as Special
Administrator ("Special Administrator") on March 30, 2017. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. filed an
Objection ("Objection") to the Motion on April 6, 2017.

No other objection was filed.

A hearing regarding the Motion and Objection occurred on May 5, 2017, at which time the Court
considered the arguments of the parties, then granted the Motion.
The Court granted the Motion on May 5, 2017, under the authority granted it
under Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Noah Hillen, as Personal Representative
is of the Estate ("PR" or "Personal Representative") is hereby granted the right and authority to

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE- I
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execute or have notarized any and all documents necessary to carry out the purpose of this Order,
and to take any actions as necessary to carry out the purpose of this Order.
On May 25, 2017, Noah Hillen's appointment as a Special Administrator was
terminated, and Mr. Hillen was appointed as the Personal Representative of the Estate. As a
result, this Order conveys the properties to Mr. Hillen in his status as a Personal Representative
rather than a Special Administrator.
Accordingly, Judgment will be entered, pursuant to Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017.

The Honorable~. Copsey
District Judge
Signed: 6/2/2017 10:27 AM

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 6/2/2017 02:49 PM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _day of June, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE
ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
RANDALL A. PETERMAN
ALEXANDERP.MCLAUGHLIN
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
P .0. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Deli very
[X] Email/ iCourt:
rap@givenspursley. corns

Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special
Administrator
VERNON K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702

Personal Representative of Estate of Vernon K.
Smith, Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson
RORY JONES and ERICA JUDD
P.A.
th
225 North 9 Street, #820
Boise, Idaho 83 702

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: vl. 59@live.com

[ ] U.S. Mail
( ] Facsimile: (208) 331-1529
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt: rj nes@idalaw . .om;
ejudd@idalaw.com

JONES, GLEDHILL, FURMAN

Attorneys for Vernon K Smith, Jr.

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
12639 West Explorer Drive
Boise, Idaho 83 713

Attorneys for Joseph H Smith
Ronald L. Swafford
Swafford Law, PC
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401

Attorneys for Sharon Bergmann

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: aelli @a:elli law.com

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 524-4131
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email / iCourt:

r n@ warn rdlaw.com

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE-3
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Courtesy copy provided to:

Victoria Anne Converse
10548 NW Skyline Blvd.
Portland OR 97231

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

ROBERT MAYNES
Maynes Taggart, PLLC
P.O. Box 3005
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403
Attorneys for Walker Land & Livestock, LLC

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 524-6095
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Darrell G. Early
Office of the Attorney General
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Attorneys for State ofIdaho Department of
Environmental Quality

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE-4
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THIRTY (30) DAY NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF LEASE
TO:

Vernon K. Smith, III and all occupants of the Premises.

DESCRIPTION OF PREMISES: 2001 ~- Raymond Street, Boise, Idaho (herein described as
the "Premises").
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the month-to-month lease ("Lease") for the
Premises between The Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Landlord") and Vernon K. Smith, III
(''Tenant") will terminate on January 31, 2019. You must vacate the Premises no later than
January 31, 2019.
Until such time as the Lease terminates, you must continue to perform all of the
terms and conditions of the Lease, including payment of rent and any other amounts due to
Landlord.
Please be advised that that nothing herein constitutes a waiver, release or estoppel
of any and all rights, remedies, claims, defenses, actions, or complaints the Landlord has or may
later have, all of which are hereby expressly reserves.
DATED this 11th day of December, 2018.
THE ESTATE OF VICTORIA H. SMITH

By

1l ~

/(4 Qa,

Noah G. Hillen
Its: Personal Representative

THIRTY (30) DAY NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF LEASE - 1
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VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,

)
)
) Case No. CV0l-19-10367
)
) ANSWER TO VERIFIED
) COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT
) AND OTHER RELIEF
)
)
)

V.

VERNON K. SMITH, III, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant above named, Vernon K. Smith, III, by and
through his attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith Jr.,

and for Answer to the Verified

Complaint on file herein, does hereby respond and allege as follows:
FIRST DEFFENSE
Defendant denies each and every allegation set forth and contained in Plaintiffs
Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief, not otherwise specifically admitted
herein.
SECOND DEFENSE
That Plaintiff does not have the standing to bring this action against this
Defendant, as Plaintiff is not the owner of the real property and premises identified in the
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Verified Complaint, as only the heirs of the decedent are, as addressed hereinafter in this
responsive pleading.
THIRD DEFENSE
Defendant has been in possession of the real property and premises continuously
since 2006, and Defendant has had continuous possession for a period in excess of 14
years, under an agreement with both Defendant's Grandmother (Victoria H. Smith,
having become deceased on September 11, 2013), then with and

continuing with

Defendant's Father, Vernon K. Smith Jr., (counsel representing Defendant's right to
possession of the premises, being the 2/3rds vested owner of the property), and currently
under the controversial administration of this Personal Representative (PR) of the Estate
of Victoria H. Smith, who has a fiduciary duty to serve and protect the interests owned by
Vernon K. Smith Jr., a 2/3rds heir in said Estate, who does oppose the removal of
Defendant, as he has assisted in the protection, preservation, maintenance, and
improvement of the premises, continuously, since 2006, as agreed, and at his expense.
FOURTH DEFENSE
That Plaintiffs Complaint fails to set forth any legal or factual basis to constitute
a cause of action against this Defendant for which any relief can be granted under the
statutes of the state of Idaho, as Plaintiff does not have any ownership interest in the
premises, and has no statutory standing to bring this action, as identified hereinafter.
FIFTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in Category I, entitled
"PARTIES", Defendant does respond to those allegations as follows:
1. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 thereof, Defendant does
acknowledge that Noah G. Hillen ("Hillen") is the Personal Representative (PR) of the
Estate of Victoria H. Smith (Estate); that any "Order" entered by the magistrate Cheri C.
Copsey, is subject to the pre-emptive effects of the Uniform Probate Code, I. C. § 15-3101 and the case law interpreting that statutory provision; that ownership of said assets of
the decedent become vested interests of the heirs of said Estate, of which Vernon K.
Smith Jr., Defendant's Father, is a 2/3rds heir and vested owner, which interest had
vested in all property interests immediately upon the death of the decedent; that the
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2/3rds interest of Defendant's Father (Vernon K. Smith Jr.) is a statutorily "vested"
interest, not founded upon any "Order" of a magistrate court, as statutorily mandated by
I. C. § 15-3-101, interpreted and confirmed by case law, Fairchild v. Fairchild, 106 Idaho

147 (1984), and El/maker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390, (2015).
That by virtue of Idaho law, all assets of a decedent "vest" m the heirs
immediately upon the date of death, not to any Estate, or PR, or administration process,
as I. C. §15-3-101 states:
"15-3-101. Devolution of estate at death -- Restrictions. The power of a
person to leave property by will, and the rights of creditors, devisees, and
heirs to his property are subject to the restrictions and limitations
contained in this code to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates.
Upon the death of a person, his separate property devolves to the
persons to whom it is devised by his last will,
That Fairchild v. Fairchild, 106 Idaho 147 (1984), held:
We view the statement that "all became cotenants" as a conclusion of
law, reached by applying existing law to the findings of fact. See LC. §
15-2-103 (concerning the share of the decedent's heirs); and I.C. § 15-3101 (decedent's property devolves to his heirs at death). This
conclusion is correct. We uphold it.
. . ... the narrow focus of this appeal has been the application of settled law
to the facts. Furthermore, there was no showing that the trial court
misapplied the law. Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163
(Ct.App.1983). We hold that this appeal was brought frivolously,
unreasonably and without foundation.
In El/maker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390, (2015) it was further held:
Idaho Code section Code section 15-3-101 provides, "Upon the death of a
person, his separate property devo Ives to the persons to whom it is devised
by his last will .... " The word "devolve" means: "1. To transfer (rights,
duties, or powers) to another. 2. To pass (rights, duties, or powers) by
transmission or succession." Black's Law Dictionary 463 (7th ed. 1999).
"The term is said to be peculiarly appropriate to the passing of an estate
from a person dying to a person living." Black's Law Dictionary 540 (4th
ed. 1968). "The legal title to estate property vests in the heirs or
devisees upon the death of the decedent." Pierce v. Francis, 194 P.3d
505, 510 (Colo.App. 2008).
That "heirs" refers to the statutory beneficiaries of an Intestate proceeding; that
"devisees" refers to the statutory beneficiaries in a Testate proceeding; that by statutory
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declaration, devolution of property interests vest upon death of the decedent, not upon
any estate, or any administration or distribution proceedings. That Defendant does assert
that his Father's interest in the subject property as the heir of this asset, has vested at the

time of death of the decedent, not subject to any "administration" of the estate, which fact
and legal result has been ignored or misunderstood by this PR.
2. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 thereof, Defendant
would state said "Order" of the magistrate, as entered June 2, 2017, under Rule 70(b),
IRCP, has no effect to any extent it contradicts the statutory provision identified above;
that the effects of said "Order" is subject to the vested interests established by statute;
that said "Order" is inferior and subordinate to the provisions of the statute and that case
law cited above; that by virtue of said provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, I. C. § 153-101, all real and personal property interests of the decedent has immediately been
transferred to and became vested in the heirs upon the death of the decedent, which
vesture occurred immediately upon death of the decedent, once identified to be the
property interests of the decedent, and nothing within the administration of the Estate can
cause any divesture or defeat the vested interests established by statute.
That the existence of the "Order" of Magistrate Cheri C. Copsey does not, and
cannot, as a matter of law, supersede or serve to divest any interest that has been
statutorily created, interpreted, and confirmed through case law; that any allegation set
forth within said Paragraph 2, to the effect that said "Order" of said magistrate is claimed
to be superior or superseding authority, seeking to alter the ownership of the assets of the
decedent, is rejected and denied; that the creation of the statutory rights and vested
interests of the heirs is superior to any inferior "Order" of this magistrate, and
Defendant's Father, Vernon K. Smith Jr., is a 2/3rds vested owner of the real property
referred to, though has been inadequately identified in this Verified Complaint, seeking to
describe the premises only by street address, not a valid legal description.
Defendant is unaware of any statutory authority that permits an order to exceed
the statutory vesture of property ownership and rights of the heirs, as no authority has
been found to exist to allow a court to defeat or undermine a vested real property interest
statutorily created and confirmed by case law; that any allegation of Plaintiffs ownership
of this premises is herewith denied.
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3. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 thereof, Defendant does
admit his residency in Ada County, Idaho, as alleged.
4. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 thereof, Defendant does
acknowledge he is in possession and /or is the occupier of the real property and premises
that is owned by the "heirs" of the decedent, Victoria H. Smith, who died on September
11, 2013; that Defendant's Father, Vernon K. Smith Jr., is such an heir, having a vested
2/3rds ownership interest in this real property and premises, established by the statutory
authority and case law set forth above; that Plaintiff is not the "owner" of said real
property and premises, as the heirs ho Id the only vested interest in said real property,
notwithstanding the "Order" cited by Plaintiff; that Defendant denies any allegation set
forth within said Paragraph 3 that is inconsistent with this response.
SIXTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in Category II, entitled
"JURISDICTION AND VENUE", Defendant does respond to those allegations as
follows:
5. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 thereof, concerning the
jurisdiction of the court, Defendant understands jurisdictional assertions constitutes
questions of law, as opposed to allegations of fact; that Defendant shall not render a legal
opinion as to the jurisdiction of any particular court to preside over this case; that Defendant
does leave the issue of jurisdiction to be decided by the provisions of the statute and the
constitution; that notwithstanding that reservation, Defendant would state, upon information
and belief, that based upon the statutes and constitutional provisions, and the actual "subject
matter" within the "Verified Complaint for Ejectment", such subject matter of possession,
detainer, and ejectment are matters to be addressed within the magistrate division of the
district court, not the district court where this action is now pending, despite the assertion
that Plaintiffhas chosen to declare the alleged dispute to exceed $10,000.00 in value.
The Magistrate Courts and the District Courts are separate and distinct entities under
the Idaho Constitution, with the magistrate courts declared to be a division of the district
court, with each being separate and distinct courts under Idaho's law.
The district courts and the magistrate courts are courts ofrecord in Idaho (See LC.
§§ 1-101 and 1-102); District Courts are constitutional courts, having original jurisdiction
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established by Art. V, §20 of the Idaho Constitution; Magistrate Courts are declared to be
"inferior courts," created by the Idaho Legislature in LC. §1-2201, by citation to the
authorization provided by Art. V, §2 of the Idaho Constitution; the Idaho Legislature alone
determines the jurisdiction of magistrate courts (See Acker v. Mader, 94 Idaho 94, 96, 481
P.2d 605, 607 (1971), stating: "It is our opinion that Art. 5, §2 of the Idaho Constitution
intended the legislature to be the sole authority in determining the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts.").
That Magistrate Courts cannot, by judicial declaration, be turned into Art V. § 20
District Courts (See Nate v. Denny, 2017 WL 3033308 at *8 (Ida.Sup.Ct. July 18, 2017),
stating: ("[T]his Court does not have the authority to rewrite the Idaho Constitution, .").
Neither labeling a magistrate court to be a "division of the district courts," nor granting
magistrate courts' jurisdiction equal to that of the district courts, can tum magistrate courts
into district courts (See, LC.AR. 5).
L C. § 1-2208(1 )( a) has granted Magistrate Courts general jurisdiction in actions

where the amount of money, damages, or value of personal property claimed does not

exceed $5,000. L C. §1-2210(1)(a) has granted Magistrate Courts general jurisdiction in
actions where the amount of money, damages, or value of personal property claimed

exceeds $5,000. That construed together, these two statutes created the potential for the
exercise of general jurisdiction by a magistrate court co-equal with the original jurisdiction
granted to the district courts by the Idaho Constitution. However, the Supreme Court's
"court rules", ever since 1981, has determined to limit the general jurisdiction of Magistrate
Courts ''where the amount of damages or value of property claimed, does not exceed

$10,000." (See LC.AR. 5(c)(l)). Reference to the adoption of this jurisdictional limitation
of$10,000 is found in The Advocate, Vol. 24, No. 1, January 1981 at pg. 2, and 1981 Idaho
Court Rules Cumulative Pocket Supplement, LR.C.P. 82(c)(2)(A).
This general jurisdictional limitation on the magistrate court's jurisdiction, when
combined with the specific conferrals of jurisdiction made in LC. §§ 1-2208(1)(b), (l)(c),
(2), (3), (4), & (5); and 1-2210(1)(b), (l)(c), (l)(d), & (l)(e) operate to exclude from
magistrate court jurisdiction a number of alleged claims, including some common actions in
which the amount claimed, or the value of property placed at issue, exceeds $10,000,
including: (1) quiet title actions; (2) breach of contract actions; (2) general negligence
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claims; (3) personal injury actions; (4) wrongful death actions; (5) malpractice claims; (6)
defamation claims; (7) mortgage foreclosure actions; (8) a private adjudication of water
rights; (9) trespass and easement claims; and (10) those matters addressed by the Uniform
Probate Code (Title 15), which do not involve either the probate of a will or the
administration of the estates of decedents, minors & incompetents, examples including
disputes arising out of charitable and spendthrift trusts, or matters concerning the exercise of
durable powers of attorney.
The true "subject matter" alleged by Plaintiff is the issue of Defendant's possession,
yet attempting to make false claims over title, and allegations of trespass, which the PR
knows is a total falsehood, as the PR seeks to wrongfully eject Defendant from his
continued possession of the real property and premises, knowing Defendant's presence does
not impact the true ownership interests of the decedent's heirs; that Defendant has never
claimed an ownership interest, as that belongs to the heirs; this is not a dispute over any
amount owed to Plaintiff under any agreement or contract with the PR, a damage claim
alleged to be in excess of $10,000.00; that Defendant has no agreement or obligation to the
Plaintiff; rather this controversy is a dispute over Defendant's right to the continued
possession of the real property and premises, pursuant to the express wishes and objectives
of a vested owner that holds the 2/3rds ownership interest therein, namely Vernon K. Smith
Jr., Defendant's Father and heir of the assets ofVictoria H. Smith, deceased.
Defendant would state, upon the advice of his counsel, that the District Court may
elect not to assume jurisdiction, or to hear this controversy, and may conclude, upon the
evidence and applicable law, the magistrate court has the jurisdiction to address this matter,
and upon such a determination, this action may be remanded to the magistrate court,
where this controversy may be addressed over the issue of possession.
6. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 6 thereof, Defendant
would re-allege the response as set forth to the allegations contained in Paragraph 5
above; that the issue of jurisdiction and statutory authority is to be determined by the
court.
7. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 thereof, Defendant
would deny "the damages and/or property claimed herein and/or at issue here exceed the
minimum jurisdictional requirements of this court"; that Defendant disputes that Plaintiff
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has any damage claim; that Plaintiff seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court,
without any factual or legal basis to establish the fundamental requirement of standing to
assert such claims, as Plaintiff lacks the statutory ownership of the real property and
premises; that Defendant would re-allege the responses as set forth to the allegations
contained in Paragraph 5 and 6 above; that Defendant denies Plaintiff has any ownership
standing to invoke jurisdiction of either the district court or the magistrate court, as
Plaintiff has no factual or legal basis or ownership to assert any damages within any
causes of actions, as alleged in the Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief.
8. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 8 thereof, Defendant does
understand assertions made regarding contents of any statutory enactments also raise
questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendant does understand that the issue of
venue is a question oflaw, the determination of which is based upon a disposition of fact;
that unless the assertion of venue is denied, and made the subject of a motion for proper
venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), Rule 12(h)(4), and Rule 40.l(a) & (b), I.R.C.P., and LC.
§5-404, the objection as to proper venue is waived; that Defendant does admit the
property described in the Verified Complaint is located in Ada County, Idaho, and upon
that factual determination, and upon the advice of counsel, Defendant would agree Ada
County may be the proper venue to address this controversy.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in Category III, entitled
"GENERAL ALLEGATIONS", Defendant does respond to those allegations as follows:
9. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 9 thereof, Defendant
denies any allegation asserted by Plaintiff that said PR is the owner of the real property
and premises in question; that ownership is statutorily vested in the heirs of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith, of which Vernon K. Smith Jr. is an heir and holds a vested 2/3rds
ownership interest in the real property and premises referred to in the Verified
Complaint; that said Vernon K. Smith Jr. has the right associated with any determination
as to the possession of his vested interest in said real property; that this Defendant has
been in the continuous possession of the real property since 2006, under the arrangements
as hereinabove and hereinafter described; that the real property and premises is a
residential facility, which has been significantly remodeled and improved with the efforts
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exhausted by this Defendant and his Father, commencing in 2006, and Defendant is
entitled to have and maintain the continued possession thereof under those arrangements;
that the address of said real property and premises is 2001 N. Raymond Street, Boise,
Idaho, which actually is further identified by Lot number in a described Block number, in
the recorded subdivision, filed of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, Ada
County, Idaho; that Plaintiff has failed to properly identify the real property with any
legal description ..
10. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 10 thereof, Defendant
does acknowledge the value of the real property and premises does exceed $10,000.00;
however this controversy does not concern the value of the real property, but the right of
Defendant to the continued possession thereto by the consent and approval of the 2/3rds
vested owner, Vernon K. Smith Jr.,, as has been consented to by him to direct Defendant
to maintain his occupancy and possession of the real property and premises.
11. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 11 thereof, Defendant
would admit he does have and maintain the possession of the premises, continuously
since 2006, with the consent and approval of Victoria H. Smith, now deceased, and with
the continuing consent and approval of her one heir, Vernon K. Smith Jr., who does have
and holds a 2/3rds vested interest in said real property and premises.
12. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 12 thereof, Defendant
denies any obligation to pay any monthly rent to plaintiff; that Defendant has been placed
in possession of the premises in 2006, to make significant repairs, remodel, restoration,
improvements and to maintain and preserve the premises, for the benefit of the owner and
for 7 years before her demise, at all times with the assistance of Defendant's Father, and
now for the benefit of his Father, Vernon K. Smith Jr., who holds his vested interest to
2/3rds of the ownership of the real property and premises, which the PR has failed to
appreciate the owners' concerns for the protection and preservation of the property, to be
accomplished through the continued possession of the Defendant, as these proceedings
and actions significantly affect the vested interests of Vernon K. Smith Jr., and his
concerns to protect and maintain this property asset, which has been and will continue to
be protected with the continued possession by the Defendant; that the Estate does not
own the asset, despite the inferior "Order", and has had no involvement with the asset
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smce the appointment of this PR, commencmg with his appointment as Special
Administrator in 2016. That to allow the PR of the Estate to cause removal of Defendant
serves only to exposes this and other properties to uncertain damage and losses, and
compromises the interests held by the true ownership interests.
13. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 13 thereof, Defendant
would state that a Notice was sent to Defendant by the PR, originally in 2017; that no
action was taken for which Defendant concluded the PR came to be aware Defendant was
in possession of the property with the consent and approval of the vested owner holding
2/3rds of the ownership interest, being maintained for the protection and preservation of
the premises by Defendant; that Defendant's continued possession has never been
terminated or discontinued by the 2/3rds vested owner, but rather confirmed to remain
and maintain and preserve the premises for the benefit of the heirs.
14. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 14 thereof, Defendant
does acknowledge he has neither vacated nor surrendered possession of the premises,
having full consent and approval from the 2/3rds vested owner to remain there and
protect the premises; that as stated above, the Plaintiff, as the PR of the Estate, before
filed a suit to evict Defendant, as identified in the Verified Complaint For Unlawful
Possession And Retainer Of Real Property, Case No.

CV0l-18-00386, filed in Ada

County Fourth District Court, but dismissed the case when Defendant and his Father
appeared to address the merits of the claim; that Defendant's continuing right to retain
possession of the Raymond St. residence serves the best interests of the 2/3rds vested
owner, who anticipates will have total ownership of the premises after the completion of
the "Estate administration" of any further litigation and controversies, which will be
consistent with Defendant's prior arrangements and agreement with his Grandmother,
and in furtherance of the arrangements with Defendant's Father, Vernon K. Smith Jr., as
Defendant agreed to restore the premises, make substantial improvements, modify the
landscape and continue with the many alterations and improvements that Vernon K.
Smith Jr. began that were needed to upgrade the premises, as the past tenants had been
very hard on the interior and exterior of the residence, requiring thousands of dollars to
be invested by Vernon K. Smith Jr. to repair the premises in years past. That when
Victoria H. Smith was alive, back in 2006, it was decided to eliminate that cycle of
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renovation, and bring Defendant into the facility as a permanent residence for him and his
children, and his value added would be his continuing contribution to the perpetual
residency of the facility.
That Vernon K. Smith Jr. has financed the remodel project, committing years to
the process of restoration, accomplished with Defendant furnishing much labor and
dedicated effort to achieve the planned restoration endeavor. That Vernon K. Smith Jr.
replaced the heating and air conditioning components, all appliances, cabinetry and
countertops in the kitchen, and the remodeled bathrooms, and all construction materials
used throughout the construction, with Defendant securing various components to replace
doors and windows, hardware and accessories associated with their installation, and
performed those installations at his expense, who then worked for Viewpoint Windows
and Doors and had that professional experience.
The agreement with Defendant's Grandmother was no rental payments, as
Defendant's contribution was coming through product acquisitions, installations, and
services he continued to perform in the maintenance, protection, and preservation of the
premises, to the present day, and that arrangement has continued with Defendant's
Father.
15. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 thereof, Defendant
denies same, as Defendant has the consent and approval of the 2/3rds vested owner.
16. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 16 thereof, Defendant
denies same, as Plaintiff is not the vested owner of the real property and premises, and
Defendant has never had any contract or agreement with this Plaintiff.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in in CLAIMS FOR RELIEF,
entitled "COUNT ONE: EJECTMENT", Defendant does respond to those allegations as
follows:
17. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 17 thereof, Defendant
does re-allege his responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1
through 16 of Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, as though said responses are set forth and
re-alleged in full herein.
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18. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 18 thereof, Defendant
denies the same, for the reason stated previously hereinabove in this responsive pleading.
19. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 19 thereof, Defendant
admits the same, for the reason stated previously hereinabove in this responsive pleading.
20. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 20 thereof, Defendant
admits he has declined to surrender possession of the premises, for the reasons stated
previously hereinabove in this responsive pleading.
21. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 21 thereof, Defendant
denies same, for the reasons stated previously hereinabove in this responsive pleading.
NINTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in CLAIMS FOR RELIEF,
entitled "COUNT TWO: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT/QUIET TITLE", Defendant
does respond to those allegations as follows:
22. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 22 thereof, Defendant
does re-allege his responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1
through 21 of Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, as though said responses are set forth and
re-alleged in full herein.
23. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 23 thereof, it remains
Defendant's belief that assertions made as to the contents of any statutory enactments
raise questions of law, as opposed to allegations of fact; that Defendant will not interpret
statutory compilations enacted by the Idaho legislature, or conclude in what manner a
plaintiff may bring an action before the court, as in this case by a PR, seeking the same
right as that of a decedent prior to death, when vesture of decedent's property interests
immediately vest in the heirs upon death, not into any "estate", or PR of any estate; that
the court will determine what authority is derived from the alleged statute, I. C. §6-401;
that Defendant does rely upon I. C. §15-3-101, which statute and case law confirms
Plaintiff has no ownership interest in the real property and premises, as a matter of law,
and that Plaintiff lacks the legal standing upon which to assert any "adverse claim"
against this Defendant, when the PR has no ownership interest to the title of the real
property and premises, notwithstanding said "Order"; that the PR is bound by his
fiduciary duty to embrace and protect the interests of the heirs; and must respect the
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interests and objectives of the 2/3rds vested ownership in the premises, and a PR's
"administration" cannot conflict with or impair the vested interests of the vested owner( s)
of the premises.
24. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 24 thereof, it remains
Defendant's belief that any assertions made as to the contents of any statutory enactments
raise questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendant will not interpret statutory
compilations enacted by the Idaho legislature regarding questions of construction or
validity arising under any "instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise", or to
obtain any declaration of "rights, status, or other legal relations", or to conclude in what
manner a plaintiff may bring an action, as in this case by a PR, on behalf of an estate,
seeking the same right as that of a decedent prior to death, when the vesture of the
decedent's property interests immediately vest in the heirs upon death, not in any "estate"
or any PR of any estate; that the court will determine what authority is to be derived from
said statute, I. C. §10-1202, relative to the facts of this controversy; that Defendant relies
upon I. C. §15-3-101, confirming Plaintiff has no ownership interest in the real property
and premises, as a matter oflaw, and that Plaintiff has no legal standing upon which to
assert any "adverse claim" against this Defendant, when the PR has no ownership interest
to the title of the real property and premises, notwithstanding said "Order"; that the PR is
bound by his fiduciary duty to embrace and protect the interests of the heirs; to respect
the interests and objectives of the 2/3rds vested ownership in the premises, and a PR's
"administration" cannot conflict with or impair the vested interests of the vested owner( s)
of the premises.
25. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 25 thereof, Defendant
does reiterate his belief that assertions made as to the contents of any statutory
enactments raise questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendant will not
interpret statutory compilations enacted by the Idaho legislature relating to the
interpretation of statutory compilations enacted by the Idaho legislature addressing a
determination or declaration ofrights, status, and other legal relations", or to conclude in
what manner any statute may vest authority within a plaintiff to bring an action on behalf
of an estate, with the same effect as that of a decedent prior to death, when the vesture of
the decedent's property ownership interests immediately vests in the heirs upon death,

ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT

P. 13
Page 37

not into any "estate" or the PR of any estate; that Defendant would rely upon the court to
determine what authority is to be derived from the statutes, I. C. §§ 10-1201, 10-1202, 101203, 10-1204, and 10-1205, relative to the facts of this controversy; that Plaintiff does
not have any standing to claim the right to control property possession in the absence of
an ownership interest in the premises, as a matter of law, as relied upon by Defendant
pursuant to I. C. § 15-3-101; that there exists no standing in this Plaintiff to give rise to
assert an "adverse claim" against this Defendant, as Plaintiff has no ownership interest in
the title of this real property and premises, as addressed in the Uniform Probate Code,
and Plaintiff, as the PR, is bound by his fiduciary duty to the heirs, and is to respect the
interests and objectives of the vested owners of the premises, and his "administration"
cannot conflict with or impair the vested interests of the vested owner(s) of the premises.
26. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 thereof, Defendant
does again reiterate his belief that assertions made as to the contents of any statutory
enactments raise questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendant will not
interpret statutory compilations enacted by the Idaho legislature regarding any relief, as
addressed in I. C. § 10-1208, or to otherwise conclude in what manner any statute may
vest authority within a plaintiff to bring an action on behalf of an estate, with the same
effect as that of a decedent prior to death, when the vesture of the decedent's property
ownership interests has immediately vested in the heirs upon death, not into any "estate"
or the PR of any estate; that Defendant would rely upon the court to determine what relief
is to be derived from said statute, I. C. § 10-1208, relative to the facts of this controversy;
that Plaintiff does not have any standing to claim the right to control property possession
in the absence of an ownership interest in the premises, as a matter of law, as relied upon
by Defendant pursuant to I. C. § 15-3-101 ; that there exists no standing in this Plaintiff to
give rise to assert an "adverse claim" against this Defendant, as Plaintiff has no
ownership interest in the title of this real property and premises, as addressed in the
Uniform Probate Code, and Plaintiff, as the PR, is bound by his fiduciary duty to the
heirs, and is to respect the interests and objectives of the vested owners of the premises,
and his "administration" cannot conflict with or impair the vested interests of the vested
owner(s) of the premises.
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27. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 27 thereof, Defendant
would state that Defendant did, and still does, possess the premises in question, with the
permission, consent and approval of the heir holding 2/3rds vested ownership interest in
the premises; that Plaintiffs beliefs appear to be contrary to the statutory authority
regarding such ownership rights; that Plaintiffs beliefs are contrary to his fiduciary duty
owed to that heir, and to any extent Plaintiff is asserting that Defendant is claiming an
ownership interest in real property is erroneous, as Defendant is not claiming any
ownership interest in the premises, but rather exercising the right to possession as
extended to him by the 2/3rds premises owner, to protect and preserve the property
throughout this on-going and contentious administration of the estate, froth with a series
of what has been the PR' s misrepresentations, malicious falsehoods, malicious
accusations, bogus and baseless claims, and violations of the fiduciary duty owed to an
heir.
28. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 28 thereof, Defendant
would state Plaintiff has no standing to seek any declaration that Defendant has no right
to occupy or possess the premises, which claim, had it even existed, would be the subject
of an unlawful possession/detainer action under I. C. §6-303, not a quiet title action or
trespass as being alleged in the Verified Complaint.
TENTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in CLAIMS FOR RELIEF,
entitled "COUNT THREE: TRESPASS", Defendant does respond to those allegations as
follows:
29. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 29 thereof, Defendant
does re-allege his responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1
through 28 of Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, as though said responses are set forth and
re-alleged in full herein.
30. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 30 thereof, Defendant
denies same, for the reasons set forth above in Defendant's responses.
31. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 31 thereof, Defendant
would state that a second Notice was sent to Defendant by the PR, the second time being
in January, 2019, from which no action was taken; that Defendant again concluded that
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the PR' s non-action was due to their awareness of the ownership issue, and that
Defendant was in possession of the property with the consent and approval of the vested
owner holding 2/3rds of the ownership interest, all of which remained to be the reasons
concerning the continued protection and preservation of the premises by Defendant; that
Defendant is not and has never been a trespasser on the premises, and has not, nor does
he presently "unlawfully" occupy the premises; that any allegation inconsistent with
Defendant's response is herewith denied.
32. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 32 thereof, Defendant
would state he has continued to preserve and protect the premises as requested by the
2/3rds vested owner of the premises; that Defendant has remained in possession for the
benefit of the 2/3rds owner, with the consent and approval of the vested owner holding
2/3rds of the ownership interest, as there is the continuous concern for the need to
maintain, protect and preserve the premises; that Defendant has never been a trespasser
on the premises, and has never unlawfully occupied the premises; that any allegation
inconsistent with Defendant's response is herewith denied.
33. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 33 thereof, Defendant
denies same; that to the contrary, past actions of the PR has been seen to be detrimental to
the property interests of the 2/3rds vested owner of these assets.
34. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 34 thereof, Defendant
would state the continued presence and possession by Defendant will enhance the
preservation and maintenance of the premises, and better serves the ownership interests,
as determined by the 2/3rds vested owner thereof; that it has been a discovered fact the
PR has been utilizing various rents and lease payments from other property interests for
financing unnecessary, improper, baseless, and wasteful administrative activities, wasting
the estate cash reserves on needless administration expenses, legal fees, baseless civil
actions and malicious accusations, seeking to curry the favor of the magistrate to the
detriment of the 2/3rds owner's best interests, that such wasteful actions has not served
the interests of either heir, and there has been no benefit or protection to the assets, but
rather the wasteful consumption and destruction of the assets, and this Plaintiff has not
endeavored to serve the best interests of the 2/3rds vested owner of these assets, and in
this particular property asset, would defeat the asset value by needless exposure of the
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premises to unnecessary and costly wear and tear by a disinterested tenant that such
destructive effects are currently being avoided; that Defendant would deny any damages
exist from his continuous occupancy under his agreement with the 2/3rds owner of the
residence, and Defendant's improvements made pursuant to his agreement and that with
that titled owner has been the continuing consideration paid by Defendant for his
occupancy of the premises; that Defendant has no obligation to Plaintiff, and no
obligation to pay Plaintiff any rent under the agreement he has, and to claim trespass and
to seek to evict Defendant would constitute a breach of the agreement upon which
Defendant expended substantial finances and effort, which agreement he did reasonably
and in good faith rely upon over the years of his arrangement.
35. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 35 thereof, Defendant
denies same.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in CLAIMS FOR RELIEF,
entitled "COUNT FOUR: UNJUST ENRICHMENT", Defendant does respond to those
allegations as follows:
36. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 36 thereof, Defendant
does re-allege his responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1
through 35 of Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, as though said responses are set forth and
re-alleged in full herein.
37. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 37 thereof, Defendant
denies same; that Defendant's possession serves to benefit the owner( s) of the premises,
protecting and preserving the premises, in accordance with the continuation of the of the
longstanding agreement and relationship with his Grandmother, Victoria H. Smith, now
deceased as of September 11, 2013, and with his Father, Vernon K. Smith Jr., who is the
2/3rds titled and vested owner of the premises, as statutorily declared, and serving the
best interests of the property preservation.
38. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 38 thereof, Defendant
denies same, for the reasons as set forth above and as are further identified in the
affirmative defense set forth below.
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39. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 thereof, Defendant
denies same, for the reasons as set forth above and as are identified in the affirmative
defense set forth below.
40. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 40 thereof, Defendant
denies same.
TWELFTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in the Category entitled
"ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS", Defendant does respond to those allegations as
follows:
41. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 41 thereof, Defendant
denies same; that Plaintiffs Complaint is both unnecessary and wasteful, seeking to defeat
the best interests that serve to protect and preserve the premises, which efforts serve to
maintain and preserve the value of the premises, avoiding what will otherwise be further
expense to replace appliances and restore and repair the premises after a disinterested
third party tenant commits unwanted wear and tear to the premises, as took place before
Defendant's occupancy and possession commenced in 2006; that Defendant is entitled to
recover all costs and expenses that will be incurred in defending this frivolous action,
which action is being pursued maliciously and vindictively against both Defendant and
his Father, in contradiction of the wishes and desires of the 2/3rds vested owner thereof,
whose sole objective has been to keep and maintain the improvements in the manner and
fashion that has been undertaken for the past 14 years.
42. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 42 thereof, Defendant
denies same.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
As a further defense, herein asserted as an Affirmative Defense, this Defendant
does allege and state as follows:
That Plaintiff has filed and served this Verified Complaint setting forth four
malicious causes of action upon Defendant, well knowing Defendant has been in
possession of the property continuously for in excess of 14 years; that Plaintiff previously
served a "three Day Notice" upon Defendant around Octo her 21, 201 7, seeking to
maliciously evict Defendant from the property; that Plaintiff then tried to sell the property
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to Defendant, having no ownership interest to convey., as by statute, the title was vested
in the heirs, as proclaimed in the Uniform Probate Code; that no further action was taken
and Defendant remained in possession as authorized by the 2/3rds vested owner, being
Defendant's Father, Vernon K. Smith Jr.; that this current action is similarly baseless, as
Defendant is in possession with the consent and approval of the 2/3rds vested owner,
having no agreement to pay "rent" to this Plaintiff, as Defendant's arrangements has
always been to make the improvements and installations to secure the restoration of the
premises, and Defendant has faithfully performed in accordance with his agreement.
That Defendant has been in continuous possession of this property since 2006,
which began under the agreement with Defendant's Grandmother, and with his Father,
Vernon K. Smith Jr.; that Defendant is entitled to the continued occupancy because of his
prior arrangements and agreements, and good faith reliance upon his continuing
performance to restore the premises, make substantial improvements, modify the
landscape and continue with the many alterations and improvements needed to upgrade
the facility, requiring thousands of dollars of Defendant's funds to repair the facility and
maintain it in its present state of repair.
That in 2006, Defendant's Grandmother decided to eliminate that cycle of
renovation, then falling upon her son, Vernon K. Smith Jr., to make the expensive
renovations and repairs, and at that time the decision was made to bring Defendant, her
grandson, into the facility as a permanent residence for him and his children, and his
value added would be his continuing contribution to the perpetual residency of the
facility, to then be managed by Vernon K. Smith Jr ..
That with that arrangement, Defendant and his Father financed the remodel
project, taking years of restoration, accomplished during weekends and evenings with
Defendant furnishing much labor and dedicated effort to accomplish what had been
discussed would be achieved in this planned restoration endeavor.
That in addition to that long term restoration project throughout the premises,
Defendant caused to be purchased all of the many furnishings and Defendant's Father
replaced heating and air conditioning components, all appliances, cabinetry and
countertops in the kitchen, and the remodeled bathrooms, and all construction materials
used throughout the construction, with Defendant replacing the doors and windows,
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hardware and accessones associated with their installation, and performed those
installations at Defendant's continuing expense.
That the agreement has always been Defendant would not pay any "rent", as his
contribution was through his product acquisitions and services he continued to perform;
that Plaintiff purported to come into title to this premises under the Order referenced as
an Exhibit to their Verified Complaint, which Order is not consistent with the statute or
the case law, and challenged that Order to be in violation of the law, as the heirs are the
vested owners, not this Plaintiff, as set forth and identified above; from which this
Plaintiff does not have the legal standing to engage any dispute, over the occupancy,
possession, or ownership of the property in any due process judicial proceeding.
That should Plaintiff undertake to remove Defendant from the continued
occupancy and possession of the premises, this Defendant will be severally damaged, and
Plaintiff will personally be subject to a resulting and significant claim for any such
damages, requiring Defendant to remove his salvageable contributions made to the
residence, and seek his resulting damages stemming from the willful breach of this
continuing arrangement that was reached and relied upon by this Defendant, with his
Grandmother and Father, who now is a 2/3rds vested owner of the premises.
That Defendant, at the request of the owner of the appliances, Vernon K. Smith
Jr., will thereupon remove all appliances installed throughout the residence, including
the heating and air conditioning system, water heater, kitchen appliances (range,
dishwasher, refrigerator, freezer, etc.), and any other removable items brought to the
agreement reached years ago between the Defendant, his Grandmother, and his Father.
All repairs, remodeling, alterations, and improvements have been the product of
what Defendant accomplished throughout the passing years, and would be a step
backwards for this arrangement to be scuttled and the fallout and consequential effects
from this deliberate and unnecessary breach sought by Plaintiff, lacking standing.
Wherefore, Defendant, having answered Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, hereby
prays for entry of judgment as follows:
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1. That Plaintiffs actions be dismissed with prejudice and Defendant recover his costs
attorney fees and preserves his claims for any losses that may come to accrue from these
baseless actions;
2. That Defendant shall be allowed to continue his occupancy and possession of the
premises, as consented to, approved and requested by the 2/3rds vested owner, for which
Defendant has continuously performed his agreement as established over 14 years ago;
3. That should this matter proceed to trial, a jury trial is requested to be scheduled to
address these factual disputes.
4. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper in the
premises.
Dated this 3rd day of July, 2019.
_Isl Vernon K. Smith, Jr.Isl_ _
Vernon K. Smith Jr.
Attorney for Defendant,
Vernon K. Smith III

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 3rd day of July 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the
following addresses as follows:

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley LLP
alexmclaughlin@givenspursley.com
kad@givenspursley.com
_/sf Vernon K. Smith, Jr.Isl __
Vernon K. Smith
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Electronically Filed
10/9/2019 10:55 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0I-19-10367

MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION
TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER
I.R.C.P. 54(B)

Plaintiff,
vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly appointed
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and hereby moves this Court for partial judgment on the pleadings and a Rule 54(b)
certificate on the judgment. This motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(c) and I.R.C.P. 54(b).
This motion is made on the grounds and reasons set forth in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b),

MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - 1
14844158.3
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which is incorporated herein as though restated in full. This motion is based on the records and
files herein. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 9th day of October, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of October, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
[ ]
[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman
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Electronically Filed
10/9/2019 10:55 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0I-19-10367

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION
TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER
I.R.C.P. 54(B)

vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.
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COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly appointed
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The controversy presently before the Court boils down to a single issue: whether
Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen ("Hillen"), as Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith
(the "Estate"), owns the Estate property Defendant Vernon K. Smith III ("Defendant") currently
possesses. Hillen does and his ownership is evidenced by that certain judgment-affirmed by the
Supreme Court-that the Honorable Cheri C. Copsey ("Probate Court") entered in the probate of
the late Victoria H. Smith's Estate ("Estate Case").
Defendant-but mostly his attorney Vernon K. Smith, Jr. ("Vernon"), who is a
party to the Estate Case and a 2/3 's heir 1-attempts to collaterally attack the Probate Court's
judgment and findings that the duly appointed personal representative of the Estate owns all right,
title, and interest to Estate property. Defendant's assertions are legally unsound. Because Hillen
exercises the same power over the property in question (the "Raymond St. Property"), and because
Defendant remains in possession of the Raymond St. Property, despite Hillen's demand that he
vacate, Hillen is entitled to a judgment ejecting Defendant from the Raymond St. Property. Hillen
respectfully asks that this Court grant Hillen's motion and enter a 54(b) certificate.

1

Which, based on counsel's arguments, appears to be fairly problematic as Vernon regularly asserts in his
briefing defenses he personally has to this action-not defenses his client has.
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II.

BACKGROUND

Victoria H. Smith ("Victoria"), Vernon's mother, owned the Raymond St. Property
prior to her death in 2013. The parties agree on this point. Answer to Verified Complaint for
Ejectment and Other Relief (filed July 3, 2019) ("Answer") at 2, "THIRD DEFENSE"
(acknowledging that the Raymond St. Property was owned by Victoria prior to her death).
Victoria died on September 11, 2013. The procedural posture of her Estate is
complex and is subject to extensive litigation. 2 One of the less complex matters in the Estate Case,
however, is the Probate Court's determination that Hillen, as the personal representative, is vested
with all right, title, and interest to all of Victoria's real and personal property. That determination
is memorialized in that certain Judgment on Motion Under Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, Vesting All Real and Personal Property of the Estate in the Personal Representative
(the "Rule 70 Judgment"), entered in In re Estate of Victoria H Smith, Case No. CV-IE-201415352, in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the state of Idaho, in and for the
county of Ada (June 2, 2017). A true and correct copy of the Rule 70 Judgment is attached hereto
as Exhibit A. 3
The Rule 70 Judgment states, in relevant part:
The Court does hereby vest in the Personal Representative as of May
5, 2017, any and all real property of any kind or nature, including
but not limited to: any fixtures, appurtenances, additions, easements,
licenses, water rights, or similar rights of any kind or nature
appurtenant thereto; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring,
rents or profits of or from any real property (collectively 'Real
Property'), including but not limited to the [Raymond St. Property]

2

See e.g. In re Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,432 P.3d 6, (2018).

3

Plaintiff asks this Court to take judicial notice of the Rule 70 Judgment, pursuant to I.RE. 201 (d). The
document is a public document on file in the Estate Case and recorded with the Ada County recorder's office.
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... Such vesting is free and clear of any lien, claim, or interest of
[Vernon]."
Rule 70 Judgment.
The pleadings establish that Defendant is in possession of the Raymond St.
Property, and has been since 2006. Complaint at 3, ,-r 11; Answer at 9, ,-r 10. It is similarly clear
that Defendant intends to remain in possession of the Raymond St. Property. Complaint at 3, ,-r 13,
Ex. B; Answer at 10, ,-r 13 ("Defendant would state that a Notice [Exh. B to the Complaint] was
sent to Defendant by [Plaintiff]"); 18, ,-r 27 ("Defendant is ... exercising the right to possession as
extended to him by the 2/3rds premises owner[, Vernon] .... ").
Therefore, the sole disputed issue before the Court is the effect the Rule 70
Judgment has on the ownership of the Raymond St. Property. This is a purely legal question and
the answer is clear: Hillen is the sole lawful owner.

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court considers whether a judgment on the pleadings is warranted under the
same standard as a ruling on summary judgment. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 4 71, 4 74, 163 P .3d
1183, 1186 (2007). When only matters within the pleadings themselves are presented, this Court
cannot look to matters outside the pleadings. Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep 't ofAdmin., 159
Idaho 813, 367 P.3d 208, 219 (2016) (expressing a "preference for interpreting the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the same language in the
federal rules" and applying that preference to Rule 12(c)).
When there are "no disputed issues of material fact, only a question of law remains,
and [the] Court exercises free review." Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 371, 48 P.3d
1256, 1260 (2002). "A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the
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allegations in the pleadings as true, [a] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Lyon v.
Chase Bank USA, NA., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dunlap v. Credit Prat. Ass'n,
L.P., 419 F.3d 1011, 1012 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2005)).

IV.

ARGUMENT

This memorandum is divided into two sections. Section A discusses the substance
of Hillen's ejectment claim, which is Count One of the Complaint. Section B addresses Hillen's
request for a 54(b) certificate in the event the Court grant's this motion and enters a partial
judgment in Hillen's favor.
A.

Plaintiff is Entitled to a Judgment ofEjectment Removing Defendant from the
Raymond St. Property.

"An action for ejectment requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) possession by the
defendants, and (3) refusal of the defendants to surrender possession." PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp.
v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 63 7, 200 P .3d 1180, 1186 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). All

three elements are established by the pleadings.
1.

Hillen is the Owner of the Raymond St. Property.

The Rule 70 Judgment is unambiguous. It vests all right, title, and interest in the
Raymond St. Property to Hillen. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Rule 70 Judgment
following Vernon's appeal. In re Estate ofSmith, 164 Idaho at 482,432 P.3d at 31. Vernon asserts
the Rule 70 Judgment has no effect because it somehow conflicts with his "vested" ownership
right in the Raymond St. Property as a 2/3 heir of the Estate. Vernon claims his partial interest in
the Raymond St. Property became "vested" pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-3-101 upon
Victoria's death.
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This argument lacks merit. First, Section 15-3-101 does not mention permanently
vesting interests nor pre-emption of future orders or judgments. Second, the Rule 70 Judgment
expressly states that Hillen's ownership of the Raymond St. Property "is free and clear of any lien,
claim or interest of the Claimants [which includes Vernon.]" The Rule 70 Judgment was, fittingly,
entered pursuant to Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That provision allows courts
to "enter a judgment divesting any party's title and vesting it in others." I.R.C.P. 70(b). Therefore,
any interest Vernon once had in the premises was divested by the Rule 70 Judgment and vested in
Hillen, the current owner.
Further, Idaho Code Section 15-3-711 expressly provides that Hillen "has the same
power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have," which includes
the power to eject a party therefrom. Hillen, therefore, has the power to eject Defendant from the
Raymond St. Property.

2.

The Parties Agree that Defendant is in Possession of the Raymond St.
Property.

There is no dispute that this element is met. Hillen asserts-and Defendant
admits-that Defendant is in possession of the Raymond St. Property. Complaint at 3,

,r

11;

Answer at 2, "Third Defense."

3.

The Parties Agree that Defendant Refuses to Surrender Possession of
the Raymond St. Property.

There is likewise no dispute that the third and final element of ejectment is met. It
is clear that Defendant intends to remain in possession of the Raymond St. Property despite
demand to vacate by Hillen. Complaint at 3,

,r 13, Ex. B; Answer at 10, ,r 13 ("Defendant would

state that a Notice [Exh. B to the Complaint] was sent to Defendant by [Plaintiff]"); 18,

,r 27

("Defendant is ... exercising the right to possession as extended to him by the 2/3rds premises
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owner[, Vernon] .... "). Accordingly, because all three elements of ejectment are met without any
issue of fact, Hillen is entitled to a judgment of ejectment removing Defendant from the premises.

4.

Having Established Entitlement to Ejectment of Defendant, Hillen
Requests a Writ of Assistance.

A writ of assistance is the typical remedy in an ejectment action, and Hillen is
entitled to one here. "A writ of assistance is a form of process issued by a court of equity to transfer
the possession of property, and more specifically lands, the title or right to which it has previously
adjudicated.... " Eagle Rock Corp. v. Idamont Hotel Co., 60 Idaho 639, 95 P.2d 838, 841 (1939).
Therefore, in addition to a judgment ejecting Defendant from the Raymond St. Property, Hillen
respectfully requests a writ of assistance transferring possession of the Raymond St. Property from
Defendant to Hillen.

B.

Any Judgment on the Ejectment (Count One) Should be Certified as Final
Under Rule 54(b ).
Rule 54(b) provides that a partial judgment may be certified as final when "an

action presents more than one claim for relief' and the court finds "there is no just reason for
delay." Whether or not to certify a partial judgment as final is within the sound discretion of this
Court. PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631,636,200 P.3d 1180, 1185 (2009). In

Perreira, the district court certified as final a partial judgment restoring possession of real property
to the plaintiff. Id. at 634, 200 P.3d at 1183. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the district court's
decision to certify as final a partial judgment granting the plaintiff possession of real property at
issue. Id., 146 Idaho at 636, 200 P.3d at 1185.
The same result is warranted here. The Raymond St. Property represents a portion
of the Estate that Hillen is unable to sell, lease, or otherwise account for due to Defendant's
unlawful possession. See Declaration ofNoah G. Hillen in Support of Motion for Partial Judgment
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on the Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b) ("Hillen Declaration"). 4
Hillen is charged with expeditiously liquidating Estate property and distributing the proceeds to
its heirs. As long as Defendant is on the Raymond St. Property, Hillen cannot discharge his
statutory duties as the personal representative of the Estate. In light of these facts, there is no just
reason to delay decision on Defendant's ejectment. If anything, time is of the essence.
Hillen, therefore, requests that this Court rule in favor of him on Count One, certify
the corresponding judgment as final under Rule 54(b ), and immediately issue a writ restoring
possession of the Raymond St. Property to its lawful owner, Hillen.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court grant his Motion
for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings.
DATED this 9th day of October, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff

4
The Hillen Declaration is submitted solely in support of the portion of this motion addressing the propriety
of a 54(b) certificate and not the portion discussing the need for judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, the presence
of the Hillen Declaration does not result in a denial of the 12(c) motion for going outside of the pleadings. Nor does
the Court have to consider converting the motion to one for summary judgment.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of October, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER
I.R.C.P. 54(B) to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
[ ]
[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman
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Electronically Filed
10/9/2019 10:55 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-10367

Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF NOAH G. HILLEN
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P.
54(B)

vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

NOAH G. HILLEN, under penalty of perjury, hereby declares and states as
follows:
1.

I am above the age of 18 and a resident of the state of Idaho. I am the

Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Estate") in that certain probate matter
styled as In re Estate of Victoria H Smith, Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, in the District Court of

DECLARATION OF NOAH G. HILLEN IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT
14844138.1
UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - 1
Page 59

the Fourth Judicial District of the state of Idaho, in and for the county of Ada ("Probate Case").
The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey ("Probate Court") presides over the Probate Case.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts in this Declaration and make this

Declaration on the basis of such knowledge.
3.

The Estate's res comprises, in part, the real property commonly known as

and located at 2001 N. Raymond St., Boise, Idaho (the "Premises").
4.

As long as Defendant remains in possession of the Premises, I cannot collect

rent for, sell, or otherwise account for the Premises which I need to do to exercise my duty to
administer the Estate on behalf of its heirs.
5.

Defendant's possession is unlawful as he does not have any sort of leasehold

interest to any portion of the Premises. The undersigned sent a termination notice to Defendant
several months back terminating whatever tenancy Defendant may or may not have had.
6.

Defendant refuses to vacate the property. This creates a significant issue.

As the Personal Representative, I am charged with liquidating Estate property in an expeditious
manner and distributing the same to the Estate's heirs.
7.

However, Defendant's possession of the Premises effectively makes it

impossible to sell the Premises at top dollar, collect rent for use of the Premises, or otherwise
account for the Premises for obvious reasons.
8.

Accordingly, in the interest of fully administering the Estate and accounting

for its res, it is necessary to have the Defendant removed from the Premises as quickly as possible.
9.

Any delay associated with his removal prevents me from discharging my

duties in a prompt fashion since, the longer the Defendant is on the Premises, the longer it will

DECLARATION OF NOAH G. HILLEN IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT
14844138.1
UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - 2
Page 60

take me to sell, collect rent for or otherwise account for the Premises, and make distributions to
the heirs.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho that the
foregoing is tme and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
Dated this ~

th day of October, 2019.

Noah G. Hillen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of October, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DECLARATION OF NOAH G. HILLEN IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) to be served by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
[ ]
[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman
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11/5/2019 11 :27 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0I-19-10367

PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS DISCLOSURE
Plaintiff,
vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly appointed
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Plaintiff'), by and through his
undersigned counsel, Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby submits this disclosure of witnesses that
Plaintiff plans to call at the trial in the above-captioned matter. Plaintiff reserves the right to
supplement this list for rebuttal purposes, if new information is discovered, should additional
unanticipated witnesses prove necessary, or for other good cause.
1.

Noah G. Hillen. Mr. Hillen may be reached via the undersigned counsel.
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2.

Vernon K. Smith, III ("Defendant"). He may be reached through counsel,
Vernon K. Smith, Jr.

3.

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.

4.

Any and all witnesses called or identified by the Defendant.

DATED this 5th day of November, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of November, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS DISCLOSURE to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman
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Electronically Filed
11/8/2019 11 :20 AM
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Phil McGrane, Clerk of the ourt
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deput Clerk

1
2
3

4
5

VernonK. Smith
ATTORNEY ATLAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
ISB No. 1365
Tel. (208) 345-1125
Fax:(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

Attorney for Defendant
6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

8

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

9

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Case No. CV0l-19-10367

11

Plaintiff,

12

V.

13

Vernon K. Smith m., an individual,

14

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Defendant.

15

I.

16

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

17

This independent proceeding arises out of the probate of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith.

18

The probate court determined that Victoria H. Smith's 1991 Holographic Will was invalid as a

19

result of undue influence, and the transfers of her property to an LLC, which were made prior to

20

her death by the use of a power of attorney, were invalid. Those findings were upheld on appeal

21

to the Idaho Supreme Court. Matter ofEstate ofSmith, 164 Idaho 457,466,432 P.3d 6, 15

22

(2018). For purposes of returning possession of the property to the estate, the probate court

23

issued a Rule 70(b) Order, a copy of which is attached to the Plaintiff's memorandum submitted

24

on this motion.

25
26

As alleged in the pleadings in this matter, the Defendant, Vernon K. Smith m, has been a
long-time tenant of residential property located on Raymond Street in Boise, Idaho. This
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1

property had been owned by his grandmother, the late Victoria H. Smith, and is now in the

2

"possession" of her estate. Vernon K. Smith III' s status on the Raymond Street property is akin

3

to that of a tenancy at will. He vigorously opposes the Personal Representative Noah Hillen's

4

attempt to oust him from that property such action by the personal representative being attempte

5

without any supporting legal authority under either the applicable provisions of the Idaho

6

Uniform Probate Code (UPC), or by any strained construction of the effect of the probate court's

7

Rule 70(b) Order.

8
9

In the absence of any necessity arising out of the administration of the estate for the
benefit of creditors or other interested persons, I.C. § 15-3-711, the Idaho UPC states a

10

preference for the in-kind distribution of the estate to the heirs, as opposed to a liquidation of

11

estate property. I.C. § 15-3-906. Actions taken by the personal representative in excess of his

12

authority can result in a breach of fiduciary duty remediable by an award of damages, I.C. § 15-

13

3-712, and can be restrained by an order of the court, I.C. § 15-3-607.

14

It is undisputed that Victoria H. Smith had no creditors at the time of her death, and no

15

creditor claims were filed against her estate. The only remaining estate liability was the payment

16

of federal estate taxes. Recently the personal representative has tendered over four million

17

dollars in payment of federal estate taxes, for the satisfaction of that obligation, the net proceeds

18

as received by the estate from the Hamer fann sale in an amount over seven million dollars were

19

more than sufficient. There are no other known estate obligations for which any liquidation of

20

estate property is seen to be required.

21

The Defendant Vernon K. Smith III opposes the PlaintiffHillen's attempt to evict him

22

from the Raymond Street property as not being authorized by any applicable provision of the

23

Idaho UPC, and lacking any basis arising out of the Rule 70(b) Order or the Idaho Supreme

24

Court's appellate decision. Hillen was not made the "sole owner'' of the estate property by the

25

Rule 70 Order, nor does the personal representative have any right conferred under the Idaho

26
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1

UPC to proceed with the liquidation of estate property in the absence of some need for such

2

action in the interest of creditors or other persons justifiably interested in the estate.

3

n

4

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

5

This independent action seeks, in part, the ejectment of Vernon K. Smith ill from what is

6

commonly referred to as the "Raymond Street'' residence. This is the second action in which the

7

Personal Representative, Noah G. Hillen, has sought the ejectment of a person or entity from

8

estate property. The first action, Hillen v. Gibson, Fourth Dist., Ada County Case No. CV 01-

9

19-10368, requested the ejectment of a long-standing business joint venture participant, David

IO

Gibson, from the Gowen Road property, placed there in 2004 by Victoria H. Smith and her son

11

Vernon K. Smith.

12

In that first action, Judge Hippler, on October 2, 2019, granted the request for entry of

13

judgment for an ej ectment of Gibson, but did not directly rule on the underlying stated-basis for

14

that request for relief which was raised by Hillen in that action, and that has again been raised

15

within this action. Instead, Judge Hippler merely held that Hillen had adequate authority to

16

proceed with the ejectment under LC. § 15-3-711 by exercising "the same power over the title to

17

property of the estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the

18

creditors and others interested in the estate." Judge Hippler's failure to expressly reject Hillen's

19

ownership and liquidation claims, while recognizing the personal representative's authority

20

under I. C. § 15-3-711, creates an i"econcilable conflict in that decision. A motion to Amend

21

his October 2, 2019 decision is currently pending.

22

The distinctions that arise out of the statutory limitations placed upon the exercise of a

23

"power'' by a personal representative, in contrast to Hillen's claim that he is the "sole owner'' of

24

the estate property, are extremely significant in determining the power and authority that the

25

personal representative may actually exercise over estate property. If in fact Hillen is determine

26

to be the "sole owner'' of estate property, to the exclusion of the estate,s heirs, then arguably he

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS PAGE - 3
Page 68

I

is no longer subject to his trust obligation to the heirs, nor·subject to the heirs' corresponding

2

statutory authority to restrain unauthorized actions (I. C. § 15-3-607), or to seek damages for

3

breach of fiduciary duty (I.C. § 15-3-712). If Hillen is deemed to be the "sole owner'' of the

4

estate property, then the heirs' trust interest has been extinguished, and they would no longer

5

have the required standing to either seek restraint against the personal representative, or to seek

6

damages for breach of fiduciary duty, inasmuch as those statutory obligations have been

7

eliminated by court order. Thus, this court must exercise caution in considering the relief sought

8

by the Personal Representative, as the heirs must preserve their right and claims to assert the

9

fiduciary breaches that have occurred in these proceedings.

10

The personal representative, Noah G. Hillen, has in this action again directly placed at

11

issue the same two questions that he raised in the previous action before Judge Hippler, which

12

were not fully addressed or decided in that earlier proceeding: (1) "[W]hether Plaintiff, Noah G.

13

Hillen ('Hillen'), as Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the 'Estate'),

14

owns the Estate property Defendant Vernon K. Smith III ('Defendant') currently possesses[?]"

15

See, Supporting Memo at pg. I ( emphasis added); and (2) "I am charged with liquidating Estate

16

property in an expeditious manner and distributing the same to the Estate's heirs." See,

17

Declaration of Noah G. Hillen, pg. 2, ,r 6 (emphasis added).

18

Plaintiff Hillen' s request for relief arises out of a June 2, 2017 Rule 70(b) Order issued by

19

Judge Copsey in the probate proceeding ordering that all estate property, previously transferred

20

to VHS, LLC by the use of an exercise of a power of attorney, was to be returned to the decedent

21

ownership. The language used within Judge Copsey' s Rule 70(b) Order appeared to divest

22

Vernon K. Smith of all title and interest in that property, clearly in conflict with his title that he

23

received by operation oflawunder I.C. § 15-3-101, when declared to be an heir.

24

Hillen argues that his claims to the sole ownership of estate property, and the

25

corresponding right as sole owner to completely liquidate estate property, were confirmed by the

26

Idaho Supreme Court inMatter ofEstate ofSmith, 164 Idaho 457,466,432 P.3d 6, 15 (2018).
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I

The two primary issues raised on the appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court were: (1) Did

2

the probate court err in finding the holographic will invalid because of undue influence? and (2)

3

Did the probate court err in ruling that the power of attorney transfers were invalid? No issue

4

was raised or decided concerning the interpretation of the Rule 70(b) Order, itself.

5

In its decision, the Idaho Supreme Court, in referring to the probate court's Rule 70(b)

6

Order, declared, "In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil

7

Procedure 70(b), which vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property in the personal

8

representative who had been appointed." Matter ofEstate ofSmith, 164 Idaho 457,466, 432

9

P.3d 6, 15 (2018). It is out of this statement that the parties' dispute in this matter arises. Hillen

10

now claims that the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order was to vest him with sole ownership of the

11

estate property, not just a "power" over estate property, as conferred by the Idaho UPC in I.C. §

12

15-3-711.

13

As further argued below, it is the contention of the Defendant, Vernon K. Smith ill, that

14

the only question concerning this particular issue, which was raised and actually decided by the

15

Idaho Supreme Court, was the invalidity of the power of attorney transfers. No issue was raised

16

before, or decided by, the Idaho Supreme Court construing the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order,

17

other than it was the vehicle chosen by Judge Copsey to obtain the transfer of the late Victoria H.

18

Smith's property back to the ownership of the Decedent. Co~sequently, as applied to the

19

Defendant, Vernon K. Smith, Ill's occupation of the Raymond Street property, he argues that the

20

Personal Representative Hillen has no authority, as conferred under the Idaho UPC or by the

21

Rule 70(b) Order, that permits Hillen to oust him of his otherwise lawful occupation of that

22

property, that he has lawfully occupied and, restored, renovated and improved since 2006.

23

m.

24

LEGAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO A MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

25
26
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Ajudgment on the pleadings cannot be granted if there remain disputed issues of fact,

I

2

such that the movant is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. State v. Yzagui"e, 144

3

Idaho 471,474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007). Questions concerning whether particular actions

4

attempted by the personal representative are authorized by statute, or are permitted by an order o

5

the court, present issues of fact that cannot be resolved on m_otibn for judgment on the pleadings.

6

144 Idaho 477, 163 P.3d at 1189.

7

IV.

8

ARGUMENT

As further argued below, Hillen's request for relief in this matter is not supported by: (1)

9
IO

the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,466, 432

11

P.3d 6, 15 (2018); (2) the actual language of the Rule 70(b) Order, itself, or (3) by the applicable

12

provisions of the Idaho Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which expressly confer and limit the

13

authority of a personal representative to act in respect to estate property.

14

A.

15
16

NO QUESTION ALLEGING THAT THE RULE 70(B) ORDER CONSTITUTED
A·CO:MPLETE TRANSFER OF THE "OWNERSHIP" OF THE ESTATE
PROPERTY TO THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WAS EITHER PLACED
AT ISSUE, OR DECIDED, ON THE APPEAL .TO THE IDAHO SUPREME
COURT

17

Two issues were presented to, and decided by, the Idaho Supreme Court in Matter of
18

Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P.3d 6, 15 (2018): (1) Did the probate court err in
19

finding the 1991 Holographic Will of Victoria H. Smith invalid due to undue influence? and (2)
20

Did the probate court err in setting aside the July 4, 2012 transfers of Victoria H. Smith's
21

22
23

property to an LLC by the exercise of the power of attorney, because the power of attorney did
not authorize gifts? On both questions the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
probate court.

24
25

26
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1
2
3
4
5
6

In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 70(b), which vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property
in the personal representative who had been appointed.
Vernon appealed these decisions, and this Court granted Joseph's motion for
acceptance of appeal directly from the magistrate court pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 44. This appeal follows the parties' stipulation to bifurcate the
appeal to first address any matters occurring up to and including the post-trial
judgment under Rule 70(b) before considering any matters occurring thereafter.
The personal representative of the estate, Intervenor-Respondent Noah Hillen, is
not participating in this portion of the appeal. 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15
. (emphasis added).

7

Hillen construes the above-cited and highlighted statement as confirming and establishin

8

his status as the "sole owner" of the estate property. See, Supporting Memo at pp. 4-5. Because

9

no issue was raised or decided by the Idaho Supreme Court as to the effect of the Rule 70(b)
Order in confirming an actual ownership interest in Hillen, the Court's statement is nothing more

11

than obiter dictum. See e.g., Smith v. Angell, 122 Idaho 25, 35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1173 (1992)

12

(Bistline, J, concurring in the reversal of the judgment below and the remand for further

13

proceedings) ('"[A] remark by the way;' that is, an observation or·remark made by a judge in

14

pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application oflaw, or

15

the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the case or

16

essential to its determination; .... ").

17

In addition, long-standing Idaho authority supports the interpretation of Idaho appellate

18

decisions by differentiating between those issues that were actually raised and decided by the

19

Court, and other matters which were simply referred to in the decision. Bashore v. Adolf, 41

20

Idaho 84, 88, 238 P. 534, 534 (1925) ("'There is a pronounced line of demarcation between what

21

is said in an opinion and what is decided by it." (citation omitted, italicized emphasis added)).

22

See also, Idaho Schools For Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 586, 850

23

P.2d 724, 737 (1993) (McDevitt, C.J., concurring and dissenting); North Side Canal Co. v. Idaho

24

Farms Co., 60 Idaho 748, 758, 96 Idaho 232, 235-36 {1939); and Stark v. McLaughlin, 45 Idaho

25

112, 123, 261 P. 244, 245 (1927).

26
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This long-standing principle of interpretation as applied to Idaho appellate opinions, and

1
2

as based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Bashore v. Adolf, supra, has been most

3

recently applied by Idaho's U.S. District Court in, AMX Intern., Inc. v. Batte/le Energy Alliance,

4

744 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1091-92 (D.Idaho 2010); and Hash v. U.S., 454 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1072

5

(D.Idaho 2006) ("The Idaho Supreme Court itself has stated that its opinions "must be

6

considered and construed in the light of the rule that they are authoritative only on the facts on

7

which they are founded. General expressions must be taken in connection with the case in which

8

those expressions are used. "There is a pronounced line of demarcation between what is said in

9

an opinion and what is decided by it." (Citation omitted).' Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 238 P.

IO

534 (1925) (emphasis in original)."}.
Furthermore, Hillen' s proposed construction of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision as

11
12

confirming a conferral of actual ownership of estate property in him, is entirely inconsistent with

13

the provisions of the Idaho UPC which only confer in the personal representative right of

14

possession and a "power" over estate property. See e.g., Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

15

P. 222, 223 (1919), ("The administrator or executor is not the owner of any part of the estate.

16

He, in his official character, only holds it in trust for the parties entitled to it, subject to the

17

purposes of administration."). 1
Court judgments and decrees are subject to the same rules of interpretation that apply to

18
19

the construction of contracts. McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190 P.3d 925, 928

20

(2008). A prominent rule of contract interpretation is that contracts must be interpreted in

21

respect to the then-existing law. Path to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220,

22

1227 (2016) ("'This Court has held that "it is axiomatic that extant law is written into and made

23

part of every written contract.""' (citations omitted). This rule was expressly applied to the

24

interpretation of an appellate decision in, Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206

25

26

1

Although Lemp was decided under the 1864 Idaho Probate Code, there is no indication that this principle of law
was in any way altered by Idaho's 1971 adoption of the Uniform Probate Code.
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I

P.2d 528, 533 (1949) ("What the court said, therefore, must be taken in connection with the

2

statutes as they then existed and applied, ...."); and in, In re Anderton 's Estate, 61 Idaho 160,

3

163, 174 P.2d 212, 213 (1946) (noting that an executor must act "in strict compliance with the

4

law .... "). Therefore, the Idaho UPC, as in effect at the time of the referenced appeal in, Matter

5

of Estate of Smith, supra, is incorporated within and applies to the interpretation of the Rule

6

70(b) Order and to the interpretation of the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion on appeal.
Even if the Idaho Supreme Court's statement were not to be considered merely as obiter

7

8

dictum, the construction to be placed upon that statement, to the effect that, title to all of

9

Victoria's real and personal property was vested in the appointed personal representative, must

10

be interpreted and applied so as to be consistent with the applicable UPC statutes, which statutes

11

only confer upon a personal representative a "power" over title, with a concurrent right to obtain

12

"possession" of that property when necessary for the administration of the estate, for the benefit

13

of creditors or other interested persons. I.C. § 15-3-711.
Hillen's argument that the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order, as confirmed by the Idaho

14
15

Supreme Court, was to make him sole owner and to permit him to completely liquidate the estate

16

is without merit in reference to the actual issues that were raised and decided by the Idaho

17

Supreme Court on appeal, and therefore his arguments must be rejected, and his motion denied.

18

B.

19
20

THE PROBATE COURT'S RULE 70(B) ORDER, ITSELF, DOES NOT
SUPPORT HILLEN'S REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Even if it should be conceded that the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion did not address or

21

decide any question concerning the construction and application of the Rule 70(b) Order, the

22

language of that Order - on its face - does not support Hillen' s contentions that it conferred upo

23

him "sole ownership" of the estate property. Judge Copsey's only authority was to restore to the

24

decedent the property transferred from the decedent, Victoria H. Smith, on July 4, 2012, which

25

prior to her death had been transferred to VHS, LLC by use of a power of attorney. In issuing

26

that Rule 70(b) Order, the transfers by the Magistrate were to be made to the Plaintiff, Hillen,
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I

conditioned upon the recognition of his capacity "as personal representative of the Estate." This

2

conditional reference clearly implies that Hillen was only to take possession of the estate

3

property, and was only authorized to exercise a "power" over that property, as consistent with

4

the provisions of the Idaho UPC concerning the authority and powers of a personal

5

representative.

6

The personal representative, in his actions in the administration of the estate, is bound by

7

the limitations imposed by the Idaho UPC. The Official Comment to I.C. § 15-3-703 specificall

8

constrains a PR's acts by statutory authority in declaring that, "[A] personal representative's

9

authority is derived from appointment by the public agency known as the Court. But, the Code

IO

also makes it clear that the personal representative, in spite of the source of his authority, is to

11

proceed with the administration, settlement and distribution of the estate by use of statutory

12

powers and in accordance with statutory directions. See Sections 3-107 and 3-704 ..... " Here,

13

Hillen is attempting to act in excess of his statutorily-conferred authority by claiming that the

14

effect of the Rule 70(b) Order was to make him the sole "owner" of the estate property, and also

15

to divest the heirs of all statutorily-conferred title in the estate property. He is clearly in breach o

16

his fiduciary duty and responsibility.

17

Somewhat more problematic is the language that appears within the Rule 70(b) Order

18

concerning the divestment of the property interest of the Defendant's father, Vernon K. Smith.

19

On page 2 of that order Judge Copsey referenced the scope of this divestment as extending to

20

Vernon K. Smith's capacity, "individually," "as personal representative," "as attorney-in-fact or

21

agent or fiduciary," and "any other capacity." The use of this all-encompassing and

22

unauthorized language by Magistrate Copsey necessarily raises the question whether it was her

23

"intention" to entirely eliminate Vernon K. Smith's interest as an intestate heir of the estate as

24

established under I.C. § 15-3-101? Ifit were, then she is in breach of her ethical obligation to

25

apply the statutory limitations from where her jurisdiction and authority arise. In addition,

26
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1

another question also arises as to whether Magistrate Copsey had any authority to eliminate the

2

interest of an intestate heir under J.C. § 15-3-101, even if that was her misguided intention?
If this Court were so-inclined to accept Hillen' s proposed construction of the Rule 70(b)

3

4

Order, then it would appear that Joseph H. Smith- Vernon's brother-has become the sole

5

intestate heir of the estate.2 Neither Magistrate Copsey- or any other judge- has the authority

6

to eliminate an heir's intestate share without any specific grant of statutory authority allowing

7

such an action3 - such an outcome would be an absurd result. By analogy to the rules of contract

8

construction that are to be relied upon in the interpretation of court orders, no effect should be

9

given to a court order that would lead to such an absurd result. Schieche v. Pasco, 88 Idaho 36,

10

41, 395 P.2d 671, 673 (1964).
The question of a court acting in excess of statutorily-conferred authority has been most

11

12

prominent addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195

13

P.3d 731 (Ct.App.2008) where that Court laid out the problem as follows:

14

[C]ourts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction when they really mean

15

simply that the court committed error because the action that was taken did not comply with

16

governing law. For example, our appellate courts have referred to a lack of"jurisdiction" when

17

perhaps more precisely meaning that a motion or complaint was not timely filed, that a condition

18

precedent to the right to file the action was not satisfied, or that governing statutes or court rules

19

did not authorize the particular decision made by the court. (citations omitted) 146 Idaho at 375,

20

195 P.3d at 734 (parenthetical reference to "citations omitted," added). The Court in Armstrong

21

went on to cite the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. American Contractors

22
23

24
25

26

2

Vernon's sister, Victoria Ann Converse, assigned her 1/3 intestate share to Vernon, such that he then held
2/3 share in the intestate estate and his brother Joseph held a 1/3 interest. If Judge Copsey's Rule 70(b) Order is soconstrued, as to eliminate Vernon's intestate share in the estate, then as the sole remaining intestate heir whose
interest has been neither assigned nor eliminated by court order, Joseph would become the sole intestate heir of the
estate.
3

The "Slayer's Act," as codified at I.C. § 15-2-803, would constitute one such example of specific statutozy
authority that permits the elimination of an intestate heir's interest in an estate.
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1

Indemnity Co., 33 Cal.4th 653, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004) for the proposition that,

2

when a court acts contrary to the authority conferred by statute, it has acted in excess of its

3

jurisdiction and that action is voidable. 146 Idaho at 376, 195 P.3d at 735.
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d 979, 982

4

5

n.3 (2011) acknowledged the Idaho Court of Appeal's decision in Armstrong, as differentiating

6

between the concepts of a court's jurisdiction and its authority, without either adopting or

7

rejecting that formulation of Idaho law made by the Idaho Court of Appeals. 4 The Idaho Court o

8

Appeals has continued to authoritatively cite and rely upon its Armstrong decision subsequent to

9

the Idaho Supreme Court's comment on Armstrong as made in the 2011 Hartwig decision. See

IO

e.g., State v. Vaughn, 156 Idaho 13, 15, 319 P.3d 497, 499 (Ct.App.2014) and State v. Steelsmith,

11

154 Idaho 577, 580 n.2, 288 P.3d 132, 135 n.2 (Ct.App.2012).
In summary, Magistrate Copsey best not have intended the Rule 70(b) Order to have the

12

13

effect that Hillen advocates, nor does it appear that she had any authority to enter an order to that

14

effect, even if that was her misguided intention. Consequently, Hillen's request for relief in this

15

action, as based upon a construction of the Rule 70(b) Order that permits him unrestrained action

16

as the "sole owner" of the estate property, and to proceed with the entire liquidation of estate

17

property, must be rejected.

18

c.

19

THERE ARE NO GROUNDS, WITHIN THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF
THE IDAHO UPC, WIDCH SUPPORT HILLEN'S REQUEST FOR RELIEF IN
THIS ACTION

20

By setting aside for a moment both the alleged effect of the Idaho Supreme Court's

21

decision and the alleged effect of the Rule 70(b) Order, the question remains as to whether

22

Hillen, as the estate's personal representative, has any statutory authority within the Idaho UPC

23

to assert his alleged status as "sole owner" of the estate's property, and to then proceed to

24
25
4

26

Until superseded by a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, as issued upon the same question, opinions of
the Idaho Court of Appeals are binding precedent upon all lower Idaho Courts. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,
986-87, 842 P.2d 660, 665-66 (1992).
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1

liquidate estate property unimpeded by any limitations concerning such liquidations as stated

2

within the Idaho UPC?

3

Under the applicable provisions of the Idaho UPC a personal representative has the

4

authority to possess and control the property of the estate and to commence actions concerning

5

the administration of the estate, but nowhere within the UPC is the personal representative

6

authorized to take actual title to estate property to the exclusion of the estate's heirs. I.C. § 15-3-

7

709, ("[E]very personal representative has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the

8

decedent's property ... He may maintain an action to recover possession of property or to

9

determine title thereto."); and I.C. § 15-3-704 ("[H]e may invoke the jurisdiction of the court, in

10

proceedings authorized by this code, to resolve questions concerning the estate or its

11

administration.").

12

Under§ 15-3-101 of Idaho's UPC, "Estates descend at death to successors identified by

13

any probated will, or to heirs if no will is probated, subject to rights which may be implemented

14

through administration." See, "Official Comment" LC. § 15-3-101, subsection (I), final

15

sentence (underlined emphasis added); and Hintz v. Black, 125 Idaho 655, 659, 873 P.2d 909,

16

913 (Ct.App.1994) ("[T]he assets were subject to recoupment by the personal representative, if

17

required in order to satisfy estate liabilities. LC.§ 15-3-709."). Therefore, absent any need

18

arising out of the administration of the estate- especially the interests of creditors, of which

19

there are none in this proceeding-the property of the estate passes at the death of the decedent

20

to devisees and heirs, as a matter of law, under LC. § 15-3-101.

21

For example, if an estate consisted of two parcels of real; property-Parcel A & Parcel B

22

-which passed by operation of law to the heirs by virtue ofl.C. § 15-3-101, the personal

23

representative is authorized by I.C. §§ 15-3-711 and 15-3-709 to divest the heirs of their

24

presumptive title to Parcel B if that parcel has been determined to be subject to a mortgage that

25

came due at the time of the decedent's death. Under the above-cited authority, the personal

26

representative has a "power" to transfer the title to Parcel B for the benefit of a creditor. In the
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I

exercise of this power it is not necessary for the personal representative to actually "own" Parcel

2

B, instead he has been conferred a "power'' under the code to transfer the title to that property for

3

the benefit of the creditor.

4

Section 15-3-101 is repetitively referenced within the chapter 3 provisions of the Idaho

5

UPC which address the powers of the personal representative. See, "Official Comment" § 15-3-

6

709 ("Section 3-101 provides for the devolution of title on death. Section 3-711 defines the

7

status of the personal representative with reference to 'title' and 'power' in a way that should

8

make it unnecessary to discuss the 'title' to decedent's assets which his personal representative

9

acquires."); "Official Comment" § 15-3-901 ("Title to a decedent's property passes to his heirs
and devisees at the time of his death. See Section 3-101. This section adds little to Section 3-

11

101 except to indicate how successors may establish record title in the absence of

12

administration.''); "Official Comment" § 15-3-906 ("This section establishes a preference for

13

distribution in kind. It directs a personal representative to make distribution in kind whenever

14

feasible and to convert assets to cash only where there is a special reason for doing so. It

15

provides a reasonable means for determining value of assets distributed in kind. It is implicit in

16

Sections 3-101, 3-901 and this section that each residuary beneficiary's basic right is to his

17

proportionate share of each asset constituting the residue.").

18

Although § 15-3-101 is not specifically referenced by name in I.C. § 15-3-711, the

19

"Official Comment" to that section clearly states the intended relationship between the

20

ownership interests of the heirs and the trust responsibilities of the PR:

21

22
23
24
25

The personal representative is given the broadest possible "power over
title." He receives a "power," rather than title, because the power concept eases
the succession of assets which are not possessed by the personal representative.
Thus, if the power is unexercised prior to its termination, its lapse clears the title
of devisees and heirs. Purchasers from devisees or heirs who are "distributees,,
may be protected also by Section 3-910. The power over title of an absolute
owner is conceived to embrace all possible transactions which might result in a
conveyance or encumbrance of assets, or in a change of rights of possession. The
relationship of the personal representative to the estate is that of a trustee. Hence,

26
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1
2

3

personal creditors or successors of a personal representative cannot avail
themselves of his title to any greater extent than is true generally of creditors and
successors of trustees. Interested persons who are apprehensive of possible
misuse of power by a personal representative may secure themselves by use of the
devices implicit in the several sections of Parts 1 and 3 of this Article. See
especially Sections 3-501, 3-605, 3-607 and 3-611. Official Comment to I.C. §
15-3-711.

4

5

In summary, even if Judge Copsey had been so inclined to confer "sole ownership" of the

6

estate property upon Hillen, there is no statutory authority that authorizes such action. Such an

7

act would be in excess of the authority of the court under the Idaho Court of Appeal's Armstrong

8

decision. A full and thorough examination of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision on appeal

9

demonstrates that no such question was presented to that Court, and that it did not decide that

10

question. Hillen' s request for the entry of a judgment on the pleadings is not supported by

11

existing Idaho law, the Rule 70(b) Order, or by the appellate decision of the Idaho Supreme

12

Court. Therefore, Hillen' s request for the entry of a judgment on the pleadings to evict the

13

Defendant, Vernon K. Smith, ill, must be denied.

14

v.

15

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR RELIEF

16

The Plaintiff Hillen' s motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied.

17

The stated basis Hillen requested relief, claiming that he is the sole owner of the Estate's

18

property and therefore entitled to entirely liquidate the Estate's property is not supported by the

19

decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Matter ofEstate ofSmith, 164 Idaho 457,466,432 P.3d

20

6, 15 (2018), nor by the terms of the probate court's actual Rule 70(b) Order. In addition, even i

21

this Court should disregard Hillen,s stated basis for his requested relief and rely only upon the

22

applicable provisions of the Idaho UPC, Hillen has not supported his request with any evidence

23

of any necessity to administer the Estate for the benefit of any creditors or other persons

24

interested in the Estate. In the absence of any valid grounds in support of his motion, Hillen has

25

no right to gratuitously seek the eviction of the Defendant, Vernon K. Smith III. Therefore,

26

Hillen's motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied.
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VI.

1

CONCLE~

2

/

3

5

Dated this 7th day of November, 2019.

6

Vernon K. Smith Jr.
Attorney for Defendant
Vernon K. Smith III

7
8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
9

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 7th day of November, 2019, I caused a tru
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at th following
11

addresses:
12
13
14

15
16

Randall A. Peterman
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
601 West Bannock Street ·
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com

17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25

26
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH,

Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352
JUDGMENT ON MOTION UNDER
RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING
ALL REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

Deceased.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

I.

Personal Property

The Court does hereby vest in Noah Hillen, as the personal representative of the
Estate ("Personal Representative"), as of May 5, 2017, any and all personal property of any kind
or nature, whether choate or inchoate, whether tangible or intangible; any and all rights or
interests in cash or cash equivalents; any and all rights in any insurance policies; any and all
rights in any executory contracts, including but not limited to leases of any kind or nature, or any

security agreements which constitute a disguised·lease under Idaho law; any rights and powers of

\

Victoria H. Smith under any personal property; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring,
rents or profits of or from any personal property ("Personal Property'').

_j
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Such vesting is free and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the following parties
("Claimants"):

I. Vemon K. Smith, Jr. individually;
2. Vernon K. Smith, Jr., in his capacity as the personal representative of the
Estates;
3. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. in his capacity as an attorney-in-fact or agent or
fiduciary for Victoria H. Smith;
4. Vernon K. Smith, Jr., in any other capacity;
5. Victoria L. Smith, in her personal and any other capacity;
6. VHS Properties, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
7. Riverside Farms, Inc., an Idaho corporation;
8. S & S Trust, LLC, in Idaho limited liability company; and
9. Any entity controlled by any of the individuals or entities identified above (the
foregoing shall hereinafter be collectively referenced as the "Claimants").

II.

Real Property
The Court does hereby vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5, 2017, any
and all real property of any kind or nature, including but not limited to: any fixtures,
appurtenances, additions, easements, licenses, water rights, or similar rights of any kind or nature
appurtenant thereto; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits..,of or from any
real property (collectively ~'Real Property''), including but not limited to the following:

A.

Jefferson County Property.
(i)
That certain Real Property A, commonly referenced as the Jefferson
County Property, and more specifically identified on Exhibit A.

B.

Ada County Property.
(i)

That certain Real Property B, commonly referenced as the Ada County,
and more specifically identified on Exhibit B.
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Such vesting is free and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the Claimants.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017.
The Honorable~. Copsey

District Judge
Signed: 6/2/2017 10:48 AM
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EXHIBIT "A" P.3

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 612/2017 02:38 PM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _day of June, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT ON MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF
THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE to be served by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
RANDALL A. PETERMAN
ALEXANDERP.MCLAUG HLIN
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special
Administrator

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email / iCourt:
rap@givenspursley.coms

VERNON K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Personal Representative ofEstate of Vernon K.
Smith, Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson

[ ] U.S. Mail

RORY JONES and ERICA JUDD

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 331-1529
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt: 1jones@idalaw.com;
ejudd@idalaw.com

JONES, GLEDHILL, F'uRMAN P.A.

225 North 9th Street, #820
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorneys for Vernon K. Smith, Jr.

[ ] Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt: vls59@live.com

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 345-9564
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt: aellis@aellislaw.com

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
12639 West Explorer Drive
Boise, Idaho 83713
Attorneys for Joseph H. Smith

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524-4131
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email / iCourt:
rons@swaffordlaw.com

Ronald L. Swafford
Swafford Law, PC
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Attorneys for Sharon Bergmann

JUDGMENT ON MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
13102216.4
REPRESENTATIVE - 4

EXHIBIT "A" P.4
Page 85

Courtesy copy provided to:

Victoria Anne Converse
10548 NW Skyline Blvd.
Portland OR 97231

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

ROBERT MAYNES

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 524-6095
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Maynes Taggart, PLLC
P.O. Box 3005
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403
Attorneys for Walker Land & Livestock, LLC
Darrell G. Early
Office of the Attorney General
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Attorneys for State ofIdaho Department of
Environmental Quality

JUDGMENT ON MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
13102216.4
REPRESENTATIVE - 5

EXHIBIT "A" P.5
Page 86

EXHIBIT A
Legal Description - Jefferson County Property
Parcel 1
Lots 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 in Block 5, Village and Townsite of Hamer, including and
joining vacated streets and alleys by Ordinance No. 5, Jefferson County, Idaho.
Parcel2
Township 7 North, Range 36 East of the Boise Meridian, Jefferson County, Idaho.
Section 2: All
Section 11: All
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EXHIBITB
Legal Description - Ada County Property
Parcel 1 (Commonly known as: 1902 W Main St, Boise, ID 83702)
Lot 6 in Block 29 of Failview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 2 (Commonly known as: 1900 W Main St, Boise. ID 83702)
Lot 7 in Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 3 (Commonly known as: 110 N. 22nd St, Boise, ID 83702)
Lot 5 in Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 4 (Commonly known as: 1807 W Idaho St, Boise, ID 83702)
The Northwesterly 32 feet of Lot 11 in Block 23 of McCarty's Second Addition to Boise City, Ada
County, State of Idaho, according to the
official plat thereof recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Ada County, State of Idaho.
Parcel 5 (Commonly known as: 2001 N Raymond St, Boise, ID 83704}
Lot 6 except the South 50 feet in Block 2 of A Resubdivision of Lot 21, and a portion of Lots 6, 7
and 22, Oradell Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof, filed In Book 25, records of Ada
County, Idaho.
Parcel 6 (Commonly known as: 0 S Pleasant Valley Rd. Boise. ID 83705: 6259 S Pleasant Valley
Rd, Boise, ID 83705: 0 S Cole Rd, Boise, ID 83709)
Unit I:
The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 32, Township 3 North, Range 2 East of
the Boise Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho.
Unit II:
Parcel A
The West half of the Northwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise
Meridian. Also shown of record as Lot 4 and the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of
Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East, of the Boise Meridian ..
Parcel B
The East half of the Northwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise
Meridian.
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Parcel C
The Southwest quarter of Section 51 Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise Meridian.
Unit Ill:
The East half of the Northeast quarter of Section 7, and the West half of the Northwest quarter of
Section 8 all in Township 2 North of Range 2 East of Boise Meridian in Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 7 (Commonly known as: 5933 N. Branstetter, Garden City, ID 83714: W. Chinden Blvd.,
Garden City, ID 83714: 9907 W. Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714)
Unit I:

Real property situated in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, consisting of 132 acres, more or less
to wit: Commencing at a point North 36°21' West distant 2.88 chains from the center of Section 26,
Township 4 North, Range 1 East, B.M., the real place of beginning, running thence South 73°15'
East a distance of 1.40 chains to a point; thence North 18°48' East a distance of 64.53 chains to a
point; thence North 60°42' West a distance of 2. 75 chains to a point; thence South 68°00' West a
distance of 9.50 chains to a point; thence North 75° 00' West a distance of 12.00 chains to a point;
thence North 49°00' West a distance of 3.90 chains to a point; thence South 64°30' West a
distance of 3.70 chains tp a point; thence South 72°00' West a distance of 8.50 chains to a point;
thence North 81 °00' West a distance of 3.83 chains to a point; thence South 0°05' West a distance
of 14.92 chains to a point; thence North 80°30' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence
South 48°15' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence South 80°30' East a distance of 3.15
chains to a point; thence South 61 °00' East a distance of 1.00 chains to a point; thence South
23°30' East a distance of 2.10 chains to a point; thence South 1000' West a 'distance of 3.60
chains to a point; thence South 26°00' West a distance of 1.80 chains to a point; thence South
27°00' East a distance of 3.70 chains to a point; thence South 1°45' East a distance of 1.50 chains
to a point; thence South 38°30' East a distance of 1.20 chains to a point; thence South 40°45' West
a distance of 2.80 chains to a point; thence South 3°45' West a distance of 4.30 chains to a point;
thence South 34°15' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence South 67°00' East a distance
of 1.40 chains to a point; thence South 49°15' East a distance of 2.50 chains to a point; thence
South 22°30' East a distance of 2.95 chains to a point; thence South 52°00' East a distance of 2.50
chains to a point; thence South 64°00' East a distance of 2.60 chains to a point; thence North
84°45' East a distance of 1.32 chains to a point; thence South 00°03' West a distance of 14.89
chains to the place of beginning; together with all water, ditch and lateral rights appurtenant
hereto or used in connection therewith, including 132 shares in the Thurman Mill Ditch Co, LTD.,
and as said acreage is further identified in that Bargain and Sale Deed, dated December 20, 1954,
and recorded in the Records of the Ada County Recorder's Office, located in Book 440 at Page
104, copies of which are attached hereto, and incorporated herein; and
Unit II:
Reai property situated in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, consisting of 44 acres, more or less,
to wit:
Commencing at a point 2 chains 88 links North 36°21' West from the Wash Boulder set in the
center of Section Twenty-six in Township Four North of Range One East of the Boise Meridian;
thence North variation 18°48' East 18 chains and 70 links to a Slough; thence North and Westerly
following the left and South Bank of the said Slough to the East boundary of Lot Nine in Section
Twenty-three in Township and Range aforesaid; thence South following East Boundary of said Lot
Nine, 7 chains and 75 links to Southeast comer of said Lot Nine; thence S~uth f.ollowlng the East
boundary of the West Half of the Northwest Quarter of said Section Twenty-six, 25 chains and 40
links to top of Bluff; thence South and Easterly following the edge of the Bluff to a point 2 chains
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and 88 links North 35°21' West from the Wash Boulder set in the center of said Section Twentysix, said point being the place of beginning. Together with all Certificates of Shares, including
Certificate No. 114 for 44 shares of the capital stock in the Thurman Mill Ditch Company, Ltd, and
as said acreage is further identified in that Warranty Deed dated March 18, 1958, and recorded in
the Records of the Ada County Recorder's Office as Instrument No. 805407, copies of which are
attached hereto and incorporated herein; and said parcels of real properties further identified in
the Tax Parcel Identification Numbers for further reference as set forth as:

{1)

Legal Description: Parcel #0995 in Flood District S2 of Sec 23 & N2 of Sec 26
4N 1E #0990-B
Tax Parcel Number: S0526120995
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St1Garden City, ID 83714

(2)

Legal Description: Parcel #4432 of SE4 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244430-S
Tax Parcel Number: S0526244432
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St, Garden City, ID 83714

(3)

Legal Description: Parcel #4434 of NE4 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244430-8
Tax Parcel Number: S0526244434
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St1 Garden City, ID 83714

(4)

Legal Description: Parcel #2580 in Flood District Secs 23 & 26 4N 1E
Tax Parcel Number: S0526212580
Property Address: W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714

(5)

Legal Description: Parcel #3600@ NW Corner SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N
1E #244660-8
Tax Parcel Number: S0526243600
Property Add~ess: W Chinden Blvd., Garden City1 ID 83714

(6)

Legal Description: Parcel #3700 Por N2 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244660-B
Tax Parcel Number: S0526243700
Property Address: W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714

(7)

Legal_Description: Parcel #4265 NR CTR SE4 NW4 Section 26
4N 1E #244255-8
Tax Parcel Number: S0526244265
Property Address: 9907 W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH nJDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH,

ORDER ON MOTION UNDER RULE
70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE

Deceased.

THIS MATTER came before the Court upon the Motion for Relief under Rule
70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("Motion"), filed by Noah Hillen as Special
Administrator ("Special Administrator") on March 30, 2017. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. filed an
Objection ("Objection,,) to the Motion on April 6, 2017.

No other objection was filed.

A hearing regarding the Motion and Objection occurred on May 5, 2017, at which time the Court
considered the arguments of the parties, then granted the Motion.
The Court granted the Motion on May 5, 2017, rmder the authority granted it
under Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Noah Hillen, as Personal Representative
is of the Estate ("PR" or "Personal Representative") is hereby granted the right and authority to

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO.RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
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execute or have notarized any and all documents necessary to carry out the purpose of this Order,

and to take any actions as necessary to carry out the purpose of this Order.
On May 25, 2017, Noah Hillen's appointment as a Special Administrator was
terminated, and Mr. Hillen was appointed as the Personal Representative of the Estate. As a
result, this Order conveys the prope1ties to Mr. Hillen in his status as a Personal Representative
rather than a Special Administrator.
Accordingly, Judgment will be entered, pursuant to Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017.

The Honorabl~. Copsey
District Judge
Signed: 6/2/201710:27 AM

f.
\...._
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 6/2J2017 02:49 PM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _day of June, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE
ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
RANDALL A. PETERMAN
ALEXANDERP.MCLAUGHLIN
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special
Administrator

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email / iCourt:
rap@givenspursley.coms

VERNON K. SMITH, JR.

[ ] U.S. Mail

Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Personal Representative ofEstate of Vernon K
Smith, Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

RORY JONES and ERICA JUDD
JONES, GLEDHILL, F'uRMAN P.A.
225 North 9th Street, #820
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorneys for Vernon K. Smith, Jr.

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 331-1529
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt: rjones@idalaw.com;
ejudd@idalaw.com

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
12639 West Explorer Drive
Boise, Idaho 83713
Attorneys for Joseph H. Smith

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Ronald L. Swafford
Swafford Law, PC
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Attorneys for Sharon Bergmann

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524-4131
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email / iCourt:
rons@swaffordlaw.com

[
[
[
[

Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email / iCourt: v1s59@live.com

]
]
]
]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: aellis@aellislaw.com
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Courtesy copy provided to:

Victoria Anne Converse
10548 NW Skyline Blvd.
Portland OR 97231

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery

ROBERT MAYNES

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524-6095

Maynes Taggart, PLLC
P.O. Box 3005
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403
Attorneys for Walker Land & Livestock, LLC

Darrell G. Early
Office of the Attorney General

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 373-0481

1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Attorneys for State ofIdaho Department of
Environmental Quality

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delive1·y
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Electronically Filed
11/27/201911:11 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Caterina Moritz Gutierrez, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
14914115_ 1.docx [0 13683-0002]
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-10367

Plaintiff,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
AND MOTION TO CERTIFY
JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B)

vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B)
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite Defendant's 1 attempt to complicate the facts, this case remams a
straightforward dispute and the issue before the Court is a narrow one: whether Hillen, as Personal
Representative of the Estate, has a sufficient ownership interest in the Estate's real property to
eject Defendant therefrom. He does based on, among other things, Judge Copsey's Rule 70
Judgment the Supreme Court previously upheld. Because the pleadings establish all three
ejectment elements, Hillen is entitled to a judgment ejecting Defendant from the Raymond St.
Property. Hillen respectfully requests that the Court grant Hillen's motion.
II.

ARGUMENT

The argument section of this memorandum makes three points: (a) there is no
factual disputes that require this Court to look beyond the pleadings; (b) Hillen is the legal title
holder to the Raymond St. Property, pursuant to the Rule 70 Judgment; and (c) Hillen has the
power and authority to eject Defendant from the Raymond St. Property, pursuant to the Uniform
Probate Code ("U.P.C."). Each point is discussed in tum.
As discussed by Defendant, a similar case was recently before the Honorable Judge
Steven Hippler of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho (Ada County Case No. CV0l19-10368). That case involved another ejectment action brought by Hillen against an occupier of
Estate-owned property who was represented by Vernon. Judge Hippler carefully analyzed similar
arguments to those raised by Defendant here, and concluded that the Rule 70 Judgment vested
Hillen with sufficient interest to maintain an ejectment action against occupiers of Estate Property.
Amended Memorandum and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the

1

Capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the same meaning as in prior briefing.
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Pleadings, CV0l-19-10368 (filed October 3, 2019), at 4-7. For the Court's convenience, a copy of
Judge Rippler's decision is attached hereto as Exhibit A should the Court find it instructive.
A.

There are no factual issues in this case and Hillen is entitled to an action for
ejectment as a matter of law.

Defendant raises no factual issues in his Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Partial Judgment on the Pleadings ("Opposition Memorandum") and this Court need look no
further than the pleadings to decide as a matter oflaw that Hillen is entitled to a judgment ejecting
Defendant from the Raymond St. Property.
All the Court needs to determine Hillen's motion is whether the three elements of
ejectment-ownership by Hillen, possession by Defendant, and refusal by Defendant to surrender
possession-are present from the pleadings. Defendant concedes the second and third elements,
leaving only ownership to be decided by the Court, which Hillen will discuss in the next section
of this brief. The point to be made, however, is that the assertions Defendant makes are irrelevant
to the task before the Court-which is to determine whether Hillen owns the Raymond St. Property
and may eject Defendant.
B.

The Rule 70 Judgment Establishes Hillen as the Lawful Owner of the
Raymond St. Property.

The pleadings are more than sufficient to establish Hillen's ownership interest in
the Raymond St. Property. The Rule 70 Judgment states, in no uncertain terms: "The Court does
hereby vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5, 201 7, any and all real property of any kind
or nature ... including but not limited to [the Raymond St. Property.]"
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Rule 70 Judgment in Matter of
Estate ofSmith, 164 Idaho 457,463,432 P.3d 6, 12 (2018). The opening paragraph of Smith states

that V emon appealed from decisions of the magistrate court "and a corresponding judgment
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entered pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b) [the Rule 70 Judgment]. We affirm the
decisions of the magistrate court." Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 463, 432 P.3d 6, 12
(2018). Given the ruling in Smith, Hillen undisputedly owns the Raymond St. Property and can
assert all powers associated with such ownership.
Of course, Defendant claims the decision in Smith is dicta. His argument lacks
merit. First, Hillen does not need Smith to establish ownership. The bottom line is that Hillen holds
a Rule 70 Judgment vesting title in the Raymond St. Property to Hillen. As stated in 4 7 Am.Jur.2d
Judgments§ 754, "A judgment of a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter

is presumptively binding until set aside in a manner prescribed by law." Defendant has done
nothing to set aside the Rule 70 Judgment. Accordingly, it is valid and binding.
Second, the comments in Smith are not dicta. As noted by Defendant, the Court
recognized that the Rule 70 Judgment vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property in
Hillen. Smith, 164 Idaho at 466,432 P.3d at 15. The Court then addressed "any matters occurring
up to and including the post-trial judgment under Rule 70(b )[. ]" Id. (emphasis added). After

considering any matters up to and including the veracity of the Rule 70 Judgment, the Supreme
Court concluded that "the decisions of the magistrate court are affirmed." Id. at 482, 432 P.3d at
31. This is not dicta. It is a direct and clear ruling from the highest court in the state.
C.

Hillen Has the Power to Eject Defendant From the Raymond St. Property.

Defendant argues that, by attempting to exercise the statutorily granted power over
Estate property (in this case the Raymond St. Property) that an absolute owner would have, Hillen
has somehow acted in excess of his authority. Opposition Memorandum at 10. This, Defendant
argues, means that Hillen is not entitled to a judgment for ejectment. Opposition Memorandum at
15. Defendant's arguments are incorrect.
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON
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First, Defendant's arguments conflict with Idaho statute. The U.P.C. states that
personal representatives-such as Hillen-have "the same power over the title to property of the
estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and
others interested in the estate." LC. § 15-3-711. An absolute owner of the Raymond St. Property
would have a sufficient interest to eject an unwelcome party therefrom. The plain language of the
U.P.C. vests Hillen with that same power. Accordingly, Hillen has the authority to bring this
ejectment action against Defendant.
Second, Defendant's claim is illogical and runs counter to the U.P.C. Section 15-3101, for example, expressly provides that rights of heirs-like Vemon-"are subject to the
restrictions and limitations" of the U.P.C. That same Uniform Probate Code caused Hillen to be
lawfully appointed the Personal Representative and the Probate Court to vest in him all of the
Estate's real property, including the Raymond St. Property.
Third, Defendant's contention that an estate's personal representative only has
power to transfer estate property for the benefit of a creditor (Opposition Memorandum at 13-14)
is contrary to the plain language of Idaho Code Section 15-3-711. Defendant cites to the foregoing
provision (and section 13-3-906) for the proposition that there is some sort of preference for an inkind distribution to an estate's heirs. That is irrelevant to the question of whether Hillen has a
sufficient ownership interest to meet the elements of ejectment-because Hillen has the same
power as would an absolute owner, he does. The comments to Section 15-3-711 make it clear that
the power conferred on Hillen is "the broadest possible 'power over title."' The comments go on
to note that the power is "conceived to embrace all possible transactions which might result in a
conveyance or encumbrance of assets, or in a change ofpossession." (emphasis added). If Hillen
is entitled to effectuate a change of possession with respect to Estate property, it is unclear how
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Hillen could ever lack the authority to remove an individual from Estate property that is unlawfully
possessing the same. That is what Hillen is doing here.
In short, whatever other effect the valid and unchallenged Rule 70 Judgment has, it
clearly and unambiguously conferred upon Hillen the power to eject Defendant from the Raymond
St. Property. Defendant's repeated references to alleged breaches of fiduciary duties or the needs
to liquidate estate property have no bearing on the analysis presently before the Court: Whether
the three elements of ejectment are met. All three elements are established as a matter of law here.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court grant his Motion
for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings.
DATED this 27th day of November, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Jack W. Relf
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day ofNovember, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY
JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Jack W Relf
Jack W. Relf
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-10367
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER BY JUDGE HIPPLER

Plaintiff,
vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on December 6, 2019, the Honorable Steven
Hippler entered a Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment and Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees in Hillen v. Gibson, Case No. CV0l-19-10368,
Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, County of Ada.

A true and correct copy of the

Memorandum Decision and Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER BY JUDGE HIPPLER - 1
Page 122

14928965.1

DATED this 11th day of December, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of December, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER BY JUDGE HIPPLER to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman
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VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
V.

VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

)
)
Case No. CV0l-19-10367
)
) SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
) OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL
) JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
)
)
)
)

I.
STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS
On the scheduled date for hearing the pending motion in this matter, December 3, 2019,
the court granted Defendant's counsel additional time to respond further to the matter pending
before the court, allowing counsel the opportunity to submit further documentation by December
17, 2019.
Though granted that opportunity, it was then disclosed by Plaintiffs counsel during that
proceeding, that Hillen' s counsel represented clear to the court that Hillen' s motion was intended
to be limited to the initial pleadings of the Parties, and that Plaintiff was therefore relying only
upon the content of the complaint and the responsive pleading, giving no basis to expand the matter
beyond the procedural issue to allow any further filings to be presented in the nature of a summary
proceeding, and the question was then limited to whether Hillen was entitled to a Judgment upon
the Pleadings, wherein he asserts he is the "owner" of the Decedent's assets, not entitled to take
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possession as a trustee under the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) as the allegations
are currently framed, or whether, in fact and as a matter oflaw, Hillen is not entitled to a judgment
on the pleadings, based upon his claim to ownership, all of which is framed by the allegations
within the complaint and the responsive pleading.
Therefore, based upon the representations of Plaintiffs counsel, the matter currently
pending before the court is to be determined as strictly a procedural matter as to the allegations set
forth in the pleadings, applying the law as it pertains to motions for judgments on the pleadings,
and will not be expanded into a summary judgment proceeding, instead limited to the law as it
pertains to the rules governing a motion based solely upon the pleadings, and whether Plaintiff has
alleged a legal and any factual basis for the relief he seeks to dispossess this Defendant upon the
allegation that Hillen is the absolute and sole owner of Decedent's property, now held in the Estate
of Victoria H. Smith.

IL

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This independent proceeding arises out of the probate of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith.
The probate court determined that Victoria H. Smith's 1991 Holographic Will was invalid as a
result of alleged undue influence, and the transfers of her property to an LLC, which were made
prior to death by the use of a power of attorney, were deemed to be invalid. Those findings were
upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court. Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P .3d
6, 15 (2018). For purposes of returning possession of the property to the Decedent, who by then
had become deceased and was to be processed through an estate, the magistrate issued a Rule 70(b)
Order, a copy of which is attached to the Plaintiffs memorandum that was submitted in support
of their Motion for Judgment upon the Pleadings.
As alleged in the pleadings in this matter, the Defendant, Vernon K. Smith III, has remained
a long-term tenant of residential property located on Raymond Street in Boise, Idaho.

This

property was owned by Defendant's grandmother, the late Victoria H. Smith, and identified as an
asset of the estate. Defendant's father, and his attorney, Vernon K. Smith, is the 2/3rds heir of the
Decedent, and by Idaho law, becomes a vested and titled owner of Decedent's assets immediately
upon death, and neither the estate or any personal representative is allowed to become an owner
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of such assets, but through the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, has certain powers relative
to the issue of possession of certain estate assets, but only upon certain circumstances wherein the
personal representative must establish a necessity to exercise the statutory power to obtain
possession, solely for the benefit and satisfaction of creditors or other interested persons; otherwise
the assets are to be distributed to the heirs or devisees as an in-kind distribution, to every extent
possible. Vernon K. Smith, being a 2/3rds heir of the Decedent, would take 2/3rds of the assets, as
the probate is currently structured, and this particular parcel of property, Raymond St. property,
will be distributed to Defendant's father. Therefore, Defendant vigorously opposes the Personal
Representative (hereafter Hillen) exercising any attempt, falsely claiming to be the "owner of the
Decedent's assets, to oust Defendant from that property that his father will receive, and such action
by Hillen is being attempted without any supporting legal authority under either the applicable
provisions of the Idaho Uniform Probate Code (UPC), or by any strained construction of the effect
of the probate court's Rule 70(b) Order, as further addressed below.
In the absence of any necessity arising out of the administration of the estate for the benefit
of creditors or other interested persons, LC. § 15-3-711, the Idaho UPC states the well-established
preference that there shall be an in-kind distribution of the assets to the heirs, as opposed to a
liquidation of any estate property. LC. § 15-3-906. Any actions taken by a personal representative
(Hillen) in excess of his statutory authority can (and will) result in a breach of his fiduciary duty,
which is remediable by an award of damages, LC.§ 15-3-712, and can be restrained by an order of
the court, LC. §15-3-607, which this Defendant does seek to be entered by this court.
It is undisputed that the Decedent, Victoria H. Smith, had no creditors at the time of her

death, as Defendant's father assisted his Mother throughout her long lifespan (she was 50 days
short of her 100th birthday) and acting as her son, agent and attorney, satisfied all liabilities that
were owed by either his Mother or her deceased husband, Vernon K. Smith Sr..
No creditor claims were filed against her estate, as none existed. The only remaining estate
liability was the payment of federal estate taxes, which were purportedly filed and paid by Hillen,
as he tendered over four million dollars in payment of federal estate taxes, for the satisfaction of
that obligation, the net proceeds as received by the estate from the Hamer farm sale in an amount
over seven million dollars were more than sufficient. There are no other known estate obligations
for which any liquidation of estate property is seen to be required.
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The Defendant has opposed Hillen's attempt to evict him from the Raymond Street
property as not being authorized by any if the applicable provisions of the UPC, acting outside the
existing case law, and lacking any necessity for creditor satisfaction and no enforceable basis
arising out of the Rule 70(b) Order or the Idaho Supreme Court's appellate decision as addressed
once again in further detail hereinafter. Hillen's motion for a judgment upon the pleadings, being
limited to the allegations within the complaint and the responsive pleadings, as Hillen's counsel
made clear they are not proceeding upon any factual basis beyond the initial pleadings filed in this
matter, and for such reasons, Hillen's motion must be denied.
Idaho law is clear that Hillen could not be made the "sole owner" of the Decedent's
property by any Rule 70 Order, as a personal representative cannot hold ownership of a decedent's
assets, as a matter of law, as confirmed by Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223
(1919), as that case, and still the authority in Idaho as being consistent with the UPC, has declared
that "The administrator or executor is not the owner of any part of the estate. That if it were to
be perceived Magistrate Copsey had the intention to eliminate Vernon K. Smith's (Defendant's
father) interest as an heir of the estate established under the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), that
would violate the authority of I.C. § 15-3-101, and Magistrate Copsey would face a serious Judicial
Cannon of Ethics violation, as no authority exists to eliminate the interest of an intestate heir who
has derived his vested and title ownership interest under I.C. § 15-3-101. Magistrate Copsey would
not seek to intentionally commit such a willful and intentional violation of the Idaho Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Judicial Cannon of Ethics.
A personal representative has no right conferred under the Idaho UPC to proceed with the
liquidation of estate property in the absence of some need for such action that is to be justified in
the interest of creditors or other persons justifiably interested in the estate.

III.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This independent action seeks, in part, the ejectment of the Defendant, Vernon K. Smith
III, from what is commonly referred to as the "Raymond Street" residence. This is the second
action in which Hillen, has sought the ejectment of a person or entity from estate property, and
there is a third action now pending. The first action will soon be made the subject of an appeal,

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS-PAGE 4

Page 133

being that proceeding pending before the Honorable Steven Hippler, which is identified herein as
the first action, Hillen v. Gibson, Fourth Dist., Ada County Case No. CV 01-19-10368, wherein
Hillen requested the ejectment of a long-standing business joint venture participant, David R.
Gibson, from the Gowen Field property, who came into possession in 2004 by Victoria H. Smith
and her son Vernon K. Smith.
In that first action, Judge Hippler, on October 2, 2019, granted the request for entry of
judgment for an ejectment of Gibson, and has since denied Gibson's motion to reconsider and alter
or amend the judgment entered in that matter. Judge Hippler did not directly rule on the underlying
stated-basis within Hillens' s pleadings, for that request for relief which was raised by Hillen in
that action, perceived to be a procedural error pertaining to judgments on pleadings. Instead, Judge
Hippler has held that Hillen had adequate authority to proceed with the ejectment under I.C. §153-711 by exercising "the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner
would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate."
Judge Hippler failed to expressly reject Hillen's ownership and liquidation claims, while
recognizing a personal representative's authority under I.C. § 15-3-711, creates an irreconcilable

conflict in that decision. The motion to amend his October 2, 2019 decision has now been denied
and is in the process of filing the notice of appeal.
The distinctions that arise out of the statutory limitations placed upon the exercise of a
"power" by a personal representative, in contrast to Hillen's claim he is the "sole owner" of
Decedent's property, are extremely significant in determining the power and authority a personal
representative may actually exercise over estate property. If Hillen were to be determined to be
the "sole owner" of Decedent's property, to the exclusion of the estate's heirs, then arguably he is
no longer subject to his trust obligation to the heirs, nor subject to the heirs' corresponding
statutory authority to restrain unauthorized actions (I.C. § 15-3-607), or to seek damages for breach
of fiduciary duty (I.C. § 15-3-712). If Hillen is deemed to be the "sole owner" of Decedent's
property, then the heirs' trust interest has been extinguished, and they would no longer have the
required standing to either seek restraint against the personal representative, or to seek damages
for breach of fiduciary duty, inasmuch as those statutory obligations have been eliminated by court
order. Thus, as we before stated, this court must exercise caution in considering the relief sought
by Hillen, as heirs must preserve their right and claims to assert the fiduciary breaches occurring
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in these proceedings.
Hillen, has in this action again directly placed at issue the same two questions that he raised
in the previous action before Judge Hippler, which were not fully addressed or decided in that
earlier proceeding: (1) "[W]hether Hillen, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H.
Smith (the 'Estate'), owns Decedent's property that Defendant (Vernon K. Smith III) currently
possesses [?]" See, Supporting Memo at pg. 1 (emphasis added); and (2) "I am charged with

liquidating Estate property in an expeditious manner and distributing the same to the Estate's
heirs." See, Declaration of Hillen, pg. 2, ,r 6 (emphasis added).
Judge Hippler had entered an Amended Memorandum Decision and Order on October 3,
following his October 2 Decision, which granted Hillen's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
In that decision Judge Hippler acknowledged the basis of Hillen's request, as founded on
his asserted claim he is the "sole owner" of Decedent's property, but despite that
acknowledgement, never clearly declared Hillen was, in fact, the sole owner of Decedent's
Property as a result of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order.
In addition to the Court's statement in the single full paragraph found on page 6 of his Dec.
3 Decision, reasoned the power conferred by I. C. § 15-3-711 was adequate, on its face, to grant
Hillen's request for an order ejecting Gibson from the Gowen Field property, of which Gibson
occupied only a small portion of the 520 acres.
In the last sentence of the second full paragraph on page 5 of the Amended Decision, Judge
Hippler concluded:
So contrary to Gibson's position, the fact that the statute gives a "power" instead
of "title" does not matter-even without holding title, Hillen would still have the
power of an absolute owner over the Gowen Property, which includes determining
who can occupy it. Amended Memo. Dec., p. 5, (bold/underlined emphasis added).
Strong exception to such statement that it "does not matter" whether Hillen is determined
to be an "owner" of the property, or determined only to have a power under the UPC to "possess"
the property with such grant of "power", as the exercise of a power is limited by Hillen' s trust
obligations to heirs under the Uniform Probate Code (UPC).
This false premise Hillen has relied upon for an order, claiming "ownership" of the
property interests, is again what Hillen is relying upon in this subsequent proceeding in which the
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distinction between "ownership" and "possession" are highly significant to the determination of
the particular cause presented in the motion for judgment on the pleadings, as neither the statute
or Idaho case law support his claim of ownership.
Significant distinctions arise out of statutory limitations placed upon the exercise of a
"power" by a personal representative, as opposed to Hillen's fictitious claim he is the sole "owner"
of Decedent's property. If Hillen is declared the "sole owner", to the exclusion of any trust interest
in the heirs, he would be free to do with that property as he pleased, completely unrestricted by
any limitations imposed upon his actions under the UPC. If Hillen were the "sole owner" of the
property, to the exclusion of Decedent's heirs, he would no longer be subject to a statutory trust
obligation to heirs, or remain subject to heirs' statutory right to restrain Hillen's unauthorized
actions (LC. §15-3-607), or statutorily authorized to seek damages for Hillen's breach of fiduciary
duty (LC. §15-3-712).
Such unrestrained behavior would provide a defense for Hillen, if Hillen were deemed the
sole owner of Decedent's property, as such determination suggests the heirs' trust interest will
have been effectively extinguished, and the heirs no longer have standing to seek an order of
restraint against Hillen, or seek damages for his breach of fiduciary duty, inasmuch as those
statutory obligations may then be eliminated by any such erroneous Order from the court.
In contrast to ownership, Hillen could seek a grant to possession, in trust, for the benefit of
creditors, if there were to have been any, and in such a situation, his actions remain subject to
review under UPC provisions as cited above. 1
IV.
LEGAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO
A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

In addition, Judge Hippler' s reliance upon the "conclusive evidence" standard of I.C. § 15-3-709 is
seen to be misplaced. See, Rippler's Amended Memorandum Decision at pg. 5. That statutory conclusive evidence
standard is only intended to apply to a personal representative's claim to the "possession" of the estate property - not
to a claim to the "ownership" of estate property. Hillen's claim, both as it was addressed in the Gibson matter, and
now in this case, has been squarely based upon his erroneous claim by Hillen to "ownership" of Decedent's property,
not mere "possession." Therefore, a question arises as to whether that statute has any application to the decision of
this matter as based upon a claim of ownership instead of mere possession. In a larger sense, it is the very application
of the UPC statutes, and the remedies and restrictions they provide concerning the unauthorized actions of a personal
representative, which is at the center of Hillen's Motion and this Defendant's objection.
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The legal standard regarding the pending motion brought by Hillen for Judgment on the
pleadings has been addressed by Defendant in his Memorandum filed in opposition to Hillen's
motion previously. Based upon what Hillen's attorney has stated in open court on December 3,
2019, to your honor and Defendant's counsel, Hillen is basing his motion solely and entirely upon
the content of his complaint, nothing else, so there is no other reliance upon any factual assertion
outside any of the factual allegations contained within Hillen's Verified Complaint, so the sole
issue is therefore one of a legal question whether Hillen is, as he has alleged, the sole and vested
"Owner" of the Decedent's property, or, as a matter oflaw, that he is not, and cannot be, aa to do
so would be in contradiction of Idaho's established law, as discussed below. The only owners,
titled and vested, are the heirs or devisees of the Decedent, not any estate or personal
representative.
V.
LEGAL QUESTIONS THAT WERE RAISED ON GIBSON'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION BEFORE JUDGE HIPPLER
In the matter before Judge Hippler, being the same issue as raised in this controversy, the
Defendant in that action, David R. Gibson, filed a motion to reconsider the Amended Decision,
and a motion to also alter or amend the judgment. In that endeavor, Gibson raised the issues as
follows:
1.

Was this Court's October 3, 2019 amended decision based upon a specific finding that
Hillen is the sole owner of the Gowen Field property - and of all other Decedent's property
- as a direct consequence of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order?

2.

Alternatively, did Judge Rippler's amended decision constitute a direct repudiation and
denial of Hillen' s claim as the "sole owner" of Decedent's property as a result of the Rule
70(b) Order on the basis Hillen is declared to have the "same power" as that of an absolute
owner under I.C. § 15-3-711, as being necessary to permit Hillen to eject Gibson from the
Gowen Field property?

3.

If Hillen were deemed to be the sole owner of Decedent's property, as a consequence of
the Rule 70(b) Order, then on what basis does Hillen remain subject to the statutorily-stated
trust obligations owed to Decedent's heir whose interest in the property is now allegedly
divested as result of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order?

4.

If Hillen were deemed to be the sole owner of Decedent's property as a consequence of the
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Rule 70(b) Order, then on what basis does the "divested" heir, Vernon K. Smith, retain any
standing to challenge or seek restraint of the unauthorized actions attempted by Hillen,
which unauthorized actions otherwise can be challenged under authority conferred by the
UPC?
VI.
THE ESSENTIAL ARGUMENT PRESENTED TO JUDGE HIPPLER IN GIBSON

The October 3, 2019 Amended Decision resulted in the grant to Hillen for the purpose of
terminating the Gibson possession of that small portion of the Gowen Field property. Gibson's
arguments directed addressed the respective legal rights and obligations of Hillen, as the Estate's
personal representative (PR), and Vernon K. Smith, an estate heir, with whom Gibson has a venture
arrangement since 2004. The question concerning whether Judge Hippler was correct depends
(with respect to a motion for judgment on the pleadings) whether Hillen was the actual sole owner
of the Gowen Field property, and therefore, unrestrained by any requirements of the UPC. In the
alternative, should it be determined that Hillen, as the PR, has no ownership interest in Decedent's
property, but instead holds only the right (under certain limited circumstances) to obtain
possession, in trust for the benefit of any estate creditors and in trust for the benefit of the heirs,
then Hillen' s exercise of his statutorily-conferred powers is constrained by the limitations imposed
by the UPC. Among these limitations is the required existence of an objective necessity for taking
possession of the property for the benefit of estate creditors and other interested persons (LC.
§15-3-711). In the exercise of these powers under the UPC, Hillen remains subject to restraining
orders for his actions taken in excess of his statutory authority (LC. § 15-3-607), and he personally
remains liable in money damages for breach of his fiduciary duties (LC. §15-3-712).
A.

That Judge Hippler's Decision Is Internally Inconsistent If It Both Recognizes That
Hillen Is An "Owner" Of The Estate Property As A Result Of The Entry Of The Rule
70(b) Order, And That He Also Remains Subject To The Statutory Obligations Of A
Trustee, The Existence Of Which Trust Obligations Are Not Consistent With A
Declaration Hillen Is The Sole Owner Of Decedent's Property

On its face, the only intended function that was to be served by the Rule 70(b) Order in the
magistrate court was the voidance of the transfer of Decedent's assets and the return to Decedent,
who then being deceased, went to the estate. No question was ever raised, placed at issue, or
decided concerning the matter that has now been presented to the Hippler Court (or to this court)
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that the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order was to vest "actual" ownership of Decedent's assets in the
PR (Hillen), and correspondingly to fully divest an intestate heir, Vernon K. Smith, of his interest
in the estate, (now 2/3rds) which interest arose as a matter oflaw under LC. §15-3-101. The law
of unintended consequences is implicated by Hillen's expressly-stated objective to completely
liquidate the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, as if his duties as a PR under the UPC are no different
than his duties as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, which is his professional involvement.
It appeared that Judge Hippler' s decision, though still remaining unclear regarding the

Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, was ultimately based upon that authority granted to a PR by
LC. §15-3-711 ("[A] personal representative has the same power over the title to property of the
estate that an absolute owner should have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and

other interested in the estate."). The basis for Rippler's decision on Hillen's motion was expressly
set out on p. 6 of Judge Rippler's Amended Memorandum Decision:
Gibson also argues that a personal representative's power is limited, and
can be used only "to the extent necessary for the administration of that property in
the interests of creditors and other interested persons." (Def.' s Mem. Opp 'n Pl.' s
Mot. Partial J. Pleadings 11.) It is true that a personal representative's temporary
power is held "in trust ... for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in
the estate." LC. § 15-3-711. This creates a fiduciary duty, but contrary to Gibson's
assertion, does not limit the personal representative's power to control the property.
Whether possession of property is "necessary for purposes of administration" is
left to the sole discretion of the personal representative, whose request "is
conclusive evidence, in any action against the heir ... for possession thereof, that
the possession of the property by the personal representative is necessary for
purposes of administration." LC.§ 15-3-709. In other words, as the comment notes,
an heir may be able to sue "for breach of fiduciary duty, but this possibility should
not interfere with the personal representative's administrative authority as it relates
to possession of the estate." Id. cmt. So even if Hillen might somehow violate his
fiduciary duty to Vernon by ejecting Gibson, the proper course is for Vernon to sue
Hillen for breach of fiduciary duty. But Gibson has not claimed such relief, nor
could he do so, as he is not an heir to Victoria's estate. Amended Memorandum
Decision at p. 6 (italicized/bold emphasis in original; bold/underlined emphasis
added).
Hillen's motion was predicated solely upon Hillen's claim he is the "sole owner" of
Decedent's property, not upon any statutory right to "possession" for any specified purpose.
Liquidate of the assets is not good enough to support any basis under the UPC. The Hippler court
neither expressly rejected, nor expressly adopted, the stated-ownership-basis for Hillen's request
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in the Gibson matter.
In opposing Hillen's motion, Gibson expressed strong exception to Judge Rippler's
conclusion, as highlighted in the above-quoted excerpt from his Decision, that the existence of the
statutory fiduciary duty imposed by the UPC does not limit the personal representative's power to
control estate property. Hillen has declared the intention to completely liquidate the estate, which
is in direct contravention of the express UPC standards requiring the preservation of estate

property. I.C. § 15-3-906, and in-kind distribution to the heirs. Because a PR is only granted
possession of the estate property in limited circumstances - holding only a power over the title,
but not holding the actual title itself - there is an inherent restraint imposed upon the actions of a
PR as a result of the statutorily-declared fiduciary duty owed to the estate heirs.
In Hillen's proceeding against Gibson, he did not seek confirmation of his status as a

trustee of the estate property, but instead requested a declaration, as based upon the Rule 70(b)
Order, he was declared to be the actual sole owner of the estate property. Such an outcome serves
to eliminate Hillen's statutorily-created trust relationship with the heirs, and as a consequence,
could extinguish his fiduciary duty to heirs, which cannot be allowed to occur.
The relief Hillen requested on this motion in Gibson, precisely the same as sought here and the relief that Gibson opposed and this Defendant continues to oppose - is the declaration
from Hillen that the probate court's Rule 70(b) Order, never addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court
on appeal, served to established him as the sole and absolute owner of the estate property, which
such claimed ownership interest would then serve to eliminate any trust interest retained by heirs
and protected by the PR's fiduciary duty to heirs.
Hillen' s request exceeds not only the statutory authority, not only substantially in excess
of the statutorily-granted authority over estate property provided to a PR by I.C. § 15-3-711, but
also violates the established case law in Lemp v. Lemp, cited both above and herein below, that
prohibits a PR from ownership of a decedent's property interests. Although Judge Hippler cited
I.C. § 15-3-711 as the basis upon which he relied in rendering his amended decision, it is not clear
whether Judge Hippler accepted or rejected Hillen's claim to absolute and sole ownership of
Decedent's property. Hillen's intentions were unequivocally stated on the face of his
memorandum submitted in both the Gibson case and as identified in this case. In Gibson, Judge
Hippler granted the motion for partial judgment on the Pleadings, pertaining to the ejectment
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claim, stating the basis to be:
The Rule 70 Judgment is unambiguous. It vests all right, title, and
interest in the Gowen Property to Hillen. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the
Rule 70 Judgment following Vernon's appeal. In re Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho at
482, 432 P .3d at 31. Vernon asserts that the Rule 70 Judgment has no effect because
it somehow conflicts with his "vested" ownership right in the Gowen Property as a
2/3 heir of the Estate. Defendant (through Vernon) claims Vernon's partial interest
in the Gowen Property became "vested" pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-3-101
upon her death.
This argument lacks merit. First, Section 15-3-101 does not mention
permanently vesting interests nor pre-emption of future orders or judgments.
Second, the Rule 70 Judgment expressly states that Hillen's ownership of the
Gowen Property "is free and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the Claimants
[which includes Vernon.]" The Rule 70 Judgment was, fittingly, entered pursuant
to Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That provision allows courts
to "enter a judgment divesting any party's title and vesting it in others." LR.C.P.
70(b ). Therefore, any interest Vernon once had in the premises was divested
by the Rule 70 Judgment and vested in Hillen, the current sole owner.
Memorandum in Support of Partial Judgment, at pp 4-5 (bold/underlined emphasis
added; bracketed/ parenthetical references in original).
There is a huge difference if this Court has granted Hillen' s request by declaring him, by
virtue of the Rule 70(b) Order, to be the sole actual owner of the estate property, to the exclusion
of Vernon (and by extension, to the other heir, Joseph), whose interests as heirs under LC. §15-3101 allegedly have been entirely divested as a result of the entry of that Rule 70(b) Order. 2 As
would be contemplated in the law, Hillen's "power" exercised in trust under LC. § 15-3-711 only
permits him to divest the heirs' title, as acquired by operation oflaw under LC. §15-3-101, when
such divestment has been determined to be necessary to satisfy estate claims.
With all due respect to the conclusions reached by Judge Hippler, under LC. §15-3-101,
title to estate property passes to heirs at the time of decedent's death, as a matter of law, subject
only to a possible subsequent divestiture as may become necessary in the administration of the
estate by the exercise of the power of a PR by LC. §15-3-711 to address creditor claims. ("Estates

2

The language used on the face of the Rule 70(b) Order was only directed at the interests associated
with Vernon K. Smith. Nonetheless, if Hillen is now the sole owner of the all the estate property, there exists no other
remaining estate interest to pass to Joseph H. Smith, by operation of law under LC. §15-3-101, and consequently
Joseph's interest as an heir also has been eliminated.
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descend at death to successors identified by any probated will, or to heirs if no will is probated,
subject to rights which may be implemented through administration." Official Comment I.C. §
15-3-101, 11).
By Idaho law, the heirs obtain and retain title, subject only to divestment of their title by
the PR's exercise of the§ 15-3-711 power, limited by a required determination that such divestment
of the heir's ownership interest in estate property is necessary for the administration of the estate
for the benefit of creditors or other interested parties.

What Hillen is wrongfully attempting to accomplish by his motion for partial judgment ion
the pleadings in Gibson's case, and now in this case, is to reverse the existing statutory mandate,
and in its place, provide that title to a decedent's property vests in him (instead of the heirs),
apparently subject only to some possible re-conveyance to heirs at the end of estate administration,
apparently at his sole discretion since the UPC has no provision addressing any of this.
If Judge Hippler had declared Hillen to be the sole owner of the estate property, as Hillen

was actually seeking, and declared such in conjunction with the divestment of Vernon's entire
interest in Decedent's property, then the § 15-3-711 trust relationship would effectively be
extinguished along with the associated right of heirs to bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty
by Hillen. If Hillen is no longer required to act under the exercise of a statutorily-conferred power,
but instead declared the actual absolute and sole owner of the property, then there no longer is any
fiduciary interest to protect, and neither Vernon (nor even Joseph) would have standing to
challenge Hillen' s actions as the PR because their interest in the estate was determined
extinguished by the Rule 70(b) Order. This was never the intention of the Order, as to be such is
without statutory authority, an act beyond the magistrate's exercise of its jurisdiction, and a clear
breach of the Judicial Cannon of Ethics.
As based upon the above-cited excerpt from Judge Rippler's Amended Memorandum, it
appears Judge Hippler did not intend to eliminate Hillen' s trust relationship to the heirs, nor to
either extinguish or eliminate the right of heirs to challenge Hillen' s actions as being a breach of
his fiduciary duty that arises out of the statutorily-imposed trust relationship. But that said,
granting the motion for partial judgement on the pleadings went beyond the allegation made in the
complaint, and the judgment grants relief that is not what was alleged. Although Judge Hippler
granted Hillen's request, clearly in a manner other than what was alleged (absolute ownership of
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the decedent's assets), it appears Judge Hippler intended to do so only in reliance upon the statutory
authority of LC. § 15-3-711, and not by granting Hillen's requested relief, as based upon the Rule
70(b) Order, and therefore, not the true relief that was being requested in the complaint-titled
ownership to the decedent's assets, as Hillen cannot become the titled owner to a decedent's assets.
Nonetheless, that is what remained uncertain with Judge Rippler's Decision, as he neither
expressly rejected, nor expressly adopted, Hillen' s ownership argument as the basis for the
judgment requested by his motion.
B.

The Probate Court Had No Authority, By Use Of The Rule 70{b) Order, To Oust
Vernon K. Smith's Ownership Interest In Estate Property, Including The Interest He
Obtained As A Matter Of Law Under I.C. §15-3-101

Even though the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion did not address or decide any question
concerning the construction and application of the Rule 70(b) Order, the language of that Order on its face - does not support Hillen's contentions it conferred upon him sole ownership of
Decedent's property. The magistrate (Cheri C. Copsey) intended only to restore title to the
property to the Decedent (estate) , being Victoria H. Smith, then deceased, which prior to her
death had been transferred to VHS, LLC by the use of a power of attorney. In issuing that Rule
70(b) Order, the transfers purportedly made to Hillen were conditioned upon the recognition ofhis
capacity "as personal representative of the Estate." This conditional reference serves to confirm
Hillen was only being authorized to take possession of the estate property, and that he was only
authorized to exercise a "power", consistent with the provisions of the Idaho UPC concerning the
authority and powers of a personal representative. 3
The PR, in his actions in the administration of the estate, is bound by the limitations
imposed by the UPC.

The Official Comment to LC. §15-3-703 notes the specific statutory

constraints placed upon a PR's actions by declaring that, "[A] personal representative's authority

3

Rule 821 of the Idaho Family Law Rules is the rule that corresponds to Idaho Civil Rule 70. The
last sentence of Rule 821 specifically addresses the issuance of an order for the transfer of "possession," as opposed
the Rule 70's singular focus only upon a transfer of "title." ("When any order or judgment is for the delivery of
possession, the party in whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of execution or assistance upon application to the
clerk."). Although the family law rule has no application here, it is cited for the proposition a distinction between
"possession" and "title" has been recognized in other contexts. Even in the absence of corresponding "possession"
language in Rule 70, in this matter Copsey's Rule 70(b) Order must be construed as a conveyance of title to the estate
- and not to Hillen individually-to exercise only a "power" over the property of the estate. I.C. §15-3-711, when
determined to be necessary.
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is derived from appointment by the public agency known as the Court. But, the Code also makes
it clear that the personal representative, in spite of the source of his authority, is to proceed with
the administration, settlement and distribution of the estate by use of statutory powers and in
accordance with statutory directions. See Sections 3-107 and 3-704 ..... "
Both in Gibson and in this case, Hillen is attempting to act in excess of his statutorilyconferred authority by falsely claiming the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order was to make him the
sole "owner" of Decedent's property, and to divest the heirs of all statutorily-conferred title.
Somewhat more problematic is the language within the Rule 70(b) Order (hereafter
"Copsey Order") concerning the divestment of the property interest of Vernon K. Smith. On p. 2
of the Copsey Order, it references the scope of divestment as extending to Vernon K. Smith's
capacity, "individually," "as personal representative," (which he never was) "as attorney-in-fact
or agent or fiduciary," and "any other capacity." The use of this all-encompassing language
necessarily raises the question whether it was a deliberate intent to eliminate Vernon K. Smith's
interest as an intestate heir of the estate as established under I.C. §15-3-101? If it were, that
magistrate is facing a serious Judicial Cannon of Ethics complaint, as the magistrate had no
authority to actually eliminate the interest of an intestate heir derived under I.C. §15-3-101, then
to be viewed as a gross violation of the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct and the Judicial Cannon
of Ethics.
If this Court were to be inclined to accept Hillen's proposed construction of the Rule 70(b)

Order, and to the effect that the Copsey Order intended to divest Vernon of his interest, then Joseph
- Vernon's brother - either has no interest as well, or became the sole intestate heir of the estate
That, also, was neither the intent nor objective of the Copsey Order. Is it to be construed that
Hillen's sole ownership of the estate property operates to eliminate Joseph's intestate share in the
estate. 4 It is doubtful that the Copsey Order - or any judicial officer - has the authority to rule to
eliminate an heir's intestate share without any specific grant of statutory authority allowing such

4

Vernon's sister, Victoria Ann Converse, assigned her 1/3 intestate to Vernon, such that he holds 2/3
share in the intestate estate and his brother Joseph currently has a 1/3 interest under the current state of the probate
proceedings. If the Rule 70(b) Order is construed as to eliminate Vernon's intestate share, then as the sole remaining
intestate heir, whose interest has been neither assigned nor expressly eliminated by court order, would Joseph become
the sole intestate heir of the estate, a most absurd result never intended when issuing the Rule 70(b) Order, assuming
the magistrate adheres to the Idaho Cannon of Judicial Conduct.
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an action5

-

such an outcome constitutes an absurd result. By analogy to the rules of contract

construction, as to be relied upon in the interpretation of court orders, no effect should be given to
a court order that would lead to such an absurd result. Schieche v. Pasco, 88 Idaho 36, 41, 395
P.2d 671, 673 (1964).
The question of a court acting in excess of statutorily-conferred authority has been analyzed
by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct.App. 2008)
where that Court laid out and addressed the issue as follows:
[C]ourts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction when they
really mean simply that the court committed error because the action that was taken
did not comply with governing law. For example, our appellate courts have referred
to a lack of "jurisdiction" when perhaps more precisely meaning that a motion or
complaint was not timely filed, that a condition precedent to the right to file the
action was not satisfied, or that governing statutes or court rules did not
authorize the particular decision made by the court. (citations omitted) 146
Idaho at 375, 195 P.3d at 734 (bold/underlined emphasis, and parenthetical
reference to "citations omitted," added).
The Court in Armstrong cited to California's Supreme Court decision in People v.
American Contractors Indemnity Co., 33 Cal.4th 653, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004) for

the proposition when a court acts contrary to the authority conferred by statute, it has acted in
excess of its jurisdiction. 146 Idaho at 376, 195 P.3d at 735.
The Supreme Court in State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d 979, 982 n.3
(2011) acknowledged the rationale of the Court of Appeal's decision in Armstrong, as
differentiating between the concepts of a court's jurisdiction and a court's authority, without
adopting or rejecting that formulation of Idaho law, as announced by the Court of Appeals. 6 The
Court of Appeals continues to authoritatively cite and rely upon Armstrong, subsequent to the
Supreme Court's decision in Armstrong, as made in the 2011 Hartwig decision. See e.g., State v.
Vaughn, 156 Idaho 13, 15, 319 P.3d 497,499 (Ct.App.2014) and State v. Steelsmith, 154 Idaho

577, 580 n.2, 288 P.3d 132, 135 n.2 (Ct.App.2012).

The "Slayer's Act," as codified at I.C. §15-2-803, would constitute an example of a statutory
authority that permits elimination of an intestate heir's interest in an estate.
6
Until superseded by a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, as issued upon the same question,
opinions of the Idaho Court of Appeals are binding precedent upon all lower Idaho courts. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho
981, 986-87, 842 P.2d 660, 665-66 (1992).
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It is irrational to believe the Copsey Order was ever intended to carry the effect Hillen

advocates, given the prohibition announced in Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397,401, 184 P. 222,223
(1919) wherein it was declared "The administrator or executor is not the owner of any part of the

estate. Magistrate Copsey would not commit to the intentional violation of the Idaho Code of
Judicial Conduct or the Judicial Cannon of Ethics. Nor did the Magistrate have any authority to
enter an order to that effect, even if it were to be an intentional act (a clear violation of the ICOJC.
Consequently, Hillen's request for relief as a claimed sole owner of the Decedent's
property in this action, no different than the manner in which he sought the same relief in the
Gibson proceeding, based upon an illogical and misplaced construction of the Rule 70(b) Order
that would permit Hillen to an unrestrained action as a sole owner of estate property, be construed
to allow him to proceed with the entire liquidation of estate property, when to do so is contrary to
the mandated in-kind distribution contemplated by the UPC. Hillen's approach must be rejected,
and because of the remaining confusion or uncertainty in the Gibson matter, that judgment and
denial of the motion to amend will be appealed so as to protect the heirs in this probate controversy.

C.

No Question Alleging The Rule 70(b) Order Constituted A Complete Transfer Of The
"Ownership" Of The Estate Property To The Personal Representative Was Ever
Placed At Issue Or Decided, On The Appeal Of The Will and Use Of The POA
Considering the construction Hillen is attempting to place upon the Rule 70(b) Order in

this matter, as a consequence of the Court's decision in, Matter ofEstate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,
466,432 P.3d 6, 15 (2018), it is no surprise Gibson, Vernon K. Smith III, and legal counsel, Vernon
K. Smith, have become greatly concerned about, and opposed to, Hillen's malicious allegation he
is the "sole owner" of Decedent's property, and that as a consequence, he is authorized to proceed
with a full liquidation of Estate's property in the same manner as if he were acting as a Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Trustee, his typical behavior in his bankruptcy assignments.
Only two issues were presented to, and decided by, the Idaho Supreme Court in Matter of

Estate ofSmith, 164 Idaho 457,466,432 P.3d 6, 15 (2018): (1) Did the probate court err in finding
the February 14, 1991 holographic will of Victoria H. Smith invalid due to undue influence? and
(2) Did the probate court err in setting aside the July 4, 2012 power of attorney transfers of Victoria
H. Smith's property to an LLC, because the power of attorney did not specifically authorize
gifting? On both questions the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the probate court.

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS-PAGE 17

Page 146

Although it is recognized the property was returned to the Estate, no issues were raised nor
decided on that appeal construing the Rule 70(b) Order, as the return to the Decedent was perceived
to be made upon the trust provisions of the UPC, despite what is being maliciously now contended
by Hillen. On the Supreme Court appeal, no issues were raised or decided to the effect that:
►

Hillen was made the sole "owner" of the Estate property, as opposed to being
granted a power and possession, in trust, for the benefit of the Estate's heirs, as
provided by the UPC;

►

The "divestment" language of the Rule 70(b) Order was intended to accomplish
anything more than a mere transfer back to the Decedent those properties that had
been earlier subject to the power of attorney transfers;

►

Vernon K. Smith was divested of all of his interest in the property of the estate,
which he received as a matter oflaw under LC. § 15-3-101;

►

As a result of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order Hillen was no longer subject to any
of the constraints, as otherwise imposed under the UPC, upon his actions as a
personal representative; and

►

As a result of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order Hillen was free to proceed with a
full liquidation of the Estate property, without reference to any necessity for the
disposition of that property in the interest of creditors and others who might have a
legitimate interest in the administration of the Estate.

The following statement, as included within the Idaho Supreme Court's recitation of the
factual and procedural background of this case, constituted that Court's only express reference

within its opinion to the probate court's Rule 70(b) Order:
In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 70(b), which vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property
in the personal representative who had been appointed.
Vernon appealed these decisions, and this Court granted Joseph's motion
for acceptance of appeal directly from the magistrate court pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 44. This appeal follows the parties' stipulation to bifurcate the
appeal to first address any matters occurring up to and including the post-trial
judgment under Rule 70(b) before considering any matters occurring thereafter.
The personal representative of the estate, Intervenor-Respondent Noah Hillen, is
not participating in this portion of the appeal. 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15
(emphasis added).
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Hillen construes the above-statement as establishing his status as the sole owner of the
estate property. See, Supporting Memo filed by Hillen. Because no issue was raised or decided
by the Idaho Supreme Court as to the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order in confirming an actual
ownership in Hillen, the Court's statement is nothing more than obiter dictum. See e.g., Smith v.

Angell, 122 Idaho 25, 35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1173 (1992) (Bistline, J, concurring in the reversal of the
judgment below and the remand for further proceedings) ("' [A] remark by the way;' that is, an
observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some
rule, principle, or application oflaw, or the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but
not necessarily involved in the case or essential to its determination; .... ").
Long-standing Idaho authority supports the interpretation of Idaho appellate decisions by
differentiating between issues actually raised and decided by the Court, and other matters simply
referred to in the decision. Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 88, 238 P. 534, 534 (1925) ("'There is
a pronounced line of demarcation between what is said in an opinion and what is decided by it."
(citation omitted, italicized emphasis added)). See also, Idaho Schools For Equal Educational

Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 586, 850 P.2d 724, 737 (1993) (McDevitt, C.J., concurring
and dissenting); North Side Canal Co. v. Idaho Farms Co., 60 Idaho 748, 758, 96 Idaho 232, 23536 (1939); and Stark v. McLaughlin, 45 Idaho 112, 123, 261 P. 244, 245 (1927).
This principle of interpretation as applied to Idaho appellate opinions, and as based upon
the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Bashore v. Adolf, supra, has been most recently applied by
Idaho's U.S. District Court in, AMX Intern., Inc. v. Battelle Energy Alliance, 744 F.Supp.2d 1087,
1091-92 (D.Idaho 2010); and Hash v. US., 454 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1072 (D.Idaho 2006) ("The Idaho
Supreme Court itself has stated that its opinions "must be considered and construed in the light of
the rule that they are authoritative only on the facts on which they are founded. General expressions
must be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. "There is a
pronounced line of demarcation between what is said in an opinion and what is decided by it."
(Citation omitted).' Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84,238 P. 534 (1925) (emphasis in original).").
Furthermore, Hillen's proposed construction of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision as
claimed to confirm a conferral of actual ownership is entirely inconsistent with not only the
provisions of the UPC which only confer upon the personal representative a right of possession
and a "power" over estate property for the satisfaction of creditor claims and other interested
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persons, but also established case law the prohibits the PR from taking ownership. See e.g., Lemp

v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919) ("The administrator or executor is not the
owner of any part of the estate. He, in his official character, only holds it in trust for the parties
entitled to it, subject to the purposes of administration."). 7 That case law remains the authority in
Idaho.
Court judgments and decrees are subject to the same rules of interpretation that apply to
the construction of contracts. McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190 P.3d 925, 928
(2008). A prominent rule of contract interpretation is that contracts must be interpreted in respect
to the then-existing law. Path to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227
(2016) ("'This Court has held that "it is axiomatic that extant law is written into and made a part
of every written contract.""' (citations omitted).

This rule was expressly applied to the

interpretation of an appellate decision in, Application ofKaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206 P .2d
528, 533 (1949) ("What the court said, therefore, must be taken in connection with the statutes as
they then existed and applied, .... "); and in,Jn re Anderton 's Estate, 67 Idaho 160, 163, 174 P.2d
212, 213 (1946) (noting that an executor must act "in strict compliance with the law .... ").
Therefore, the UPC, as in effect at the time of the referenced appeal in, Matter ofEstate of Smith,

supra, is incorporated within and applies to the interpretation of the Rule 70(b) Order and to the
interpretation of the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion on appeal.
The Rule 70(b) Order must be interpreted and applied as consistent with the applicable
UPC statutes, which statutes only confer upon a personal representative a "power" over title, with
a concurrent right to obtain "possession" of that property when necessary for the administration of
the estate for the benefit of creditors and other interested persons. LC. § 15-3-711.
Hillen's argument to the effect the Rule 70(b) Order, as referenced by the Idaho Supreme
Court, has made him sole owner and to permit him to completely liquidate the estate is without
merit in reference to the actual issues raised and decided by the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal,
and therefore his arguments must be rejected, and his motion should have been denied, as it was
framed, and this court's Memorandum Decision and Judgment must be reconsidered and amended.

7

Although Lemp was decided under the 1864 Idaho Probate Code, this principle of law has not in
any way been altered by Idaho's 1971 adoption of the Uniform Probate Code.
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V.
THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THIS DEFENDANT
The Hippler Amended Decision, and the ruling on the motion to alter or amend, continues
to place reliance upon the authority of I.C. § 15-3-711, which grants a "power" to a PR, while at
the same time the Hippler disposition neither states it is adopting nor rejecting Hillen 's

contention that he is, in fact, the sole and absolute owner of the estate property. The consequence
of this conundrum serves only to perpetuate a continuing conflict and uncertainty on the very issue
presented by Hillen's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. As it was filed and being
limited to the content of the complaint, the motion should be denied, as Hillen cannot own estate
property, as prohibited by Lemp v, Lemp, supra. No court can give Hillen the absolute and sole
ownership of a Decedent's property, as a matter of law, notwithstanding the overreaching and
unenforceable language found within the Rule 70(b) Order, as to do so serves to jeopardize the
heirs' standing and unconditional legal basis to challenge Hillen' s actions and secure recovery for
his fiduciary breaches.
If this Court recognizes Hillen cannot take title to estate property, then it must reject
Hillen's argument (as was thought required in Gibson's matter, but now requiring Gibson to
embrace the issue in an appeal to the Supreme Court for review, ), and this court must reject
Hillen' s "ownership" contentions, as Idaho law requires, and that disposition will confirm the heirs
continue with their statutory right to vested title and ownership of the Decedent's assets as
embraced by the UPC and Idaho case law, and he heirs preserve all rights to challenge Hillen' s
actions on all grounds provided by the UPC. Hillen is well aware he has only a right to exercise a
"power" over "possession" of the property, as expressly authorized by the UPC,for the benefit of
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creditors and other interested persons, as limited by the provisions of the statute, and there are no

r·

creditors, and he has no right to unilaterally liquidate the pro - y mterests as
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Once again, Defendant has jumped at the chance to muddle a simple issue. At oral
argument on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (the "Motion"), Defendant1
indicated, through counsel, that he would be submitting an affidavit in support of his opposition to
the Motion. Instead, Defendant now concedes that the Motion can be decided solely on the law.
Further, instead of an affidavit, Defendant filed a twenty-two (22) page brief ("Supplemental
Opposition") that does nothing more reargue points Defendant already presented. Accordingly,
Hillen objects to the Supplemental Opposition as: (1) non-compliant with the Court's comments
at the hearing on the Motion; and (2) an unauthorized sur-opposition brief.
But, even if the Court were to consider the improper Supplemental Oppositionwhich may countenance granting the Motion outright, and overruling Hillen's objection as mootit does nothing to change the fact that the pleadings establish the elements of ejectment as a matter
of law. Accordingly, Hillen is entitled to a judgment ejecting Defendant from the Raymond St.
Property. Hillen respectfully requests that the Court grant the Motion and enter such relief.
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hillen filed the Motion on October 9, 2019. On November 8, 2019, Defendant filed
his opposition (the "Opposition"). Hillen then submitted a reply. This Court heard oral argument
on Hillen' s Motion on December 3, 2019. At the hearing, the parties discussed whether the Motion
asked the Court to consider matters outside the pleadings.
After some discussion, the Court recognized that the issue before it is "a pure
question oflaw." Recording of December 3, 2019 Hearing ("Recording") at 00: 17: 18. The Court

1

Capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the same meaning as in prior briefing.
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then asked Defendant if he wanted more time to submit additional evidence. Counsel for the
Defendant indicated he would "submit a further affidavit on certain other issues." Recording at
00: 17 :45. Defendant's counsel also previously indicated he "would want to submit a further
affidavit." Recording at 00: 14:22. A new filing schedule was ordered by the Court to accommodate
Defendant's request for additional time to file any affidavit(s).
The problem, of course, is that Defendant did not submit any new evidence,
declarations or affidavits by the deadline the Court provided to the parties. Instead, Defendant
submitted a lengthy Supplemental Opposition, conceding that Hillen's Motion is a pure question
of law that may be decided on the pleadings. As noted, Hillen objects to the Supplemental
Opposition. As to the substantive points, Hillen's comments are as follows.

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Pleadings Establish the Three Elements of Ejectment as a Matter of Law
and Judgment in Hillen's Favor is Appropriate.

Assuming the Court considers the Supplemental Opposition, Defendant raises no
new or compelling arguments that Hillen does not have the power to eject Defendant from the
Raymond St. Property. Hillen will not regurgitate his prior briefing establishing the ownership
element of an ejectment claim, but instead incorporates the same herein by reference. Suffice it to
say, Hillen has the same power to control possession of the Raymond St. Property that an absolute
owner would have pursuant to, among other things, the Rule 70(b) Judgment and the U.P.C. That
power includes the power to eject Defendant from the Raymond St. Property, which is what Hillen
is seeking in the Motion.
Defendant's arguments to the contrary are dependent on a misunderstanding and
misrepresentation of Hillen's position. For one, Hillen did not "request[] a declaration, as based
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upon the Rule 70(b) Order, he was declared [sic] to be the actual sole owner ofthe estate property."
Supplemental Opposition at 11 (emphasis in original). By this action, Hillen asks this Court: (1) to
effect ejectment of Defendant from the Raymond St. Property (Complaint at 4,

1 21);

(2) for a

declaration "that Defendant has no right to occupy or possess the [Raymond St. Property]"
(Complaint at 5,128); and (3) for monetary damages resulting from Defendant's trespass on and
unjust enrichment from the Raymond St. Property (Complaint at 6, 11 34-35, 40). That's it. To
achieve the first form of requested relief, Hillen brought this Motion. That Motion is governed by
three clear elements that are established by the pleadings.
So, contrary to Defendant's claim that what Hillen is "attempting to accomplish by
his motion for partial judgment ion [sic] the pleadings . . . is to reverse the existing statutory
mandate, and in its place, provide that title to a decedent's property vests in him (instead of the
heirs)," Hillen is seeking no such thing. All Hillen wants is to fulfil his duties to administer the
Estate by ejecting Defendant from Estate property. Hillen has the power to do this under the
Rule 70(b) Judgment and Idaho Code Section 15-3-711.

IV.

CONCLUSION

As is clear from the U.P .C.-and as found by Judge Hippler-Hillen has power
over Estate property sufficient to eject Defendant therefrom. Defendant's (or more accurately his
counsel's) arguments about fiduciary duties and proper administration of the Estate are not proper,
and should be raised in the probate case by Defendant's counsel, not Defendant. What matters here
is whether the elements of ejectment are met. They are unambiguously established by the
pleadings. Hillen, therefore, respectfully requests that the Court grant this Motion, enter a 54(b)
certificate, and issue a Writ of Assistance.
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DATED this 31st day of December, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV0l-19-10367
WRIT OF ASSISTANCE

vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

TO THE SHERIFF OR ANY CONSTABLE OF THE COUNTY:
WHEREAS, a certain action for the possession of the following described premises, towit:
2001 North Raymond Street, Boise, Idaho 83704,
lately tried before the above entitled Court, wherein Noah G. Hillen, as personal representative of
the estate of Victoria H. Smith, was Plaintiff and Vernon K. Smith III was Defendant, Judgment
, that the Plaintiff Noah G. Hillen, as personal representative
was rendered on 2/10/2020
of the estate of Victoria H. Smith, have restitution of the premises;
In the name of the State of Idaho, you are, therefore, hereby commanded to cause the
Defendant and his goods and chattels to be forthwith removed from the premises and the Plaintiff
is to have restitution of the same. In the event the goods and chattels are not promptly removed
thereafter by the Defendant you are authorized and empowered to cause the same to be removed
to a safe place for storage. You are also commanded to levy on the goods and chattels of the
Defendant, and pay the costs and disbursements, aforesaid, and all accruing costs, and to make
legal service and due return of this Writ.
WITNESS my hand and official seal on

Signed: 2/10/2020 04:12 PM

Phil McGrane
Clerk of the District Court

6u1wf/

By
Deputy Court Clerk
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Filed: 02/10/2020 13:36:21
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Hoskins, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

Case No. CV0l-19-10367
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR
PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS, RULE 54(B)
CERTIFICATION, AND WRIT OF
ASSISTANCE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and
request for a writ of assistance, filed through counsel on October 9, 2019. Hearings were held on
December 3, 2019, and on January 14, 2020, at which time the matter was taken under
advisement. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motions are GRANTED.

FACTS

In this ejectment action, Plaintiff Noah Hillen ("Hillen"), the personal representative of Victoria
Smith's ("Victoria") estate, seeks to eject Defendant Vernon K. Smith III ("Vernon") from
property that is owned by Victoria's estate.

This case is one of several cases concerning Victoria's estate. In March of 2017, the magistrate
court, in Ada County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, issued a decision finding that Victoria's
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holographic will was invalid because it was a product of Vernon K. Smith Jr.'s (Vernon's father
and lawyer in this case) undue influence, 1 and that Victoria died intestate. In June of 2017, in the
same case, an Order and Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b)2 were entered
vesting title to all of Victoria's real and personal property to Hillen as the appointed personal
representative of Victoria's estate. Specifically, the Judgment vested Hillen with "any and all
real property of any kind or nature, including but not limited to: any fixtures, appurtenances,
additions, easements, licenses, water rights, or similar rights of any kind or nature appurtenant
thereto; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits of or from any real
property[,]"3 including the property at issue in this case - 2001 North Raymond Street, Boise,
Idaho 83704 (hereafter, "Raymond Street property").

The Judgment provided that "[s]uch

vesting is free and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the Claimaints[,]" one of whom included
Vernon K. Smith Jr.

Vernon K. Smith Jr. appealed these decisions, and in 2018, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
the magistrate court's decisions. See Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6
(2018). The Supreme Court specifically noted that the Rule 70(b) Judgment was at issue in the
appeal:
In October 2016, the magistrate court held a two-day bench trial on the issue of
undue influence. The parties then submitted post-trial briefing. On March 9, 2017,
the magistrate court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in which
1

Vernon K. Smith Jr. was the sole beneficiary under the will.

2

"If the real or personal property is within the district, the court, instead of ordering a conveyance, may enter a
judgment divesting any party's title and vesting it in others. That judgment has the effect of a legally executed
conveyance." I.R.C.P. 70(b).
3

The Court talces judicial notice pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 of the Judgment (filed June 2, 2017) in Ada
County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352.
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it ruled that Victoria's will was invalid because it was a product of Vemon's4
undue influence, and that Victoria died intestate. The court later amended its
decision to correct minor typographical and clerical errors. In June 2017, the court
entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b), which vested
title to all of Victoria's real and personal property in the personal representative
who had been appointed [Hillen].
Vernon appealed these decisions, and this Court granted Joseph's motion for
acceptance of appeal directly from the magistrate court pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 44. This appeal follows the parties' stipulation to bifurcate the
appeal to first address any matters occurring up to and including the post-trial
judgment under Rule 70(b) before considering any matters occurring thereafter.
The personal representative of the estate, Intervenor-Respondent Noah Hillen, is
not participating in this portion of the appeal.
Vernon asserts that the magistrate court erred in granting Joseph partial summary
judgment (and the corresponding Rule 70(b) judgment) and then erred again in its
ruling that the will was invalid.
Id. at 466,432 P.3d at 15 (emphasis added).

On December 11, 2018, Hillen sent a 30 day notice of termination of lease to Vernon at the
Raymond Street property. The notice demanded Vernon vacate the Raymond Street property no
later than January 31, 2019. Vemon did not vacate the property.

On June 7, 2019, Hillen filed the instant Verified Complaint against Vernon alleging (1)
ejectment, (2) declaratory judgment/quiet title, (3) trespass, and (4) unjust enrichment. 5

4

Referencing Vernon's father and lawyer- Vernon K. Smith Jr.

5

On the same date, Hillen filed a nearly identical ejectment action against a business that was occupying property
that was owned by Victoria's estate (Ada County Case No. CV0l-19-10368). Following the filing of a Motion
similar to the one before this Court, on October 3, 2019, Judge Hippler issued a Memorandum Decision and Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings.
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Hillen now seeks a partial judgment on his ejectment claim and requests the Court issue a writ of
assistance and certify the judgment as final under Rule 54(b).

LEGAL STANDARD

"After the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial, a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings." I.R.C.P. 12(c). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56, and all parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
pertinent to the motion. I.R.C.P. 12(d). Here, Hillen provided a Declaration in Support of his
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. At the December 3, 2019 hearing, the Court
notified the parties that it intended to treat the Motion as one for summary judgment and gave
them time to file any additional materials. Accordingly, the Court finds that the parties have
been given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material pertinent to the Motion.

Summary judgment may be entered only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a).
The Court "liberally construes the facts and existing record in favor of the non-moving party" in
making such determination. Hall v. Fors/off, 124 Idaho 771, 773, 864 P.2d 609, 611 (1993). "If
reasonable people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the motion
must be denied." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385
(2005). Moreover, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not
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sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment." Stafford v. Weaver, 136
Idaho 223, 225, 31 P.3d 245, 247 (2001) (citations omitted).

The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, and then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence
to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872,
874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (1994). When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving an
element at trial, the moving party may establish a lack of genuine issue of material fact by
establishing the lack of evidence supporting the element. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311,
882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1994).

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon mere allegations in the
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial."
Gagnon v. W Bldg. Maint., Inc., 155 Idaho 112, 114, 306 P.3d 197, 199 (2013). Such evidence

may consist of affidavits or depositions, but ''the Court will consider only that material . . .
which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial." Harris v.
State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992). If the

evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains on
which the court may then enter summary judgment as a matter of law. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co.
ofIdaho, 138 Idaho 443,445, 65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003).
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ANALYSIS

Hillen asserts he is entitled to judgment on his claim for ejectment and requests a Rule 54(b)
certificate and writ of assistance. Each issue will be addressed in turn.

(1) Ejectment

"Ejectment requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) possession by the defendants, and (3) refusal of
the defendants to surrender possession." Ada Cty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments,

LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008) (noting that it is necessary to determine the
quiet title portion of the suit before reaching the issue of ejectment).

Here, there is no dispute as to the second and third elements, i.e. Vernon is in possession of the
Raymond Street property and he refuses to surrender his possession. The issue is whether Hillen
is the owner of the Raymond Street property.

V emon asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court did not decide whether the Rule 70(b) Order and
Judgment transferred complete ownership of Victoria's estate property to Hillen, the Rule 70(b)
Order does not support Hillen's request for relief, and various provisions of Idaho's Uniform
Probate Code do not support Hillen' s request.

Although this particular issue might not have been raised in the previous appeal, it is clear that
the Rule 70(b) Order and Judgment were at issue on appeal. The Supreme Court noted that the
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appeal followed ''the parties' stipulation to bifurcate the appeal to first address any matters
occurring up to and including the post-trial judgment under Rule 70(h) before considering any
matters occurring thereafter." Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that Vernon K. Smith Jr. argued on appeal ''that the magistrate
court erred in granting Joseph partial summary judgment (and the corresponding Rule 70(b)
judgment) and then erred again in its ruling that the will was invalid." Id.

The Rule 70(b) Judgment vested in Hillen "any and all real property of any kind or nature,
including ... [the Raymond Street property]" and "[s]uch vesting is free and clear of any lien,
claim or interest of the Claimaints[.]" Generally, "fmal judgments, whether right or wrong, are
not subject to collateral attack." Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 894, 277 P.3d 337, 341
(2012) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

As Judge Hippler noted in his Amended

Memorandum Decision and Order p. 7 (filed Oct. 3, 2019), if''the Judgment could not have done

what it purported to do, then Vernon [K. Smith Jr.] should have moved in that case for relief
from the judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b). [The defendant] essentially requests that the Court act as
an appellate court and overrule the Judgment in the other case, something it cannot do."

Vernon next argues that the Rule 70(b) Order itself does not support Hillen's request, because as
a personal representative of Victoria's estate, Hillen is statutorily constrained by Idaho's Uniform
Probate Code and is in breach of his fiduciary duties.

"The legal title to estate property vests in the heirs or devisees upon the death of the decedent."
El/maker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 580, 377 P.3d 390, 394 (2015); see J.C. § 15-3-101.
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However, "the rights of creditors, devisees, and heirs to his property are subject to the restrictions
and limitations contained in this code to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates." LC. § 15-3101.

One such restriction or limitation is the right of a personal representative to ''take

possession or control of, the decedent's property[.]"

I.C. § 15-3-709.

"[A] personal

representative has the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner
would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate.
This power may be exercised without notice, hearing, or order of court." LC. § 15-3-711. The
Uniform Law Comments note that
The personal representative is given the broadest possible "power over title". He
receives a "power", rather than title, because the power concept eases the
succession of assets which are not possessed by the personal representative. . . .
The power over title of an absolute owner is conceived to embrace all possible
transactions which might result in a conveyance or encumbrance of assets, or
in a change of rights ofpossession.
(Emphasis added.)

Here, the plain language of the Rule 70(b) Judgment vested in Hillen "any and all real property
of any kind or nature, including ... [the Raymond Street property]" and "[s]uch vesting is free
and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the Claimaints[.]" Thus, by virtue of the plain and
unambiguous statutory language and the Rule 70(b) Order and Judgment, Hillen is the owner (in
his capacity as the personal representative of Victoria's estate) of the Raymond Street property
and has authority to eject Vernon. Accordingly, Hillen's Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings on his ejectment claim is GRANTED.
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(2) Rule 54(b) Certificat

Hillen also requests a Rule 54(b) certification.

In order for the Court to attach a Rule 54(b)(1)

certificate entering a final judgment on "one or more but less than all of the claims or parties,"
the Court must find ''that there is no just reason for delay," in entering a final judgment as to that
claim or party. I.R.C.P. 54(b)(l); Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 505 (2005). Kolin v. St.
Luke's Regional Medical Center, 130 Idaho 323, 328 (1997), is instructive on when a trial court

should grant Rule 54(b) certification. In Kolin, the respondents filed a motion for Rule 54(b)(1)
certification after summary judgment was granted in their favor.

The trial court granted the

certification, and the petitioner filed a motion to decertify, which the trial court denied.

On

appeal, the Supreme Court found that the district court abused its discretion in granting Rule
54(b) certification. It explained: "We have cautioned that I.R.C.P. 54(b) certification should not
be granted routinely, or as a matter of course; it should be reserved only for the 'infrequent harsh
case.' The party requesting certification must show that it will suffer some hardship or injustice,
or provide some other compelling reason why the certification should be granted." Id.

The respondents in Kolin argued that they would be prejudiced or harmed, because they "had
obtained a quick resolution to their case, and did not feel they should have to wait until the
claims against the other defendants were resolved." Id. The Court emphasized that "mere delay
is not a hardship in and of itself, because I.R.C.P. 54(b) contemplates that there will normally be
a delay in cases involving multiple parties and motions." Id. "The decision to grant or deny a
54(b) certificate rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge who is best able to evaluate the
situation." Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 599, 21 P.3d 918, 921 (2001); PHH Mortg.
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Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 636, 200 P.3d 1180, 1185 (2009) (affirming trial court's

decision to grant Rule 54(b) certification on decision restoring possession of property to the
plaintiff).

Hillen asserts Rule 54(b) certification is warranted because he is unable to sell, lease, or
otherwise perform his statutory duties as the personal representative of Victoria's estate, due to
Vernon's unlawful possession.

He asserts that he has been charged with expeditiously

liquidating estate property and distributing the proceeds to Victoria's heirs and that Vernon's
continued possession prevents him for doing so.

Under these facts and circumstances, the Court finds that there is no just reason for delay and
Rule 54(b) certification is proper.

In addition, Vernon made no argument that Rule 54(b)

certification should not be granted.

(3) Writ of Assistance

Hillen also requests a writ of assistance to transfer possession of the property from Vemon to
Hillen. The decision to grant a writ of assistance is in the trial court's discretion. Williams v.
Sherman, 35 Idaho 169, 205 P. 259 (1922); Federal Land Bank v. Parsons, 118 Idaho 324, 796

P.2d 533 (Ct. App. 1990). "A writ of assistance is a form of process issued by a court of equity
to transfer the possession of property, and more specifically lands, the title or right to which it
has previously adjudicated...." Pro lndiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Tr., 131 Idaho 741, 746,
963 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1998) (citation omitted).
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The sole question to be determined on the motion is whether applicant has a right,
as against the party in possession to use the writ to obtain possession. In the
absence of any claim of an independent paramount title, the only question on such
application is whether the decree has or has not been complied with.

Id. (citation omitted).

As set forth previously, Hillen has the right to eject Vernon from the Raymond Street property.
Judge Hippler granted a writ of assistance in his case for the following reasons:
The Court recognizes that the typical course would be to refrain from issuing a
writ of assistance until after the party fails to comply with the judgment. In this
case, however, such a waiting period would be pointless, as it seems likely that
Gibson will not comply in a timely manner. His future non-compliance seems
likely for two reasons: First, when at the hearing the Court asked Gibson whether
he would comply with a judgment against him, Gibson failed to give an
unequivocal answer in the affirmative. Second, Vernon's 6 conduct in the
underlying probate case reveals a dilatory pattern and the Court is concerned that
Vernon, as Gibson's counsel, will continue this pattern by encouraging his client
to not immediately comply with the judgment. A waiting period in this instance
seemingly would serve no purpose but to further delay the probate of Victoria's
estate and waste her estate's resources by requiring it to again request a writ of
assistance after Gibson fails to comply. To avoid such a waste of time, and
believing a writ will likely be necessary to enforce the judgment, the Court grants
Hillen's request for a writ of assistance.

Vernon made no argument that a writ of assistance should not be granted. Here, it seems likely
that Vernon's attorney and father will dispute any judgment this Court enters based on his past
conduct in the probate court and based on the same arguments and defenses he has raised in this
case and in Judge Rippler's case. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the writ of assistance.

6

Referencing Vernon's father and attorney in this case- Vernon K. Smith Jr.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Hillen's Motions for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, Rule
54(b) certification, and Writ of Assistance are GRANTED. The Rule 54(b) Judgment and Writ
of Assistance will be issued concurrent with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: 2/10/2020 09:06 AM

Date
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Signed: 2/10/2020 01 :36 PM

I hereby certify that on _ _ _ _ __, I served a true and correct copy of the within instrument
to:

Randall Peterman
Alexander McLaughlin
Jack Relf
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Vernon Smith
vkslaw@live.com

Phil McGrane
Clerk of the District Court

By ~

DeputyollrtClerk
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FRED By·

Tyler Atkinson 6/212017 at 2:36 PM

Deputy Clerk

Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH,
Deceased.

Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352
JUDGMENT ON MOTION UNDER
RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES
OF CML PROCEDURE, VESTING
ALL REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

I.

Personal Property

The Court does hereby vest in Noah Hillen, as the personal representative of the
Estate ("Personal Representative"), as of May 5, 2017, any and all personal property of any kind
or nature, whether choate or inchoate, whether tangible or intangible; any and all rights or
interests in cash or cash equivalents; any and all rights in any insurance policies; any and all
rights in any executory contracts, including but not limited to leases of any kind or nature, or any
security agreements which constitute a disguised lease under Idaho law; any rights and powers of
Victoria H. Smith under any personal property; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring,
rents or profits of or from any personal property ("Personal Property").

JUDGMENT ON MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
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Such vesting is free and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the following parties
("Claimants"):
1. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. individually;
2. Vernon K. Smith, Jr., in his capacity as the personal representative of the
Estates;
3. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. in his capacity as an attorney-in-fact or agent or
fiduciary for Victoria H. Smith;
4. Vernon K. Smith, Jr., in any other capacity;
5. Victoria L. Smith, in her personal and any other capacity;
6. VHS Properties, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
7. Riverside Farms, Inc., an Idaho corporation;
8. S & S Trust, LLC, in Idaho limited liability company; and
9. Any entity controlled by any of the individuals or entities identified above (the
foregoing shall hereinafter be collectively referenced as the "Claimants").
II.

Real Property
The Court does hereby vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5, 2017, any
and all real property of any kind or nature, including but not limited to: any fixtures,
appurtenances, additions, easements, licenses, water rights, or similar rights of any kind or nature
appurtenant thereto; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits of or from any
real property (collectively "Real Property"), including but not limited to the following:

A.

Jefferson County Property.
(i)
That certain Real Property A, commonly referenced as the Jefferson
County Property, and more specifically identified on Exhibit A.

B.

Ada County Property.
(i)

That certain Real Property B, commonly referenced as the Ada County,
and more specifically identified on Exhibit B.
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Such vesting is free and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the Claimants.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017.

The Honorable~. Copsey
District Judge
Signed: 612/2017 10:48 AM
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 6/2/2017 02:38 PM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _day of June, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT ON MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF
THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE to be served by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
RANDALL A. PETERMAN
ALEXANDER P. MCLAUGHLIN
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special
Administrator

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt:
rap@givenspursley .corns

VERNON K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Personal Representative of Estate of Vernon K.
Smith, Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: vls59@live.com

RORY JONES and ERICA JUDD
JONES, GLEDHILL, FURMAN P.A.
225 North 9th Street, #820
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorneys for Vernon K Smith, Jr.

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 331-1529
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt: rjones@idalaw.com;
ejudd@idalaw.com

ALLEN B. ELLIS

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

ELLIS LAW, PLLC

12639 West Explorer Drive
Boise, Idaho 83713
Attorneys for Joseph H Smith
Ronald L. Swafford
Swafford Law, PC
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Attorneys for Sharon Bergmann

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: aellis@aellislaw.com

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524-4131
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt:
rons@swaffordlaw.com
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Courtesy copy provided to:
Victoria Anne Converse
10548 NW Skyline Blvd.
Portland OR 97231

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

ROBERT MAYNES
Maynes Taggart, PLLC
P.O. Box 3005
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403
Attorneys for Walker Land & Livestock, LLC

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 524-6095
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Darrell G. Early
Office of the Attorney General
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Attorneys for State ofIdaho Department of
Environmental Quality

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
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EXIDBITA
Legal Description - Jefferson County Property
Parcel 1
Lots 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 in Block 5, Village and Townsite of Hamer, including and
joining vacated streets and alleys by Ordinance No. 5, Jefferson County, Idaho.
Parcel 2
Township 7 North, Range 36 East of the Boise Meridian, Jefferson County, Idaho.
Section 2: All
Section 11 : All

EXHIBIT A-1
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EXIDBITB
Legal Description - Ada County Property
Parcel 1 (Commonly known as: 1902 W Main St. Boise, ID 83702}
Lot 6 in Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 2 (Commonly known as: 1900 W Main St, Boise, ID 83702)
Lot 7 in Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 3 (Commonly known as: 110 N. 22nd St. Boise, ID 83702)
Lot 5 in Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 4 (Commonly known as: 1807 W Idaho St. Boise, ID 83702)
The Northwesterly 32 feet of Lot 11 in Block 23 of McCarty's Second Addition to Boise City, Ada
County, State of Idaho, according to the
official plat thereof recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Ada County, State of Idaho.
Parcel 5 (Commonly known as: 2001 N Raymond St. Boise, ID 83704)
Lot 6 except the South 50 feet in Block 2 of A Resubdivision of Lot 21, and a portion of Lots 6, 7
and 22, Oradell Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 25, records of Ada
County, Idaho.
Parcel 6 (Commonly known as: 0 S Pleasant Valley Rd. Boise, ID 83705; 6259 S Pleasant Valley
Rd, Boise, ID 83705: 0 S Cole Rd. Boise, ID 83709)
Unit I:
The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 32, Township 3 North, Range 2 East of
the Boise Meridian, in Ada County, Idaho.
Unit II:
Parcel A
The West half of the Northwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise
Meridian. Also shown of record as Lot 4 and the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of
Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East, of the Boise Meridian.
Parcel B
The East half of the Northwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise
Meridian.
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Parcel C
The Southwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise Meridian.
Unit Ill:
The East half of the Northeast quarter of Section 7, and the West half of the Northwest quarter of
Section 8 all in Township 2 North of Range 2 East of Boise Meridian in Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 7 (Commonly known as: 5933 N. Branstetter, Garden City. ID 83714; W. Chinden Blvd .•
Garden City. ID 83714: 9907 W. Chinden Blvd .• Garden City. ID 83714)
Unit I:
Real property situated in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, consisting of 132 acres, more or less
to wit: Commencing at a point North 36°21' West distant 2.88 chains from the center of Section 26,
Township 4 North, Range 1 East, B.M., the real place of beginning, running thence South 73°15'
East a distance of 1.40 chains to a point; thence North 18°48' East a distance of 64.53 chains to a
point; thence North 60°42' West a distance of 2.75 chains to a point; thence South 68°00' West a
distance of 9.50 chains to a point; thence North 75° 00' West a distance of 12.00 chains to a point;
thence North 49°00' West a distance of 3.90 chains to a point; thence South 64°30' West a
distance of 3.70 chains to a point; thence South 72°00' West a distance of 8.50 chains to a point;
thence North 81 °00' West a distance of 3.83 chains to a point; thence South 0°05' West a distance
of 14.92 chains to a point; thence North 80°30' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence
South 48°15' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence South 80°30' East a distance of 3.15
chains to a point; thence South 61°00' East a distance of 1.00 chains to a point; thence South
23°30' East a distance of 2.10 chains to a point; thence South 1000' West a 'distance of 3.60
chains to a point; thence South 26°00' West a distance of 1.80 chains to a point; thence South
27°00' East a distance of 3.70 chains to a point; thence South 1°45' East a distance of 1.50 chains
to a point; thence South 38°30' East a distance of 1.20 chains to a point; thence South 40°45' West
a distance of 2.80 chains to a point; thence South 3°45' West a distance of 4.30 chains to a point;
thence South 34°15' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence South 67°00' East a distance
of 1.40 chains to a point; thence South 49°15' East a distance of 2.50 chains to a point; thence
South 22°30' East a distance of 2.95 chains to a point; thence South 52°00' East a distance of 2.50
chains to a point; thence South 64°00' East a distance of 2.60 chains to a point; thence North
84°45' East a distance of 1.32 chains to a point; thence South 00°03' West a distance of 14.89
chains to the place of beginning; together with all water, ditch and lateral rights appurtenant
hereto or used in connection therewith, including 132 shares in the Thurman Mill Ditch Co, LTD.,
and as said acreage is further identified in that Bargain and Sale Deed, dated December 20, 1954,
and recorded in the Records of the Ada County Recorder's Office, located in Book 440 at Page
104, copies of which are attached hereto, and incorporated herein; and
Unit II:
Real property situated in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, consisting of 44 acres, more or less,
to wit:
Commencing at a point 2 chains 88 links North 36°21' West from the Wash Boulder set in the
center of Section Twenty-six in Township Four North of Range One East of the Boise Meridian;
thence North variation 18°48' East 18 chains and 70 links to a Slough; thence North and Westerly
following the left and South Bank of the said Slough to the East boundary of Lot Nine in Section
Twenty-three in Township and Range aforesaid; thence South following East Boundary of said Lot
Nine, 7 chains and 75 links to Southeast corner of said Lot Nine; thence South following the East
boundary of the West Half of the Northwest Quarter of said Section Twenty-six, 25 chains and 40
links to top of Bluff; thence South and Easterly following the edge of the Bluff to a point 2 chains
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and 88 links North 35°21' West from the Wash Boulder set in the center of said Section Twentysix, said point being the place of beginning. Together with all Certificates of Shares, including
Certificate No. 114 for 44 shares of the capital stock in the Thurman Mill Ditch Company, Ltd, and
as said acreage is further identified in that Warranty Deed dated March 18, 1958, and recorded in
the Records of the Ada County Recorder's Office as Instrument No. 805407, copies of which are
attached hereto and incorporated herein; and said parcels of real properties further identified in
the Tax Parcel Identification Numbers for further reference as set forth as:

(1)

Legal Description: Parcel #0995 in Flood District S2 of Sec 23 & N2 of Sec 26
4N 1E #0990-B
Tax Parcel Number: S0526120995
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St, Garden City, ID 83714

(2)

Legal Description: Parcel #4432 of SE4 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244430-S
Tax Parcel Number: S0526244432
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St, Garden City, ID 83714

(3)

Legal Description: Parcel #4434 of NE4 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244430-B
Tax Parcel Number: S0526244434
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St, Garden City, ID 83714

(4)

Legal Description: Parcel #2580 in Flood District Secs 23 & 26 4N 1E
Tax Parcel Number: S0526212580
Property Address: W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714

(5)

Legal Description: Parcel #3600@NW Comer SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N
1E #244660-8
Tax Parcel Number: S0526243600
Property Address: W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714

(6)

Legal Description: Parcel #3700 Por N2 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244660-B
Tax Parcel Number: S0526243700
Property Address: W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714

(7)

Legal Description: Parcel #4265 NR CTR SE4 NW4 Section 26
4N 1E #244255-8
Tax Parcel Number: S0526244265
Property Address: 9907 W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714
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Electronically Filed
2/24/2020 3:40 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
15006713 [013683-0002]

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-10367

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen ("Plaintiff'), the duly appointed Personal
Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the "Estate"), by and through his counsel of
record, and hereby submits this Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Memorandum"),
pursuant to Rules 54( d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code § 12-121.
The Memorandum is supported by the Declaration of Alexander P. McLaughlin in Support of
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Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("McLaughlin Declaration"). The McLaughlin
Declaration is incorporated herein by reference as though restated in full.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff seeks costs and fees related to Count One of his Complaint-the ejectment
claim-which the Court resolved via its Order Granting Motions for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings, Rule 54(B) Certification, and Writ of Assistance (the "Order").
Plaintiff understands, however, that the entire controversy between Plaintiff and
Defendant Vernon K. Smith, III ("Defendant") is not yet resolved. This request for costs and fees
is, therefore, not meant to address who is the prevailing party for the remaining claims, or any
entitlement to costs and fees related to the outstanding claims. Those matters, and, in all likelihood
this fee request, will be resolved at a later date.
Plaintiff only wishes to preserve his ability to seek and obtain fees and costs with
respect to Count One. As such, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court refrain from ruling on
this fee petition and any objection thereto by Defendant until such time as this Court enters a final
judgment on all counts, so the Court can determine, at that time, prevailing party status and
entitlement to an award of fees and costs.

II.

RECAPITULATION OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
Plaintiffhereby submits the following recapitulation of the costs and attorneys' fees

incurred in the prosecution of this litigation brought against Defendant. To the best of Plaintiffs
knowledge and belief, the items herein are correct and the costs and fees claimed in this
Memorandum and the McLaughlin Declaration are in compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e),
including, but not limited to, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4), I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5):
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COSTS (Sections II and III 2 lnf!a)

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) Costs as a Matter of Right:

$

283.63

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) Discretionary Costs:

$

0.00

TOTAL COSTS:

$

283.63

Randall A. Peterman (partner)- 3.2 hours@ $335/hr

$

1,072.00

Alexander P. McLaughlin (partner)- 4.2 hours@ $245/hr

$

1,029.00

Jack W. Relf (associate)- 31.1 hours@ $185/hr

$

5,753.50

Tiffiny Hudak (paralegal) - 8.2 hours @ $185/hr

$

1,517.00

Keri A. Moody (paralegal)- 13.4 hours@ $170/hr

$

2,278.00

TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES

$

11,649.50

TOTAL COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

$

11,936.13

ATTORNEY FEES (Section IV2 lnf!a)

III.

I.R.C.P. 54(D)(l)(C) / COSTS-ITEMS ALLOWED-AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
1.

Court Filing Fees:

06/07/2019- Filing Fee - Complaint
Total Court Filing Fees
2.

$
227.63
$_ _ _
22_7_.6_3

Actual Fees for Service of Process:

06/19/2019 - Service Fee to Tri-County Process Serving
(service of complaint/summons upon Defendant)

$

Total Actual Fees for Service of Process

$

56.00

- - -56.00
--

3.

Witness Fees: None

4.

Witness Travel Fees: None

5.

Certified Copies of Documents Admitted as Trial Exhibits: None

6.

Cost of Trial Exhibits: None

7.

Cost of Bond Premiums: None
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8.

Reasonable Expert Witness Fees, not to Exceed $2,000 for Each
Expert Witness: None

9.

Charges for Reporting and Transcribing Depositions: None

10.

Charges for One Copy of any Deposition: None

TOTAL COSTS UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(d}(l}(C}
IV.

$====28==3==.6==3

I.R.C.P. 54(D)(l)(D) / DISCRETIONARY COSTS

Plaintiff is not seeking any discretionary costs. Plaintiff recognizes that not all costs
incurred by Plaintiff were necessary and exceptional as required under I.R.C.P 54(d)(l )(D), e.g.,
costs expended for certain routine services, including copy and messenger fees.
V.

ATTORNEYS' FEES

Plaintiff requests $11,649.50 in attorneys' fees. The fee arrangement between
Plaintiff and Givens Pursley was on a time and hour basis. The working attorneys, their fees, their
rates, and the time incurred in this matter are specifically listed and itemized in Exhibit A to the
McLaughlin Declaration.
VI.

LEGAL BASIS FOR AWARD OF FEES

Plaintiff initiated this suit to, among other things, eject Defendant from the subject
property (the "Raymond Street Property"). Plaintiff moved for partial judgment on the pleadings
on Plaintiff's ejectment count. The Court granted the motion and agreed to certify a judgment
under Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Order at 8-10. This Court also
issued a Writ of Assistance for removal of Defendant from the Raymond Street Property. See Writ
of Assistance (February 10, 2020). Plaintiff is, therefore, the prevailing party under I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l )(B).
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A.

Plaintiff is Entitled to Attorneys' Fees and Costs Under Idaho Code Section
12-121.

Idaho Code§ 12-121 states:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees
to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation.
I.C. § 12-121; see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(2) (same). 1
The above standard is met where a party fails to set forth "any genuine issues of
law or legitimate issues of fact.. .. " Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 362, 347 P.3d 645, 654-55
(2015) (awarding attorneys' fees on appeal) (citing Telford Lands LLC v. Cain, 154 Idaho 981,
993,303 P.3d 1237, 1249 (2013)). An award of fees is also warranted under Section 12-121 where
the non-prevailing party advocates a position that is "not fairly debatable." Assocs. Northwest,
Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 1987). "When deciding whether

the case was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire
course of the litigation must be taken into account." Idaho Military Historical Society v. Maslen,
156 Idaho 624, 631, 329 P.3d 1072, 1079 (2014) (stating, in part, that the assertion that a party set
forth at least one argument that has merit is no longer a basis to evade an award of fees and costs).
Here, this Court should award Plaintiff his reasonable fees under I.C. § 12-121.
The main issue in this action was whether Plaintiff owns the Raymond Street Property, occupied
by Defendant. As the Court noted in its Order, ownership was already decided in favor of Plaintiff
via the Rule 70 Judgment the probate court entered (and the Supreme Court affirmed). That issue

1
Idaho Code§ 12-121 is a discretionary attorneys' fees provision. Jim and Maryann Plane Family Trust v.
Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, _, 342 P.3d 639, 647 (2015). Thus, an award of fees under Section 12-121 "will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion." Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259 P.3d 608, 614 (2011) (citing
Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008)).
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is not "fairly debatable" and Defendant failed to set forth "any genuine issues of law or legitimate
issues of fact." Since Defendant defended this action without a basis in fact or law, Plaintiff is
entitled to an award of fees under Section 12-121.

B.

Plaintiff's Attorneys' Fees Are Reasonable.
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) "sets forth the factors the court must consider to determine what

amount is reasonable" for an award of fees and costs. Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 459,
210 P.3d 552, 559 (2009). Those factors consist of the following:
(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances
of the case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.

(J) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer
Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably
necessary in preparing a party's case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the
particular case.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(3); Na/en v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79, 81, 741 P.2d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that the court is to consider each factor without placing undue weight on any given one).
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Here, a review of the above factors indicates the fees Plaintiff incurred and seeks
are reasonable. The reasonableness of the award is set out in detail in the McLaughlin Declaration.
Briefly, however, Plaintiff notes that he achieved a tremendous outcome-ejectment of Defendant
from the Raymond Street Property. Counsel are experienced litigators and their rates are
reasonable. Further, while the labor involved in this matter was not intensive, the amount Plaintiff
seeks is commensurate with the labor involved and the result obtained. The record supplies a more
than adequate basis for the Court to award the attorneys' fees requested using the factors set forth
in Rule 54(e)(3).
C.

Plaintiff is Entitled to an Award of the Fees and Costs Incurred in Preparing
the Documents Associated with this Fee Request.

In BECO Construction Company, Inc., v. J-U-B Engineers Inc., the Idaho Supreme
Court held "that courts may award reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the effort
to secure a reasonable amount of attorney fees." 149 Idaho 294,298,233 P.3d 1216, 1220 (2010);
also Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 185 P.3d 258 (2008) (affirming district court's ruling

awarding fees in connection with litigating the reasonableness of fees requested by the prevailing
party, stating that "litigation over the amount of the attorney fee award is also part of the legal
action for which he is entitled to an award of attorney fees.").
Here, the amount sought by Plaintiff in connection with an award of reasonable
fees and costs is itself reasonable. Also, just as in Lettunich, the requested fee award is a
continuation of the litigation. Accordingly, an award of fees for drafting the documents associated
with Plaintiffs fee request is appropriate.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated above, Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action and Idaho
Code Section 12-121 entitles Plaintiff to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. The items of costs
and attorneys' fees stated in this Memorandum are correct, reasonable, and in compliance with
Rules 54(d) and 54(e). For these reasons, an award of costs in the amount of $286.63 and fees in
the amount of $11,649.50 (for a total amount ofSll,936.13) is reasonable and warranted in favor
of Plaintiff against the Defendant.
DATED this 24th day of February, 2020.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Randall A. Peterman- Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of February, 2020, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vvs1900@gmail.com

Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Alexander P. McLaughlin
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Electronically Filed
2/24/2020 3:40 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
15017435 [13683-0002]

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-10367

DECLARATION OF ALEXANDER P.
MCLAUGHLIN IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

ALEXANDER P. MCLAUGHLIN, under penalty of perjury, hereby declares and
states as follows:
1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly

appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the "Plaintiff'). I am a
partner with the law firm of Givens Pursley LLP ("Givens Pursley") and was one of the attorneys
responsible for handling the litigation 1 in the above-captioned matter. I am, therefore, well versed

1

The "litigation" referred to means the litigation surrounding the single cause of action-ejectment-for
which this Court issued relief in Plaintiffs favor. The remainder of the claims are pending.
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as to the charges listed in Exhibit A 2 to this Declaration and Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs and
Attorneys' Fees (the "Memorandum"), each of which are by this reference incorporated herein as
though restated in full.
BASIS AND METHOD OF FEE AND COST COMPUTATION
2.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e), Exhibit A to this Declaration sets forth:

(a) the names and rates of the attorneys and paralegals that worked on this matter; (b) the date on
which the attorneys and paralegals rendered services; (c) the actual services rendered; (d) the
hourly rates charged; and (e) the number of hours expended. Under the arrangement with Plaintiff,
Givens Pursley charged him on a time and hour basis. To the best ofmy knowledge and belief, the
items of costs and attorneys' fees stated in the Memorandum and Exhibit A are correct and in
compliance with Rules 54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure including, but not
limited to, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4), I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5).
RULE 54(E)(3) FACTORS FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARD
3.

As to the reasonableness of the amount of fees and costs sought, the

undersigned has properly taken into consideration the following factors with regard to the fees
requested: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the attorney
in the particular field oflaw; (4) the prevailing charges for like work; (5) whether the fee is fixed
or contingent; (6) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case;
(7) the amount involved and the results obtained; (8) the undesirability of the case; (9) the nature

2

The matter history report is submitted in place of copies of the actual billing statements to reduce the amount
of pages actually filed with the Court. By submitting the matter history report to the Court, Plaintiff does not, nor do
he intend to, waive the attorney-client or work product privileges in any respect. Plaintiff also notes that for time
entries containing more than one matter within a single line item entry (e.g., drafting the complaint filed in this matter
simultaneously with drafting the complaint filed in the similar ejectment action pending in Ada County District Court
Case CV0l-19-10368), such entries were split in half, with only one-halfofthe entry apportioned to the instant action.

DECLARATION OF ALEXANDER P. MCLAUGHLIN IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS - 2
Page 191

and length of the professional relationship with the client; ( 10) awards in similar cases; and ( 11) the
reasonable cost of automated legal research. Each relevant factor will be discussed in tum.
TIME AND LABOR INVOLVED

4.

Relatively speaking, this case did not involve a great deal of time or labor.

The Court resolved this ejectment component of this case based on a single motion brought by
Plaintiff, with no discovery conducted; provided, however, the Court did continue the initial
hearing on Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and allowed Defendant to file
supplemental briefing, to which Plaintiff objected and responded. That said, while the time and
labor involved may not have been significant, the charges for such time and labor were
commensurate with the amount of fees requested and the result obtained.
SKILL NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUTCOME AND EXPERIENCE OF ATTORNEY/
PREYAILING CHARGES FOR LIKE WORK

5.

Randall A. Peterman has been a practicing attorney for over 40 years and is

a partner at Givens Pursley. In that time, he has been lead counsel on a number of complex, highdollar commercial litigation cases. He is named in Chambers and Partners for bankruptcy and
creditor's rights. He is also a member of the American College of Bankruptcy. Mr. Peterman's
rate of $335.00 is consistent and customary for attorneys of similar experience.
6.

The undersigned is a partner at Givens Pursley and the co-chair of Givens

Pursley's litigation department. I have practiced law for approximately 11 years. In that time, I
have garnered a great deal of litigation experience, have worked as lead counsel on many
significant cases, and have represented clients before the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Court of
Appeals, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States District Court for the District
of Idaho. I am ranked as a Band 2 attorney in Chambers and Partners for business litigation, listed
as a Mountain States Super Lawyer, and am an Associate Fellow for Litigation Counsel of
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America. My rate of $245 per hour is reasonable. If anything, it is on the low end for partners at
larger firms in Idaho.
7.

Associate attorney Jack Relf also assisted in this matter. Mr. Relf has been

an attorney for over 3 years and has garnered significant litigation experience in a short time.
Mr. Relf graduated magna cum laude from the University of Idaho College of Law and was a law
clerk at the Idaho Supreme Court. Mr. Relf s hourly rate of $185 is consistent with the market for
attorneys of similar experience.
8.

Tiffiny Hudak, a senior paralegal with nearly 25 years of experience,

obtained her paralegal certificate from California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo,
in 1995. Ms. Hudak is experienced in many areas oflitigation, and has assisted in taking a dozen
large, multi-party, multi-million-dollar litigation matters to trial, in both federal and state
courts. Ms. Hudak has also assisted in multiple evidentiary hearings and administrative
proceedings. Over the course of her career, Ms. Hudak has reviewed and managed document
databases containing over two million pages of documents. Ms. Hudak' s hourly rate of $185 is,
therefore, commensurate with her vast experience.
9.

Keri Moody has also aided in the representation of Plaintiff. Ms. Moody has

over 15 years' experience as a paralegal. She graduated in 2003 from Northwest Nazarene
University, magna cum laude, with a Bachelor of Arts in Public Communication, with a minor in
Business Administration. Ms. Moody's rate on this matter is $170.00 per hour.
THE RESULT OBTAINED

10.

The Givens Pursley timekeepers identified above assisted in obtaining a

tremendous result in this case, namely, the ejectment of Defendant from the subject property.
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A WARDS IN SIMILAR CASES
11.

Courts in Idaho have awarded similar sums associated with single motion

cases (although this case will be continuing). For example, in ABC Agra, LLC v. Critical Access
Group, Inc., Case No. CV-2012-513, the Honorable Robert Elgee awarded the defendant
$11,058.00 in fees and costs after the defendant prevailed on a motion to dismiss for lack of
ripeness. A true and correct copy of Judge Elgee's decision in attached hereto as Exhibit B. The
case was appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed on a different issue than the reasonableness of
fees. ABC Agra, LLC v. Critical Access Group, Inc., 156 Idaho 781, 331 P.3d 523 (2014).
CONCLUSION

Based on the points stated above and the relevant 54(e)(3) factors, the amount
Plaintiff requests as an award of fees is reasonable. Plaintiff respectfully asks that this Court award
Plaintiff the full amount of fees requested in the Memorandum in the amount of $11,649.50, as
well as $283.63 in costs, for a total amount of $11,936.13.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
DATED this 24th day of February, 2020.
Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Alexander P. McLaughlin
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of February, 2020, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DECLARATION OF ALEXANDER P. MCLAUGHLIN IN
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vvs1900@gmail.com

Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Alexander P. McLaughlin
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EXHIBIT A
Givens Pursley LLP
Attorney Fees Listing

Noah G. Hillen v. Vernon K. Smith, Ill
Date

05/23/2019

Attorney

JWR

Hours

Amount

Rate

0.50

92.50

185.00

Narrative

Correspond with A. McLaughlin and R. Peterman regarding
eviction that need to be filed against tenant of client (.1);
correspond with K. Moody regarding background information
on tenant to be evicted (.1); draft, revise, and edit complaint
for ejectment (.3);

05/24/2019

JWR

0.10

18.50

185.00

Revise complaints for ejectment against Vernon K. Smith Ill;

05/28/2019

KAO

0.10

17.00

170.00

Correspondence to J. Relf regarding scope of ejectment action

05/29/2019

JWR

0.40

74.00

185.00

(.1);
Revise complaint for ejectment, unjust enrichment, and other
relief;
Edit and revise ejectment complaint (.2);

05/31/2019

APM

0.20

49.00

245.00

05/31/2019

JWR

0.70

129.50

185.00

Further revise complaint for ejectment and other relief
against Vernon K. Smith Ill (.6); correspond with A.

06/04/2019

KAO

0.30

51.00

170.00

Revise complaint against V.K. Smith, Ill for ejectment and

06/05/2019

APM

0.50

122.50

245.00

similar relief (.3);
Analyze complaints, deposition transcripts, other documents

McLaughlin regarding the same (.1);

associated with unlawful detainer, and discuss the same with
J. Relf (.5);
06/05/2019

KAO

0.10

17.00

170.00

Conference regarding ejectment action as to V.K. Smith, Ill;

06/05/2019

JWR

0.60

111.00

185.00

Correspond with A. McLaughlin regarding ejectment action
against V. Smith Ill (.2); further review of complaint for

06/06/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

expedited unlawful detainer (.4).
Finalize ejectment complaint against and V.K. Smith, Ill (.1);
correspondence to N. Hillen regarding the same (.1);

06/06/2019

APM

0.10

24.50

245.00

Finalize unlawful detainer complaint (.1);

06/06/2019

RAP

0.20

67.00

335.00

Review and approve ejectment complaint against lessee, and
draft email to K. Moody and A. McLaughlin regarding same
(.2);

06/17/2019

KAO

0.40

68.00

170.00

Correspondence to K. Vink regarding status of service of
ejectment complaint on V.K. Smith, Ill (.1); draft motion to
disqualify in ejectment case against V.K. Smith, Ill (.3);

06/18/2019

KAO

0.10

17.00

170.00

Conference with K. Vink regarding status of service of
complaint on V.K. Smith, Ill (.1);

07/01/2019

KAO

0.30

51.00

170.00

Draft order granting motion to disqualify judge in V.K. Smith,
Ill ejectment case (.3);
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Date

Attorney

Hours

Amount

Rate

07/01/2019

APM

0.10

24.50

245.00

07/02/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

Narrative

Correspond regarding status of disqualification motion and
three day notice of intent to take default {.l);
Review order granting disqualification of Judge Moody in V.K.
Smith, Ill ejectment case and discuss action to default said
defendant {.2);

07/11/2019

APM

0.10

24.50

245.00

07/24/2019

KAO

0.10

17.00

170.00

Address next steps in ejectment action {.1);
Correspondence regarding status of motion for summary
judgment in V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment {.1);

07/30/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

Review notice of reassignment of V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment
case {.2);

08/07/2019

KAO

0.30

51.00

170.00

Draft scheduling stipulation in V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment case

08/26/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

{.3);
Correspondence regarding stipulation for scheduling and

09/09/2019

0.20

49.00

245.00

planning in V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment case {.2);
Draft motion to amend scheduling order {.2);

09/10/2019

APM
APM

0.30

73.50

245.00

Edit and revise motion to amend scheduling order {.3);

09/16/2019

JWR

0.80

148.00

185.00

Draft, revise, and edit motion for judgment on the pleadings
in ejectment case against V.K. Smith from Raymond Street
property {.8);

09/17/2019

JWR

0.70

129.50

185.00

Review and analyze answer to complaint for ejectment filed
by V.K. Smith related to Raymond Street property (.7);

09/19/2019

JWR

0.50

92.50

185.00

Draft, revise, and edit motion for judgment on the pleadings
in ejectment case against V.K. Smith for Raymond Street
property {.5);

09/23/2019

JWR

0.90

166.50

185.00

Draft, revise, and edit memorandum in support of motion for
judgment on the pleadings in ejectment case against V.K.
Smith from Raymond Street property {.5); review and analyze
legal authority cited by opposing party in answer to complaint
for ejectment {.4);

09/30/2019

JWR

1.40

259.00

185.00

Draft, revise, and edit memorandum in support of motion for
judgment on the pleadings for ejectment case against Vernon
K. Smith on Raymond Street property;

10/07/2019

JWR

4.20

777.00

185.00

Review and analyze complaint and answer filed in ejectment
case against V.K. Smith Ill in preparation for filing motion for
judgment on the pleadings {.6); draft, revise, and edit motion
for judgment on the pleadings, together with memorandum
and declaration of N. Hillen in support of ejectment case
against V.K. Smith Ill.

10/08/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

Further correspondence regarding trial date in V.K. Smith, Jr.

10/08/2019

APM

0.40

98.00

245.00

ejectment case {.2);
Discuss dates for continued hearing with K. Moody {.3);
communicate with client regarding filing in V.K. Smith Ill case
{.l);
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Date

10/09/2019

Attorney

KAO

Hours

Amount

Rate

1.30

221.00

170.00

Narrative

Draft notice of hearing regarding motion for judgment on
pleadings in V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment case (.2); finalize and file
said motion for judgment in pleadings in V.K. Smith, Ill
ejectment case and supporting documents (.8); conference
with V.K. Smith, Jr. regarding hearing dates for motion for
judgment on pleadings in case against V.K. Smith, Ill and
attend to issues thereon (.3);

10/09/2019

APM

0.10

24.50

245.00

Correspond regarding trial dates in V.K. Smith Ill's case (.1);

10/10/2019

KAO

0.40

68.00

170.00

Correspondence regarding trial dates in V.K. Smith, Ill
ejectment case and order on pending motion (.2); exchange
additional correspondence regarding said trial date and
communicating with Judge's chambers regarding the same
(.2);

10/11/2019
10/11/2019

KAO
APM

0.40
0.10

68.00
24.50

170.00

Draft order granting motion to change trial date in V.K. Smith,

245.00

Ill ejectment (.4);
Address issue regarding new trial date in V.K. Smith, Ill
ejectment case (.1);

10/21/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

Conference with Mark at office of V.K. Smith, Jr. regarding
proposed order to extend trial in V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment case
(.2);

10/29/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

Conference with Mark at office of V.K. Smith, Jr. regarding
status of endorsement of order to extend trial date in V.K.

11/05/2019

KAO

0.40

68.00

170.00

Smith, Ill ejectment case (.2);
Exchange correspondence regarding issues in V.K. Smith, Ill
ejectment case and witness disclosures (.4);

11/05/2019

JWR

0.70

129.50

185.00

Correspond with A. McLaughlin and K. Moody regarding
developing strategy moving forward in ejectment case against
V.K. Smith Ill (.2); review and analyze scheduling order and
correspondence with V.K. Smith Jr. in ejectment case against
V.K. Smith Ill (.3); draft, revise, and edit witness disclosure of
lay witnesses in ejectment case against V.K. Smith Ill (.l);
correspond with K. Moody regarding upcoming hearing on
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in ejectment case
against V.K. Smith Ill (.l);

11/05/2019

APM

0.20

49.00

245.00

Correspond regarding filings in V.K. Smith Ill case (.l);
correspond regarding ejectment (.l);

11/08/2019

JWR

0.70

129.50

185.00

Review and analyze opposition to motion for partial judgment
on the pleadings in ejectment case against V.K. Smith Ill (.7);

11/13/2019

KAO

0.50

85.00

170.00

Analyze V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment case, and action items in
case (.2);

11/22/2019

KAO

0.10

17.00

170.00

11/25/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

Conference regarding upcoming deadlines in V.K. Smith, Ill
eviction case (.l);
Exchange correspondence regarding upcoming action items in
V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment (.2);
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Date

11/26/2019

Attorney

KAO

Hours

Amount

Rate

1.40

238.00

170.00

Narrative

Prepare for December 3 hearing in V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment
(.2); revise reply in support of motion for judgment on
pleadings in V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment (.5);

11/26/2019

JWR

2.60

481.00

185.00

Review and analyze opposition to motion for partial judgment
on the pleadings in ejectment case involving Raymond Street
property (.8); draft, revise, and edit reply memorandum in
support of motion for partial judgment on the pleadings in
Raymond Street property {1.8);

11/27/2019

JWR

1.00

185.00

185.00

Review and revise reply memorandum in support of motion
for partial judgment on the pleadings in ejectment case
involving Raymond St. Property (.4); draft, revise, and edit
outline of oral argument on motion for partial judgment on
the pleadings in ejectment case involving Raymond St.

12/02/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

Property {.6);
Conference with J. Relf regarding probate status as it relates
to issues that may raise at hearing regarding motion for
judgment on the pleadings in V.K. Smith Ill case {.2);

12/02/2019

APM

0.10

24.50

245.00

Correspond regarding hearing on the motion for judgment on
the pleadings (V.K. Smith Ill) (.l);

12/02/2019

JWR

0.60

111.00

185.00

Correspond with A. McLaughlin regarding upcoming hearing in
ejectment case against V.K. Smith Ill {.l); draft, revise, and
edit outline of argument for motion for judgment on the
pleadings in ejectment case against V.K. Smith Ill (.5);

12/03/2019

APM

0.20

49.00

245.00

Assist J. Relf in preparing for hearing {.2);

12/03/2019

JWR

3.00

555.00

185.00

Prepare for and attend oral argument on motion for partial
judgment on the pleadings in ejectment case against V.K.
Smith Ill {2.8}; draft, revise, and edit summary of hearing on
motion for judgment on the pleadings against V.K. Smith Ill
{.2);

12/04/2019

KAO

0.90

153.00

170.00

Exchange correspondence regarding outcome of hearing in
V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment case, new deadlines and related
issues {.3); draft amended notice of hearing for said case as to
motion for partial judgment on pleadings (.2); correspondence
to V.K. Smith, Jr. regarding trial date in said ejectment case
(.4);

12/10/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

Correspondence to V.K. Smith, Jr. regarding alternate trial

12/10/2019

APM

0.10

24.50

245.00

Edit and revise Notice of Supplemental Authority and Order
Granting Motion to Reset Trial Date (.l);

12/10/2019

JWR

0.20

37.00

185.00

Review and revise notice of supplemental authority and

dates for V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment trial {.2);

proposed order granting motion to adjust trial date in
ejectment case against V.K. Smith Ill {.2);
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Date

Attorney

Hours

Amount

Rate

12/10/2019

RAP

0.30

100.50

335.00

12/11/2019

KAO

1.20

204.00

170.00

Narrative

Attend to issues regarding ejectment action as to V.K. Smith Ill
{.3);
Extended conference regarding V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment {.2);
exchange correspondence with counsel for V.K. Smith, Ill
regarding trial date and order thereon (.3); revise order
modifying scheduling order in said case {.2); draft notice of
memorandum decision in Gibson case for filing in V.K. Smith,
Ill ejectment case {.3); correspondence to N. Hillen regarding
trial dates in V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment case {.2);

12/11/2019

APM

0.10

24.50

245.00

Correspond regarding status of order and notice of

12/11/2019

JWR

0.30

55.50

185.00

supplemental authority;
Review and revise notice of supplemental authority and

170.00

ejectment case against V.K. Smith Ill;
Correspondence to counsel for V.K. Smith, Ill regarding trial

proposed order granting motion to adjust trial date in
12/12/2019

KAO

0.40

68.00

date {.2); finalize notice of supplemental authority for filing in
V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment case and proposed order regarding
trial date {.2);
12/12/2019

RAP

0.50

167.50

335.00

Conference regarding V.K. Smith Ill ejectment (.2); attend to
trial issues regarding V.K. Smith Ill ejectment, and change in
scheduling order {.3);

12/13/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

Review and circulate order in V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment

12/13/2019

JWR

0.10

18.50

185.00

regarding trial date {.2);
Review and analyze order granting motion to amend
scheduling order in ejectment case against V.K. Smith Ill;

12/13/2019

RAP

0.40

134.00

335.00

Attend to issues regarding trial date for ejectment action, and
review documents regarding ejectment action against V.K.
Smith Ill (.4);

12/16/2019

RAP

0.30

100.50

335.00

Attend to issues regarding Raymond Street residence and

12/17/2019

APM

0.20

49.00

245.00

absence of V.K. Smith Ill (.3);
Correspond regarding V.K. Smith Ill litigation {.2);

12/17/2019

KAO

1.10

187.00

170.00

Review correspondence regarding occupancy of Raymond
Street house {.2); conference with supervising attorney
regarding V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment and apparent vacancy of
house (.1); review amended scheduling order in V.K. Smith, Ill
ejectment and attend to updated deadlines {.8);

12/17/2019

JWR

1.10

203.50

185.00

Review and analyze supplemental memorandum in opposition
to motion for partial judgment on the pleadings in ejectment

12/17/2019

RAP

0.20

67.00

335.00

case against V.K. Smith Ill;
Review email from J. Strother regarding possible
abandonment of property by V.K. Smith Ill, and A.
McLaughlin's response {.2);
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12/18/2019

Attorney

KAO

Hours

Amount

Rate

0.60

102.00

170.00

Narrative

Conference with Court regarding December 3, 2019 hearing in
V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment case (.2); correspondence to Court
regarding audio file of the same (.2); conference with
supervising attorney regarding the same (.2);

12/18/2019

APM

0.10

24.50

245.00

Discuss strategy in V.K. Smith Ill litigation and in general;

12/18/2019

RAP

0.30

100.50

335.00

Review supplemental memo in opposition to motion on the

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

pleadings filed as to V.K. Smith Ill ejectment;
12/19/2019

Exchange correspondence regarding motion for partial
judgment on pleadings in V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment (.2);

12/19/2019

JWR

0.30

55.50

185.00

Review audio recording of hearing on motion for judgment on
the pleadings in ejectment case against V.K. Smith Ill;

12/19/2019

RAP

0.30

100.50

335.00

Attend to issues regarding hearing on ejectment against V.K.
Smith Ill {.3);

12/23/2019

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

Exchange correspondence regarding filing additional affidavit
in support of motion for judgment on the pleadings in V.K.

12/30/2019
12/30/2019

KAO
JWR

0.20
1.60

34.00
296.00

170.00

Smith, Ill ejectment (.2);
Correspondence regarding status of opposition to V.K. Smith,

185.00

Ill submission regarding ejectment case {.2);
Draft, revise, and edit motion to strike supplemental
memorandum filed by opposing party in ejectment case

12/31/2019

APM

0.70

171.50

245.00

against V.K. Smith Ill and opposition to the same;
Edit and revise objection and response to V.K. Smith Ill's
supplemental opposition (. 7);

12/31/2019

JWR

4.30

795.50

185.00

Draft, revise, and edit motion to strike supplemental
memorandum filed by opposing party in ejectment case
against V.K. Smith Ill and opposition to the same {3.6);
correspond with A. McLaughlin regarding briefing in
ejectment case against V.K. Smith Ill {.3); review and analyze
objection to supplemental opposition in ejectment case

01/09/2020

JWR

0.50

92.50

185.00

against V.K. Smith Ill (.4);
Draft outline of oral argument for upcoming motion for
judgment on the pleadings in ejectment case against V.K.
Smith Ill (.5);

01/13/2020

JWR

0.90

166.50

185.00

Prepare for upcoming oral argument on motion for judgment
on the pleadings in ejectment case against V.K. Smith Ill {.9);

01/14/2020

APM

0.30

73.50

245.00

Discuss outcome of hearing with J. Relf on V.K. Smith Ill
motion for judgment on the pleadings {.1); discuss pending
matters in case {.2);

01/14/2020

RAP

0.50

167.50

335.00

Review email from J. Relf regarding outcome of ejectment
action of as to V.K. Smith Ill, and as to plans of V.K. Smith, Jr.
(.2); discuss same with A. McLaughlin and draft letter to J. Relf
and A. McLaughlin regarding same {.3);
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Date

01/14/2020

Attorney

JWR

Hours

Amount

Rate

2.40

444.00

185.00

Narrative

Prepare for and participate in oral argument on motion for
judgment on the pleadings in ejectment cast against V.K.
Smith Ill (2.0); draft, revise, and edit summary of outcome of
above hearing and review and analyze feedback and strategy
from R. Peterman regarding the same (.4);

2/10/2020

APM

0.10

24.50

245.00

2/11/2020

KAO

0.20

34.00

170.00

Analyze decision from Judge Hoagland in VKS, Ill (.1);
Review order granting motion for judgment on pleadings in
V.K. Smith, Ill ejectment case and discuss next steps (.2);

2/11/2020

TMH

0.90

166.50

185.00

Review order granting motions for partial judgment on the
pleadings and writ of assistance (VKS Ill eviction) (.l); begin
working on fee application and compiling relevant time
entries (.8);

2/12/2020

TMH

4.70

869.50

185.00

Continue working on fee application (VKS Ill eviction) (.9);
begin draft of declaration of counsel in support (.3); work on
exhibit to declaration (.2); review time entries from May
through December and parse out relevant entries for VKS Ill

2/13/2020

RAP

0.20

67.00

335.00

fee application (3.3);
Review N. Hillen's email confirming to proceed forward with
ejectment and eviction as to V.K. Smith, Ill's residence (.2);

2/20/2020

TMH

2.60

481.00

185.00

Complete draft of fee application (VKS Ill eviction) (1.0);
complete draft of declaration of counsel in support thereof
(.8); review time entries from January and February and parse
out relevant entries for VKS Ill fee application (.8);

60.10

11,649.50

SUMMARY OF FEES
APM

4.20

1,029.00

245.00

JWR

31.10

5,753.50

185.00

KAO

13.40
3.20

2,278.00

170.00

1,072.00

335.00
185.00

RAP
TMH

8.20

1,517.00

60.10

11,649.50
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EXHIBIT A
Givens Pursley LLP
Costs Listing

Noah G. Hillen v. Vernon K. Smith1 Ill
Date

Description

06/07/2019
06/25/2019

Filing Fees

Amount Narrative

Serving Expense

227.63 iCourt filing fee
56.00 Service of complaint and summons on Vernon K Smith, Ill

Total

283.63
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DISTRICT COURT
FIFTH JUDICIAL DIST
JEROME COUNTY, IDAHO

2013

~311re1r~·s~h

~~~.11•
-

-

Patrick J. Miller, ISBN 3221
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISBN 5876
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock St.
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200

.C
~ A 11

ax: (208) 388-1300

2 13

iv ns Pursley, LLP

(10?9'"8)

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME
ABC AGRA, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company~

Case No.: CV-2012o;513
ORDER AW A.RDING
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiff;
V,

CRITICAL ACCESS GROUP, INC., a
Minnesota non-profit corporation,
Defendant

This matter having come before the Court on the Defendant's application for attorneys'
fees and costs and the Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Part of the Defendant's Attorneys' Fees,

and after hearing argument of counsel;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, based upon the reasons stated on the record at the hearing in
this action on December 12, 2012, that attomey
fees are awarded to Defendant in the amount of
'f, ,

ORDER Aw ARD1NG ATTORNEYS' FEES AND Cosrs
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$11,000.00 and costs, as a matter of right; are awarded in the amount of $58.00, for a total of
$11,058.00.

DA ED this

day of December 2012.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

_3-.__

day of December 2012, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing was served on the following individual(s) by the means indicated:

ef'

Gary D. Slette
Robertson & Slette, PLLC
P.0. Box 1906

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 933 .. 0701
Email

Email: gslette@r:sidaholaw.oom

D
D
D
D

Patrick J. Miller

ciu.S.Mail

Twin Falls, ID 83303-1906

D
D
D
D

Givens Pursley LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Boise; ID 83 702
Email: pjm@givenspursley.com

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mai]
Facsimile (208) 388 1300
Email

CLERK F THE COURT

ORl>ER AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES A_ND COSTS
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Filed: 02/28/2020 13:57:50
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Hoskins, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV0I-19-10367
PARTIAL JUDGMENT

vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, as personal representative of the estate
of Victoria H. Smith, on Count One of his Complaint. Defendant Vernon K. Smith III shall
immediately vacate and surrender possession of the premises located at 2001 North Raymond
Street, Boise, Idaho 83704.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: 2/24/2020 04:51 PM

Date
District Judge

Partial Judgment - 1
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE

With respect to the issues determined by the above partial judgment it is hereby CERTIFIED, in
accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is no just reason for
delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct that the above
partial judgment is a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken
as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: 2/28/2020 01 :04 PM

Date
District Judge

Partial Judgment - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Signed: 2/28/2020 01 :58 PM

I hereby certify that on ______ , I served a true and correct copy of the within instrument
to:

Randall Peterman
Alexander McLaughlin
Jack Relf
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Vernon Smith
vkslaw@live.com

Phil McGrane
Clerk of the District Court

By~
DeputyourtClerk

Partial Judgment - 3
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Electronically Filed
3/5/2020 4:26 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
v.

VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV0l-19-10367

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
FEES AND COSTS

I.
STATUS OF THE PROCEEDING

On February 10, 2020, partial judgment on the pleadings in the nature of a summary
judgment was entered for the Plaintiff Hillen on a single count for ejectment as contained within
the complaint. A Rule 54(b) Certificate was issued with this judgment. On February 24, 2020
Plaintiff Hillen submitted a Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, as arising out of the entry
of the February 10, 2020 judgment.
As further argued below the Defendant Smith III objects to, and opposes, the Plaintiff
Hillen's requests for an award of costs and fees on the basis that: (1) at this point in the proceeding
no prevailing party can be determined who would be entitled to any award of costs and fees; and
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS-PAGE 1
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(2) an award of attorney's fees under LC. §12-121 can only to be made at the conclusion of the
entire action, not at the time any single motion has ·been determined. Therefore the Plaintiff
Hillen's request for an award of costs and fees must be denied in its entirety.

II.
ARGUMENT

A.

Hillen Cannot Be Declared The Prevailing Party In The Action

As clearly stated on the face of the Plaintiff Hillen' s supporting memorandum, "Plaintiff
solely wishes at this point to preserve his ability to seek and obtain fees and costs with respect to
Count One." Fees & Cost Memo at pg. 2. The prevailing party analysis provided by Rule 54(d)
is based only upon a determination of which party prevailed on the main issue of the entire action,
and not upon a determination of which party has prevailed on any single issue within the action.
As recently stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 301, 385 P.3d
856 (2016):
Rule 54(d)( 1)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure guides the prevailing party
analysis: "In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled
to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties." The
Court stated in Hobson that "the issue ... is not who succeeded on more individual
claims, but rather who succeeded on the main issue of the action." 154 Idaho at 49,
294 P.3d at 175. 161 Idaho at 315, 385 P.3d at 870.
The application of this entire proceeding prevailing party analysis is not altered by the entry
of a Rule 54(b) Certificate rendering as final an otherwise interlocutory judgment. A Rule 54(b)
Certificate does not in any manner alter the applicable prevailing party analysis that is based upon
a determination of the outcome of the entire case, as was stated by the Court in Steel Farms, Inc.
v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 297 P.3d 222 (2012):
[T]his appeal arises from an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certified judgment which resolved some,
but not all, of the parties' claims. Since each claim in an action must be resolved
before a court may determine the prevailing party, the identity of the prevailing
party in this case will not be known until proceedings at the trial level are complete.
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l); Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 804-05, 241 P.3d 972, 97778 (2010) (citing MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Fouche, 146 Idaho 1, 4, 189 P.3d 463,
466 (2008)). Upon the district court's entry of a final judgment deciding each claim
below, the court is to determine which party has prevailed and whether that party
is entitled to attorney fees related to this appeal. 154 Idaho at 269,297 P.3d at 232.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS -PAGE 2
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Because an award of costs can only be made to a prevailing party, as determined under
Rule 54(d)(l ), and that determination cannot be made by the Court at this early stage of the
proceedings, the Plaintiff Hillen's request for an award of costs, as a matter of right, as arising out
of the determination of the ejectment claim, must be denied at this time.
No award of any attorney's fees can be made to Hillen in the absence of a prior
determination of his status as a prevailing party, inasmuch as both of the requested basis for an
award of fees cited in support of Hillen's memorandum- LC. §12-121 - only permit an award to
be made to a prevailing party, and only then in the discretion of the court, not as a matter of right.
Therefore Hillen's request for the award of fees must be denied in their entirety at this juncture of
the proceedings. Because independent grounds exist as well to further support a denial of Hillen' s
request for an award of fees under both LC. §12-121, those additional independent grounds will
be further stated in the argument set out below.

B.

Plaintiff has come to realize Attorney's Fees Cannot Be Awarded Under I.C. §12120(3) On A Claim For Eiectment, as was previously sought in the similar action
filed by Plaintiff in Hillen v. Gibson, Case No. CV0J-19-10368
Plaintiff Hillen had previously requested an award of attorney's fees in the case
entitled Hillen v. Gibson, Case No. CV0J-19-10368, upon the "commercial transaction"
basis of LC. §12-120(3). Because of Gibson's objection to any such award in that case,
Plaintiff Hillen has come to realize, after being so informed by counsel in that action, that
there is a long-recognized exception to any award of attorney's fees under the commercial
transaction provision of LC. § 12-120(3) regarding those claims in which the gravamen of
the action is a property dispute, rather than a claimed commercial action. This property
dispute exclusion has been summarized as follows by the Idaho Supreme Court in C & G,
Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 25 P.3d 76 (2001):

The present action is primarily a dispute over whether the properties in
question were conveyed in fee simple or as easements. As such, this case does not
fall within the meaning of a commercial transaction as defined in LC.§ 12-120(3).
The present situation is instead more analogous to situations involving the
determination of property rights where this Court and the Court of Appeals have
uniformly denied an award of attorney fees. See Jerry J. Joseph CL. U Ins. Assoc.
v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (Ct.App.1990) (denying attorney fees
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS -PAGE 3
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under LC. § 12-120(3) in an action where property owner sought a judgment
compelling adjoining property owners to reimburse it for irrigation assessments, to
record an instrument establishing an access easement, and to remove a fence
hindering its use of the easement and where after settlement, adjoining property
owners breached the settlement agreement); Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 1006, 829
P.2d 1355 (Ct.App. 1991) (determining that a quiet title action involving dispute
over the existence of a prescriptive easement was not a commercial transaction
under LC.§ 12-120(3)); Durrantv. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 785 P.2d 634 (1990)
(holding that an action in which landowners sought adjudication of water rights and
a permanent restraining order prohibiting the defendant from interfering with their
diversion and use of water determined was not based on a commercial transaction
as defined in I.C. § 12-120(3)); Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131
Idaho 657, 962 P .2d 1041 ( 1998) (stating that an action to determine ownership and
easement rights did not fall within the meaning of a commercial transaction under
I.C. 12-120(3) and therefore attorney fees were properly denied). Accordingly, we
decline to award fees to Union Pacific under LC.§ 12-120(3). 135 Idaho at 769, 25
P.3d at 82.
See also, Bedke v. Pickett Ranch and Sheep Co., 143 Idaho 36, 42, 137 P.3d 423, 429

(2006) (Denying an award of §12-120(3) attorney's fees in reliance upon the same grounds as
summarized in the just-cited C & G, Inc. v. Rule decision).
The Court in issuing the C & G, Inc. v. Rule opinion specifically included quiet title actions
within the property dispute exception to commercial transaction claims made under LC. § 12120(3). The relief requested in both quiet title and ejectment actions is closely related and
frequently those two actions must proceed in conjunction for purposes of the determination of the
entire action. Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360,369,
179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008) ("We note it was necessary to determine the quiet title portion of the suit
before reaching the issue of ejectment."). In this proceeding the Plaintiff Hillen has also included
a quiet title claim within his complaint upon which this Court has now granted his request for an
ejectment of the Defendant V.K.Smith III. Thus, Hillen has declined to ask for fees under that
statute in this case once being advised that there are at least two Idaho appellate decisions involving
ejectment actions in which the Idaho Supreme Court has denied a request for an award of attorney's
fees under I. C. § 12-120(3) on the basis of the property dispute exception stated above. In Black
Diamond Alliance, LLC v. Kimball, 148 Idaho 798, 229 P .3d 1160 (2010), in which the central

claim was for the issuance of a writ of ejectment, the Court rejected the prevailing party's §12-

DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
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120(3) attorney fee request. In doing so the Idaho Appellate Court relied upon its earlier decision
in, PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631,200 P.3d 1180 (2009), in which PHH
had requested an ejectment of the Perreiras from a residence. In both of these opinions the Court
held ejectment actions could not be characterized as commercial transactions for the purpose of
the recovery of attorney's fees under I.C. §12-120(3). 148 Idaho at 802,229 P.3d at 1164.
Hillen has before deliberately misstated the law to the Hippler court in an attempt to
bootstrap his request for fees, as arising out of the ejectment action, as being a commercial
transaction arising out of an underlying contract.

See Hillen's Memorandum regarding his

requested Fees & Cost pg. 5 in the case entitled Hillen v. Gibson, Case No. CV0J-19-10368. It
was that very argument in which an award of §12-120(3) attorney's fees was rejected in both the

Kimball and Perreira opinions. The gravamen ofHillen's claim in this case is also clearly on the
upon his motion for entry of partial judgment on the pleadings, constituting an ejectment action,
which was the only relief granted by the entry of the Order of this Court.
Therefore, because of the application of the property dispute exception as specifically
incorporating ejectment claims, Hillen has been advised not to seek any recovery under a statute
that has no application, once having committed that misrepresentation to the Hippler Court,
confirming by the controlling authority no right ever existed to claim a basis for an award of
attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).
This prior behavior of Hillen in the act of misstating the law is but a continuation of what
has been his false claims in a number of activities within the probate proceedings: and here in this
case in which he is falsely claiming that, as a matter of law, he is the vested and titled owner of
the Decedent's property interests, and that the heirs have been divested of their interests by the
ineffective Order of Magistrate Copsey as entered on June 2, 2017, a clear contradiction of the
Uniform Probate code and controlling case law.

C.

The Award Of Attorney's Fees Under I.C. §12-121 Does Not Apply To Motion
Practice; V.K. Smith Ill's Opposition To Hillen's Claim To The "Ownership" Of
Estate Property On A Basis Other Than That Provided By The UPC Was Not
Frivolous, And Has Been Consistent With Idaho Caser Law
An award of attorney's fees under I.C. §12-121 is to be determined only after all claims in

the action have been decided. Consequently, § 12-121 does not provide a basis for an award of
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attorney's fees arising out the decision of a single motion. Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451,457,
95 P.3d 69, 75 (2004) ("LC. §12-121 applies to cases as a whole and not to individual motions.").
Although the basis for an award of §12-121 attorney's fees has been modified by Idaho
Military Historical Society v Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 631-32, 329 P.3d 1072, 1079-1080 (2014),

the Maslen decision did not alter the timing for the evaluation of such an award of fees, which
remains at the time all claims made within an action have been determined. Therefore, Hillen's
request for an award of§ 12-121 attorney's fees must also be denied on the basis that such an award
is not appropriate as applied to a decision arising out of motion practice prior to the time all claims
within an action have been determined.
This Court's decision on Hillen's motion for ejectment appears to have been based upon a
perception that there was a determination the Rule 70(b) Order believing it became final as an
issue on appeal, coupled with the authority granted to a personal representative by LC. §15-3-711
("[A] personal representative has the same power over the title to power of the estate that an
absolute owner should have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and other interested
in the estate.''), and then the reference to the Uniform Law Comments within the Code. Those will
be among the matters to be addressed with the appeal of this Judgment, soon to be filed.
By that declaration of the court, Hillen is now on notice that the heirs of the Estate have a
cause of action for Hillen's breach of fiduciary duty, and he has not been insulated from such
claims to be addressed in further proceedings, as there has never been a creditor in the Estate for
which satisfaction of a claim required the divesture of this property asset from the statutorily
declared owners under the law.
In opposing Hillen's motion, V.K. Smith III has taken strong exception to this Court's
conclusion reflected within the decision of the court , as the existence of the fiduciary duty does
not limit the personal representative's power to control the estate property. The travesty that is
currently taking place within this probate proceeding is Hillen's declared intention to completely
liquidate the estate in contravention of the express standards of the UPC for the preservation of
estate property. The existence of the fiduciary duty, as a consequence of the personal representative
only having possession of the estate property - holding only a power over the title, but not holding
the actual title itself - functions as an inherent restraint upon the actions of the personal
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representative. In the proceeding on this ejectment claim, Hillen did not merely seek confirmation
of his status as the trustee ofthe estate property, but rather, and quite to the contrary, he requested
a declaration as based upon the Rule 70(b) Order that he was the actual sole owner of the estate
property. Such an outcome would have eliminated Hillen's statutorily-created trust relationship

with the heirs, and as a consequence would have also extinguished his fiduciary duty to the heirs.
The relief that Hillen requested on his motion for partial judgment on the pleadings - and
the relief that V .K. Smith III opposed - was for a declaration to be made by this Court that the
probate court's Rule 70(b) Order, claimed to have been affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court on
appeal, established Hillen' s sole and absolute ownership of the estate property, which ownership
interest excluded and eliminated any trust interest retained by the heirs and as protected by the
personal representative's fiduciary duty to the heirs.
This requested relief was much broader, and in fact was in excess of, the statutorily-granted
authority over estate property provided to the personal representative by LC. §15-3-711, which
statutory authority was ultimately made part of the basis upon which this Court relied in rendering
its decision. Hillen' s intentions were unequivocally stated on the face of the memorandum that he
submitted to this Court in support of his motion for partial judgment on the ejectment claim in
which he declared the basis for his requested relief on the basis the Rule 70(b) Judgment was
unambiguous, and vested all right, title, and interest in the Raymond Street Property to Hillen.
There is a potentially fundamental difference in outcome if this Court had granted Hillen's
requested relief declaring him, by virtue of the Rule 70(b) Order, to be the sole actual owner of the
estate property to the exclusion of Vernon K. Smith Jr. whose interest under LC. §15-3-101
allegedly had been entirely divested as a result of the entry of that Rule 70(b) Order. Has Joseph's
interest been divested also by the Rule 70(b) Judgment/Order? In the normal course of events
Hillen's "power" exercised in trust under I.C. §15-3-711 only permits him to divest the heirs' title,
as acquired by operation of law, when necessary to satisfy estate claims.
With due respect to the conclusions reached by this Court, under LC. § 15-3-101 title to
estate property passes to the heirs at the time of death, as a matter oflaw, subject only to subsequent
divestiture ifnecessary in the administration ofthe estate as needed to satisfy creditors, and in this
probate Estate there were no creditors, as Vernon K. Smith Jr. resolved any and all claims long
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before his Mother's death. Hillen is allowed to exercise the power granted to the personal
representative by LC. §15-3-711, and cannot own the assets, as confirmed in the case of Lemp v.
Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919), stating "The administrator or executor is not
the owner of any part of the estate. He, in his official character, only holds it in trust for the parties
entitled to it, subject to the purposes of administration". ("Estates descend at death to successors
identified by any probated will, or to heirs if no will is probated, subject to rights which may be
implemented through administration." LC. §15-3-101 Official Comment, ,r 1). The heirs obtain
and retain title, subject only to divestment of their title by the personal representative's exercise of
the § 15-3-711 power, as limited by a required determination that such divestment of the heir's
ownership interest in estate property is necessary for the administration ofthe estate for the benefit

of creditors or other interested parties.
What Hillen has attempted to accomplish in his motion for partial judgment on the
ejectment claim was to reverse the existing statutory mandate and in its place vest in him (instead
of the heirs) the sole title to the estate property, apparently subject only to a possible reconveyance
to the heirs at the end of estate administration, if at that time, any property subject to distribution
still remained. If this Court had declared Hillen to be the sole owner of the estate property in
conjunction with the divestment of Vernon's entire interest in that estate property, then the §15-3711 trust relationship would have been extinguished along with the associated right of the heirs to
bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
If Hillen were no longer required to act only by the exercise of a statutorily-conferred
power, but instead was declared the actual absolute sole owner of the property, then there no longer
would be any fiduciary interest to protect, and neither Vernon K. Smith Jr. nor Joseph H. Smith
would have had any standing to challenge the actions of Hillen, as the personal representative,
because their entire interest in the estate would have been determined to have been extinguished
by the entry of this erroneously worded Rule 70(b) Order.
As based upon the decision of this court, it appears it may serve to be the intent of this
Court to eliminate Hillen's trust relationship to Decedent's assets, or to either extinguish or
eliminate, the right of the heirs to challenge Hillen' s actions as being a breach of his fiduciary duty
that arises out of the statutorily-imposed trust relationship. Although this Court granted Hillen's
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request for ej ectment, it did sounder the theory the Rule 70(b) Judgment/Order was an issue on
appeal and decided, and then in reliance upon the statutory authority of LC. §15-3-711, and not
entirely upon Hillen' s claimed titled ownership of the property, as based upon the Rule 70(b)
Order, as Hillen perceives to have been granted to him as the sole owner with the exclusive vested
title ownership rights of the of the Decedent's property assets, contrary to law, making it statutorily
and legally impossible.
Regrettably, this Court's decision, by confirming the alleged effect of the Rule 70(b) Order,
and in essence, continuing the existence of this potential breach of fiduciary action arising out of
the statutorily-imposed trust relationship, has the appearance of a conflict between the personal
representative and the heirs of the Decedent.
Consequently, in the context of the ownership claims that were actually raised by Hillen
on his motion- but upon which "ownership claims" he obtained no relief by virtue of the statutory
and case law prohibition - it cannot be deemed frivolous for V .K. Smith III to have challenged
Hillen's ownership claims and request for relie£ Those ownership claims, on their face, is a
fallacious attempt by Hillen to establish his sole and absolute ownership of Decedent's property.
This outcome serves to grant Hillen authority in excess of that which is statutorily-granted to a
personal representative by LC. §15-3-711, as there are no creditors and no necessity for such
behavior. Therefore, even if it were appropriate to consider a request for an award of§ 12-121
attorney fees arising out of motion practice, that request must be denied on the basis that V. K.
Smith Ill's actions in opposing Hillen's requested "ownership claims" were well founded, as based
upon the existing law, statutory authority, and standards of the Idaho Uniform Probate Code
(UPC).

III.
CONCLUSION

Because a prevailing party cannot be determined at this stage of the proceeding, Hillen's
request for an award of costs and attorney's fees must be denied in their entirety. Hillen has come
to understand there is no legal basis to request fees under LC. § 12-120(3) arising out of claim for
ejectment, and has therefore decline to make such a request in this particular action, contrary to
what he sought to claim in the Gibson case, about which this court is infinitely aware in the Hippler
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court, which is also a similar property dispute to which that statutory provision does not apply. In
as much Hillen has now predicated his motion for relief upon a belief that the Rule 70(b) Order
had made him both the sole owner of the estate property and also had divested all interests of the
. ~

heirs in that property, such a finding would be
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statutorily-granted to a personal representativ over a Decedenf's.prop~~herefor it was not
frivolous for V.K. Smith III to oppose Hillen' motion, sue that Hillen's requ¢st for a award of
fees under LC.§ 12-121 must be denied in its ent1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
V.

VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV0l-19-10367

DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS

)
Defendant.

)
)

The Defendant, Vernon K. Smith III, submits this motion in objection to the Plaintiffs
Memorandum of Fees and Costs, as required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). Scott Beckstead Real Estate

Co. v. City of Preston, 147 Idaho 852, 856 n.1, 216 P.3d 141, 145 n.1 (2009). This motion is
supported by the accompanying memorandum which details the grounds for the Defendant's
objections. As provided by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D), the Defendant requests oral argument, to be
scheduled as provided by Fourth District, Ada County Local Rule 2.2.

Dated this 5th day of March, 2020.
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ATTORNEY ATLAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
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vkslaw@live.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV0l-19-10367
NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, NOAH G. HILLEN,
acting in the capacity as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, and
Plaintiff-Respondent's attorneys, Jack W Relf and Alexander P. McLaughlin, of the law firm
of Givens-Pursley, LLP, Boise, Idaho, 83701-2720, and the Clerk of the above entitled Court
of Ada County, Idaho.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Appellant, Vernon K. Smith III, through his attorney of

record, Vernon K. Smith, does appeal against the above-named Plaintiff-Respondent, Noah
G. Hillen, from that MEMORANDUM DECISION, ORDER and PARTIAL JUDGMENT
granting Plaintiffs MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, entered February
28, 2020, said appeal taken pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule l l(a)(3) I. A.R., the Honorable
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Samuel Hoagland, District Judge presiding~ with copies thereof attached hereto as provided
for by Idaho Appellate Rule l 7(e)(l)(C).
2.

That the above-named Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme

Court from that Partial Judgment entered on the Motion for Judgment On The Pleadings,
described in paragraph 1 above, as was certified as provided by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., and is
an appealable Order/Judgment pursuant thereto.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues to be presented on appeal, which

Appellant intends to assert, but not preventing Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal,
do include, but not limited to, the following:
a. In the absence of any established need for the liquidation of assets in the
administration of an estate, as determined under I. C. §15-3-711, does a personal
representative have any authority within the general provisions of the Idaho Uniform
Probate Code, I. C. §§ 15-1-101 et seq. (UPC), to eject a person in possession under a
tenancy-preservation-renovation participant dating back to 2005 (Appellant Smith III)
from his otherwise lawful possession of property that by law (I. C. §15-3-101) his Father
is vested in the heirs of the Estate?
b. Under the UPC, can a personal representative ever "own" estate property,
as opposed to taking and holding "possession" of that property in trust for the benefit of
creditors in satisfaction of their claims?
c. Does a magistrate in a probate proceeding have any authority to transfer
"ownership" of property to a personal representative by means of a Rule 70(b), I.R.C.P.
order?
d. Does the "conclusive evidence" standard announced in I. C. §15-3-709
apply to a personal representative's pleading, made upon alleged "ownership" of property,
as opposed to a pleading to obtain "possession" of property, for satisfaction of creditor
claims as a estate necessity, to which the "conclusive evidence" standard was intended to
apply under that section?
THE NATURE OF THIS APPEAL
Appellant Smith III is a long-time occupant and restoration participant of a
residential property located at 2001 N. Raymond St., Boise Idaho, restoring and preserving
the premises that is owned by the heirs of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith. The personal
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representative of the Estate, Noah G. Hillen, filed a complaint for ejectment, which was
granted, entering a Rule 54(b) judgment ejecting Smith III from the property he occupied,
upon the sole claim Hillen was the "owner" of the property. Hill en's ejectment pleading
was exclusively premised upon Hillen's (acting as a personal representative) controversial
allegation he has exclusive "ownership" of the property, as arising out of a .-ansfer of
"ownership" made to him, as personal representative, by a Rule 70(b) I.R.C.P. Order
entered by Magistrate Cheri Copsey in the probate proceeding. The property, if not
wrongfully sold, will remain with the ownership if Appellant's father, preferring his
continued occupancy to prevent vandalism, damage and potential property loss.
This appeal arises out of the district court's entry of a 54(b)certified judgment and
apparent determination no distinction exists between a personal representative's "power
over the title to property," as granted by, and limited in its exercise under the Idaho Uniform
Probate Code (UPC), and the alternative alleged "actual ownership of property", as arising
out of the magistrate's Rule 70(b) I.R.C.P. Order, which Order simultaneously would
effectively operate to divest Estate heirs of their titled and vested interest in that property.
The Personal Representative (Hillen) relies upon a single sentence, as included
within the statement of facts within an opinion issued in the appeal of the Matter of Estate
of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018), in support of his alleged "ownership" and

unrestricted authority to dispose of the property. That single sentence stated the following:
"In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
70(b), which vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property in the personal
representative who had been appointed." 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15.
Consequently, as based upon this alleged statement of "ownership" of the Smith
Estate property, Hillen is attempting to liquidate the entire Smith Estate in the same fashion
he typically liquidates an estate in his work as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee.
The Estate of Victoria H. Smith had no creditors, and Federal estate taxes were
paid, and no illustrated obligation was identified in the complaint to justify further
possession and liquidation in the administration by the Personal Representative to require
further liquidation of remaining property in satisfaction of a lawful purpose recognized
under the provisions of the UPC, specifically I. C. §15-3-711.
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.
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5.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? No, just the Clerk's Record pertaining

to the documents and disposition taken in this matter identified below.
6.

Appellant does specifically request the Clerk's Record to include all filed

and lodged documents currently identified to be as follows:
a. Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief (06/07/2019)
b. Answer to Verified Complaint (07/03/2019)
c. Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (10/09/2019)
d. Memorandum in Support of Motion (10/09/2019)
e. Declaration ofNoah G. Hillen (10/09/2019)
f. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion (11/08/2019)
g. Reply Memorandum (11/27/2019)
h. Decision and Order (02/10/2020)
i. Partial Judgment (2/28/20)
j. Memorandum for costs and attorney fees (02/24/2020)
k. Defendant's Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs (03/05/2020)

1. Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Motion In Opposition to
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Fees and Costs (03/05/2020)
m. The Estate Tax Return, if not of record, to be augmented or submitted in
appendix.
n. Hillen v. David R. Gibson (4th Dist., Ada County Case No.CV0l-1910368) (J. Hippler) Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief
(currently on appeal, Docket No. 47687-2020).
o. Hillen v. Law Office of Vernon K Smith, et al (4th Dist., Ada County
Case No.CV0l-19-20686) (J. Reardon) Complaint for Ejectment and Other
Relief (11/13/19).
7.

I certify:
a. No Reporter's Transcript has been requested, so no notice has been sent

to the Reporter;
b. No estimate fee for any Reporter's Transcript, as none is requested;
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c. That the Clerk of the District Court will be paid the estimated fee for the
preparation of the Clerk's Record, when requested.
d. That the required filing fee has been paid in~-·JJ'.,.~,tr'."'1',.':l-'lu
filing system in the amount of$129.00.
e.

That service has been made u

pursuant to Rule 20, I.AR.
Dated this 16th day of March, 2020.

Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Defendant-Appella t,
Vernon K. Smith III
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 16th day ofMarch, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the llowing
addresses:
Jack W. Relf
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com

~ail--...
Fax 208-388~20
Hand Delivered

Ve

.

Attorney for Defendant-Ap
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Filed: 02/10/2020 13:36:21
Fourth Judicial District. Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Hoskins, Janet

1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
vs.

VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,

Case· No. CV0 1-19-10367
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR
PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS, RULE 54(B)
CERTIFICATION, i\ND WRIT OF
ASSISTANCE

Defendant.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and
request for a writ of assistance, filed through counsel on October 9, 2019. Hearings were held on
December 3, 2019, and on January 14, 2020, at which time the matter was taken under
advisement. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motions are GRANTED.

FACTS

In this ejectment action, Plaintiff Noah Hillen ("Hillen"), the personal representative of Victoria
Smith's (''Victoria'') estate, seeks to eject Defendant Vernon K. Smith III ("Vernon") from
property that is owned by Victoria's estate.

This case is one of several cases concerning Victoria's estate. In March of 2017, the magistrate
court, in Ada County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, issued a decision finding that Victoria's
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holographic will was invalid because it was a product of Vernon K. Smith Jr.'s (Vernon's father
and lawyer in this case) undue influence, 1 and that Victoria died intestate. In June of 2017, in the
same case, an Order and Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b)2 were entered
vesting title to all of Victoria's real and personal property to Hillen as the appointed personal
representative of Victoria's estate. Specifically, the Judgment vested Hillen with "any and all
real property of any kind or nature, including but not limited to: any fixtures, appurtenances,
additions, easements, licenses, water rights, or similar rights of any kind or nature appurtenant
thereto; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits of or from any real
property[,]"3 including the property at issue in this case - 2001 North Raymond Street, Boise,
Idaho 83704 (hereafter, "Raymond Street property").

The Judgment provided that "[s]uch

vesting is free and clear of any lien, daim or interest of the Claimaints[,]" one of whom included
Vemon K. Smith Jr.

Vernon K. Smith Jr. appealed these decisions, and in 2018, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
the magistrate court's decisions. See Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6
(2018). The Supreme Court specifically noted that the Rule 70(b) Judgment was at issue in the
appeal:

In October 2016, the magistrate court held a two--day bench trial on the issue of
undue influence. The parties then submitted post-trial briefing. On March 9, 2017,
the magistrate court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in which
1

Vernon K. Smith Jr. was the sole beneficiary under the will.

2
'"If the real or personal property is within the district, the court, instead of ordering a conveyance, may enter a
judgment divesting any party's title and vesting it in others. That judgment has the effect of a legally exacuted
conveyance.'' I.R.C.P. 70(b).

3

The Court takes judicial notice pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 of the Judgment (filed June 2, 2017) in Ada
County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352.
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it ruled that Victoria's will was invalid because it was a product of Vemon's4
undue influence, and that Victoria died intestate. The court later amended its
decision to correct minor typographical and clerical errors. In June 2017, the court
entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b}, which vested
title to all of Victoria's real and personal property in the personal representative
who had been appointed [Hillen].
Vernon appealed these decisions, and this Court granted Joseph's motion for
acceptance of appeal directly from the magistrate court pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 44. This appeal follows the panies' stipulation to bifurcate the
appeal to first address any matters occurring up to and including the post-trial
judgment under Rule 70(b) before considering any matters occurring thereafter.
The personal representative of the estate, Intervenor-Respondent Noah Hillen, is
not participating in this portion of the appeal.
V emon asserts that the magistrate court erred in granting Joseph partial summary
judgment (and the corresponding Rule 70(b)judgment) and then erred again in its
ruling that the will was invalid.

Id. at 466,432 P.3d at 15 (emphasis added).

On December 11, 2018, Hillen sent a 30 day notice of termination of lease to Vernon at the
Raymond Street property. The notice demanded Vernon vacate the Raymond S•eet property no
later than January 31, 2019. Vernon did not vacate the property.

On June 7, 2019, Hillen filed the instant Verified Complaint against V emon alleging (1)
ejectment, (2) declaratory judgment/quiet title, (3) trespass, and (4) unjust enrichment. 5

4

Referencing Vernon's father and lawyer- Vernon K. Smith Jr.

5

On the same date, Hillen filed a nearly identical ejectment action. against a business that was occupying property
that was owned by Victoria's estate (Ada County Case No. CV0l-19-10368). Following the filing of a Motion
similar to the one before this Court, on October 3, 2019, Judge Hippler issued a Memorandum Decision and Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings.
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Hillen now seeks a partial judgment on his ejectment claim and requests the Court issue a Vlrit of
assistance and certify the judgment as final under Rule 54(b).

LEGAL STANDARD

"After the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial, a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings." l.R.C.P. 12(c). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56~ and all parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
pe~ent to the motion. I.R.C.P. 12(d). Here, Hillen provided a Declaration in Support of his
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. At the December 3, 2019 hearing, the Court
notified the parties that it intended to treat the Motion as one for summary judgment and gave
them time to file any additional materials. Accordingly, the Cow1 finds that the parties have
been given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material pertinent to the Motion.

Swnmary judgment may be entered only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute.as
to any material fact and the movaut is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 1.R.C.P. 56{a).
The Court uliberally construes the facts and existing record in favor of the non-moving party" in
making such determinaii.on. Hall v. Forsloff, 124 Idaho 771, 773, 864 P.2d 609,611 (1993). "If
reasonable people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the motion
must be denied." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385
(2005). Moreover, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not
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sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment." Stafford v. Weaver, 136
Idaho 223,225, 31 P.3d 245,247 (2001) (citations omitted).

The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact, and then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence
to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872,
874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (1'994).

When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving an

element at trial, the moving party may establish a lack of genuine issue of material fact by
establishing the lack of evidence supporting the element. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311,
882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1994).

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment ''may not rest upon mere allegations in the
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial."
Gagnon v. W. Bldg. Maint., Inc., 155 Idaho 112,114,306 P.3d 197, 199 (2013). Such evidence

may consist of affidavits or depositions, but (.'the Court will consider only that material . . .
which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial."' Han-is v.
State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156!r 1159 (1992). If the

evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains on
which the court may then enter summary judgment as a matter of law. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co.
ofIdaho, 138 Idaho 443, 445, 65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003).
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ANALYSIS

Hillen asserts he is entitled to judgment on his claim for ejectment and requests a Rule 54(b)
certificate and writ of assistance. Each issue will be addressed in tum.

(1) Ejectment

"Ejectment requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) possession by the defendants, and (3) refusal of
the defendants to surrender possession." Ada Cty. Higmvay Dist. v. Tot«/ Success Investments,
LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008) (noting that it is necessary to determine the
quiet title portion of the suit before reaching the issue of ejectment).

Here, there is no dispute as to the second and third elements, i.e. Vemon is in possession of the
Raymond Street property and he refuses to surrender his possession. The issue is whether Hillen
is the owner of the Raymond Street property.

Vernon asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court did not decide whether the Rule 70(b) Order and
Judgment transferred complete ownership of Victoria's estate property to Hillen, the Rule 70(b)
Order does not support Hillen's request for relief, and various provisions of Idaho's Uniform
Probate Code do not support Hillen' s request.

Although this particular issue might not have been raised in the previous appeal, it is clear that
the Rule 70(b) Order and Judgment were at issue on appeal. The Supreme Court noted that the
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appeal followed ''the parties' stipulation to bifurcate the appeal to first address any matters

occurring up to and including the post-trial judgment under Rule 70(b) before considering any
matters occurring thereafter." Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that Vernon K. Smith Jr. argued on appeal "that the magistrate
court erred in granting Joseph partial SUIIUilfilY judgment (and the corresponding Rule 70(b)
judgment) and then erred again in its ruling that the will was invalid.'' Id.

The Rule 70(b) Judgment vested in Hillen "any and all real property of any kind or nature,
including ... [the Raymond Street property]" and "(s]uch vesting is free and clear of any lien,
claim or interest of the C1aimaints[.]" Generally, "final judgments, whether right or wrong, are
not subject to collateral attack." Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 894, 277 P.3d 337, 341
(2012) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

As Judge Hippler noted in his Amended

Memorandum Decision and Order p. 7 (filed Oct. 3, 2019), if '1he Judgment could not have done
what it pmported to do, then Vernon [K. Smith Jr.] should have moved in that case for relief
from the judgment under LR.C.P. 60(b). [The defendant] essenaally requests that the Court act as
an appellate court and overrule the Judgment in the other case, something it cannot do.''

Vernon next argues that the Rule 70(b) Order itself does not support Hillen's request, because as
a personal representative of Victoria's estate, Hillen is statutorily conmained by Idaho,s Uniform
Probate Code and is in breach of his :fiduciary duties.

"The legal title to estate property vests in the heirs or devisees upon the death of the decedent.''

El/maker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 580, 377 P.3d 390, 394 (2015); see 1.C. § 15-3-101.
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However, "the rights of creditors, devisees, and heirs to his property are subject to the restrictions
and limitations contained in this code to facilitate the prompt settlement of estates." LC. § 15-3101.

One such restriction or limitation is the right of a personal representative to "take

possession or control of, the decedent's property[.]"

LC. § 15-3-709.

"[A] personal

representaii.ve has the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner
would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate.
This power may be exercised without notice:, hearing, or order of court." I.C. § 15-3-711. The
Uniform Law Comments note that
The personal representative is given the broadest possible "power over title". He
receives a "power", rather than title, because the power concept eases the
succession of assets which are not possessed by the personal representative. . ..
The power over title of an absolute owner is conceived to embrace all possible

transactions which might result in a conveyance or encumbrance of asse'ls, or
in a change ofrights ofpossession.
(Emphasis added.)

Here, the plain language of the Rule 70(b) Judgment vested in Hillen "any and all real property
of any kind or nature, including ... [the Raymond Street property]" and "[s]uch vesting is free
and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the Claimaints[. ]" Thus, by 'virtue of the plain and
unambiguous statutory language and the Rule 70(b) Order and Judgment, Hillen is the owner (in
his capacity as the personal representative of Victoria's estate) of the Raymond Street property
and has authority to eject Vernon. Accordingly, Hillen' s Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings on bis ejectment claim is GRANTED.
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(2) Rule 54(b) Certificat~

l
Hillen also requests a Rule 54(b) certification.

In order for the Court to attach a Rule 54(b)(1)

certificate entering a final judgment on "one or more but less than all of the claims or parties,"
the Court must find "that there is no just reason for delay,'' in entering a final judgment as to that
claim or party. I.R.C.P. 54(b)(l); Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 505 (2005). Kolln v. St.

Luke's Regional Medical Center, 130 Idaho 323, 328 (1997), is instructive on when a trial court
should grant Rule 54(b) certification. In Kolin, the respondents filed a motion for Rule 54(b)(1)
certification after summary judgment was granted in their favor.

The trial court granted the

certification, and the petitioner filed a motion to decertify, which the trial court denied.

On

appeal, the Supreme Court found that the district court abused its discretion in granting Rule
54(b) certification. It explained: "We have cautioned that I.R.C.P. 54(b) certification should not
be granted routinely, or as a matter of course; it should be reserved only for the ~infrequent harsh
case.' The party requesting certification must show that it will suffer some hardship or injustice,
or provide some other compelling reason why the certification should be granted." Id.

The respondents in Kolln argued that they would be prejudiced or harmed, because they "had
obtained a quick resolution to their case, and did not feel they should have to wait until the
claims against the other defendants were resolved.'' Id. The Court emphasized that ''mere delay
is not a hardship in and of itself, because I.R.C.P. 54(b) contemplates that there will normally be
a delay in cases involving multiple parties and motions." Id. "The decision to grant or deny a
54(b) certificate rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge who is best able to evaluate the
situation." Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596,599, 21 P.3d 918,921 (2001); PHH Mortg.
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Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631,636, 200 P.3d 1180, 1185 (2009) (affirming trial court's
decision to grant Rule 54(b) certification on decision restoring possession of property to the
plaintiff).

Hillen asserts Rule 54(b) certification is warranted because he is unable to sell, lease, or
otherwise perform bis statutory duties as the personal representative of Victoria's estate, due to
Vernon's unlawful possession.

He asserts that he has been charged Vvith expeditiously

liquidating estate property and distributing the proceeds to Victoria's heirs and that Vernon's
continued possession prevents him for doing so.

Under these facts and circumstances, the Court finds that there is no just reason for delay and
Rule 54(b) certification is proper.

In addition, Vernon made no argument that Rule 54(b)

certification should not be granted.

(3) Writ of Assistance

Hillen also requests a vn-it of assistance to transfer possession of the property from Vernon to
Hillen. The decision to grant a writ of assistance is in the trial court's discretion. Williams v.

Sherman, 35 Idaho 169, 205 P. 259 (1922); Federal Land Bank v. Parsons, 118 Idaho 324, 796
P.2d 533 (Ct. App. 1990). "A writ of assistance is a form of process issued by a court of equity
to transfer the possession of property~ and more specifically lands, the title or right to which it
has previously adjudicated ...." Pro Indiviso. Inc. v. 1\1.lid-Mile Holding Tr.., 131 Idaho 741, 746,
963 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1998) (citation omitted).
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The sole question to be determined on the motion is whether applicant has a right,
as against the party in possession to use the writ to obtain possession. In the
absence of any claim of an independent paramount title, the only question on such
application is whether the decree has or has not been complied with.

Id. (citation omitted).

As set forth previously, Hillen has the right to eject Vernon from the Raymond Street property.

Judge Hippler granted a writ of assistance in his case for the following reasons:
The Court recognizes that the typical course would be to refrain from issuing a
-vvTit of assistance until after the party fails to comply with the judgment. In this
case, however, such a waiting period would be pointless, as it seems likely that
Gibson will not comply in a timely manner. His future non-compliance seems
likely for two reasons: First, when at the hearing the Court asked Gibson whether
he would comply with a judgment against him, Gibson failed to give an
unequivocal answer in the affirma'iive. Second, Vernon's6 conduct in the
underlying probate case reveals a dilatory pattern and the Court is concerned that
Vernon, as Gibson's counsel, will continue this pattern by encouraging his client
to not immediately comply with the judgment. A waiting period in this instance
seemingly would serve no purpose but to further delay the probate of Victoria's
estate and waste her estate's resources by requiring it to again request a writ of
assistance after Gibson fails to comply. To avoid such a waste of time, and
believing a writ will likely be necessary to enforce the judgment, the Court grants
Hillen's request for a writ of assistance.

Vernon made no argument that a writ of assistance should not be granted. Here, it seems likely
that Vernon's attorney and father will dispute any judgment this Court enters based on his past
conduct in the probate court and based on the same arguments and defenses he has raised in this
case and in Judge Hippler's case. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the writ of assistance.

6

Referencing Vernon's father and attorney in this case - Vernon K. Smith Jr.

Order Granting Motions for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings.. Rule 54(b) Certification, and Writ of Assistance - 11
Page 238

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Hillen's Motions for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, Rule
54(b) certification, and Writ of Assistance are GRANTED. The Rule 54(b) Judgment and Writ
of Assistance will be issued concurrent with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: 2/10/2020 09:06 AM

Date
District Judge

Order Grant.lg Motions for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, Rule 54(b) Certification, and Writ of Assistance- 12
Page 239

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Signed: 2110/2020 01 :36 PM

I hereby certify that on _ _ _ _--.;, I served a true and correct copy of the within instrument
to:

Randall Peterman

Alexander McLaughlin
Jack Relf
rapuugivenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Vernon Smith
vkslaw@live.com

Phil McGrane

Clerk of the District Court

By~
DeputyouftClerk
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flHB';By::>_Jyler A,~inson 6/~01,? ,lll, ?:,3,~ ,PM

J)epdty Clerk,

. ·-:~oorttU~:-.~-A$l:County
QJRJ$1.fJPJ,JE.ll)dUOJi.rk .

IN TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII mDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN TIIBMATTEROF TIIB ESTATE OF

Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352

VICTORIA H. SMITH,
Deceased.

JUDGMENT ON MOTION UNDER
RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING
ALL REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:

I.

Personal Property
The Court does hereby vest in Noah Hillen, as the personal representative of the
Estate ("Personal Representative~'), as of May 5, 2017, any and all personal property of any kind
or nature, whether choate or inchoate, whether tangible or intangible; any and all rights or
interests in cash or cash equivalents; any and all rights in any insurance policies; any and all

rights in any executory contracts, including but not limited to leases of any kind or nature, or any
security agreements which constitute a disguised lease under Idaho law; any rights and powers of
Victoria H. Smith under any personal property; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring,
rents or profits of or from any personal property ("Personal Property").
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Such vesting is i-ee and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the following parties
("Claimants"):
1. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. individually;
2. Vernon K.. Smith, Jr., in his capacity as the personal representative of the
Estates;
3. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. in his capacity as an attorney-in-fact or agent or
fiduciary for Victoria H. Smith;
4. Vernon K. Smith, Jr., in any other capacity;
5. Victoria L. Smith, in her personal and any other capacity;
6. VHS Properties, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
7. Riverside Farms, Inc., an Idaho corporation;
8. S & S Trust, LLC, in Idaho limited liability company; and
9. Any entity controlled by any of the individuals or entities identified above (the
foregoing shall hereinafter be collectively referenced as the "Claimants").
•·

Real .Property
The Court does hereby vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5, 2017, any

and all real property of any kind or nature, including but not limited to: any fixtures,
appurtenances, additions, easements, licenses, water rightst or similar rights of any kind or nature
appurtenant thereto; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits of or from any
real property (collectively "Real Property"), including but not limit~ to the following:
A.

Jefferson County Property.
(i)
That certain Real Property A, commonly referenced as the Jefferson
County Property, and more specifically identified on Exhibit~

B.

Ada County Property.
(i)

That certain Real Property B, commonly referenced as the Ada County,
and more specifically identified on Exhibit B.
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Such vesting is free and clear of any lien~ claim or interest of the Claimants.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017.

The Honorabl~. Copsey

District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 6f212017 02:38 PM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _day of June, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT ON MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF
THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE to be served by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ J Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt:
rap@givenspursley.corns

RANDALL A. PETERMAN
ALEXANDERP.MCLAUGHLIN
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83 70 l
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special
Administrator

VERNON K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Personal Representative ofEstate of Vernon K

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: vls59@live.com

Smith> Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 331-1529
[ ) Hand Delivery
[ 1 Overnight Delivery
[X] Email / iCourt: rjones@idalaw.com;
ejudd@idalaw.com

RORY JONES and ERICA JUDD
JONES, GLEDHILL, .FURMAN P.A.

225 North 9th Street, #820
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorneys for Vernon K Smith, Jr.
ALLEN B. ELLIS

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

ELLIS LAW, PLLC

12639 West Explorer Drive
Boise, Idaho 83 713
Attorneys for Joseph H. Smith
Ronald L. Swafford
Swafford Law t PC
65 5 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Attorneys for Sharon Bergmann

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email / iCourt: aellis@,aellislaw.com

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524-4131
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email / iCourt:
rons@swaffordlaw.com

JUDGMENT ON MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE - 4
13702276.4

Page 244

Courtesy copy provided to:
Victoria Anne Converse
10548 NW Skyline Blvd.
Portland OR 97231

[X]
( ]
[ )
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

ROBERT MAYNES

[X] U.S. Mail

Maynes Taggart, PLLC

Facsimile: (208) 524-6095
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery

l )

P.0. Box 3005
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403
Attorneys for Walker Land & Livestock, LLC

Darrell G. Early

(X] U.S. Mail

Office of the Attorney General
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706

[ ] Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
[ ] Hand Delivery

t ] Overnight Delivery

Attorneys for State ofIdaho Department of
Environmental Quality
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EXHIBIT A
Legal Description - Jefferson County Property
Parcel 1
Lots 7, 8, 9, 101 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 in Block 5, Village and Townsite of Hamer, including and
joining vacated streets and alleys by Ordinance No.. 5, Jefferson County, Idaho.
Parcel 2
Township 7 North, Range 36 East of the Boise Meridian, Jefferson County, Idaho.
Section 2: All
Section 11: All
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EXIIlBITB
Legal Description - Ada County Property
Parcel 1 (Commonly known as: 1902 W Main St, Boise, ID 83702)
Lot 6 in Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 2 (Commonly known as: 1900 W Main St, Boise, 10 83702)
Lot 7 in Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 3 {Commonly known as: 110 N. 22nd St. Boise, ID 83702}
Lot 5 in Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 2 of Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14t 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
official records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 4 {Commonlv known as: 1807 W Idaho St, Boise. ID 83702)
The Northwesterly 32 feet of Lot 11 in Block 23 of McCarty's Second Addition to Boise City, Ada
County, State of Idaho, according to the
official plat thereof recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Ada County, State of ldaho.
Parcel 5 (Commonly known as: 2001 N Raymond St, Boise, ID 83704)
Lot 6 except the South 50 feet in Block 2 of A Resubdivision of Lot 21, and a portion of Lots 6, 7
and 22, Oradell Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 25, records of Ada
County, Idaho.
Parcel 6 (Commonly known as: OS Pleasant Valley Rd, Boise, ID 83705; 6259 S Pleasant Valley
Boise, ID 83705j O S Cole Rd. Boise, ID 83709)

Rd.

Unit I:
The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 32, Township 3 North, Range 2 East of
the Boise Meridian, in Ada County. Idaho.
Unit II:
Parcel A
The West half of the Northwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise
Meridian. Also shown of record as Lot 4 and the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of
Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East~ of the Boise Meridian.
Parcel B
The East half of the Northwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise
Meridian.
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Parcel C
The Southwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise Meridian.
Unit Ill:
The East half of the Northeast quarter of Section 71 and the West half of the Northwest quarter of
Section 8 au in Township 2 North of Range 2 East of Boise Meridian in Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 7 (Commonly known as: 5933 N. Branstetter, Garden City. ID 83714; W. Chinden Blvd ..
Garden City. ID 83714; 9907 W. Chinden Blvd.;, Garden City. ID 83714 )
Unit I:
Real property situated in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, consisting of 132 acres, more or less
to wit: Commencing at a point North 36°21' West distant 2.88 chains from the center of Section 26,
Township 4 North, Range 1 East, B.M., the real place of beginning, running thence South 73°15'
East a distance of 1.40 chains to a point; thence North 18°48' East a distance of 64.53 chains to a
point; thence North 60°42' West a distance of 2.75 chains to a point; thence South 68°00' WNt a
distance of 9.50 chains to a point; thence North 75° 00' West a distance of 12.00 chains to a point;
thence North 49°00' West a distance of 3.90 chains to a point; thence South 64°30' West a
distance of 3.70 chains to a point; thence South 12°00• west a distance of 8.50 chains to a point;
thence North 81°00' West a distance of 3.83 chains to a point; thence South 01>05' West a distance
of 14.92 chains to a point; thence North 80°30' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence
South 48°15' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence South 80°30' East a distance of 3.15
chains to a point; thence South &1°00• East a distance of 1.00 chains to a point; thence South
23°30' East a distance of 2.10 chains to a point; thence South 10001 West a •distance of 3a60
chains to a point; thence South 261>00' West a distance of 1.80 chains to a point; thence South
27°00, East a distance of 3. 70 chains to a point; thence South 1°45' East a distance of 1.50 chains
to a point; thence South 38°30' East a distance of 1.20 chains to a point; thence South 40°45' West
a distance of 2.80 chains to a point; thence South 3°45' West a distance of 4.30 chains to a point;
thence South 34°15' East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence South 67°00' East a distance
of 1.40 chains to a point; thence South 49°155 East a distance of 2.50 chains to a point; thence
South 2r30' East a distance of 2.95 chains to a point; thence South 52°00' East a distance of 2..50
chains to a point; thence South 64°00' East a distance of 2.60 chains to a point; thence North
84°45' East a distance of 1.32 chains to a point; thence South 00°03' West a distance of 14.89
chains to the place of beginning; together with all water, ditch and lateral rights appurtenant
hereto or used in connection therewithJ including 132 shares in the Thurman Mill Ditch Co, LTD.,
and as said acreage is further identified in that Bargain and Sale Deed, dated December 20, 1954,
and recorded in the Records of the Ada County Recorder's Office, located in Book 440 at Page
104, copies of which are attached hereto, and incorporated herein; and
Unit II:
Real property situated in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, consisting of 44 acres, more or less,
to wit:
Commencing at a point 2 chains 88 links North 36°21' West from the Wash Boulder set in the
center of Section Twenty..,six in Township Four North of Range One East of the Boise Meridian;
thence North variation 18°48' East 18 chains and 70 links to a Slough; thence North and Westerly
following the left and South Bank of the said Slough to the East boundary of Lot Nine in Section
Twenty-three in Township and Range aforesaid; thence South following East Boundary of said Lot
Nine, 7 chains and 75 links to Southeast comer of said Lot Nine; thence South following the East
boundary of the West Half of the Northwest Quarter of said Section Twenty.six, 25 chains and 40
links to top of Bluff; thence South and Easterly following the edge of the Bluff to a point 2 chains
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and 88 links North 35°21' West from the Wash Boulder set in the center of said Section Twentysix, said point being the place of beginning. Together with all Certificates of Shares, including
Certificate No. 114 for 44 shares of the capital stock in the Thurman Mm Ditch Cornpany1' Ltd, and
as said acreage is further identified in that Warranty Deed dated March 181 1958, and recorded in
the Records of the Ada County Recorder's Office as Instrument No. 805407, copies of which are
attached hereto and incorporated herein; and said parcels of real properties further identified in
the Tax Parcel Identification Numbers for further reference as set forth as:
(1)

Legal Description: Parcel #0995 in Flood District S2 of Sec 23 & N2 of Sec 26

4N 1E '#0990-B
Tax Parcel Number: S0526120995
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St, Garden City, ID 83714

(2}

Legal Description: Parcel #4432 of SE4 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244430..s
Tax Parcel Number. S0526244432
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St, Garden City, ID 83714

(3}

Legat Description; Parcel #4434 of NE4 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244430-B
Tax Parcel Number: S0526244434
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St, Garden Cify1 ID 83714

(4}

Legal Description: Parcel #2580 in Flood District Secs 23 & 26 4N 1E
Tax Parcel Number: S0526212580
Property Address: W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, 10 83714

(5)

Legal Description: Parcel #3600@ NW Comer SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N
1E #244660-B
Tax Parcel Number: 80526243600
Property Address: W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714

(6)

Legal Description: Parcel #3700 Por N2 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #244660-B
Tax Parcel Number. 80526243700
Properly Address: W Chinden Blvd., Garden Ciy, to 83714

(7)

Legal DNcription: Parcel #4265 NR CTR SE4 NW4 Section 26
4N 1E #244255-B
Tax Parcel Number: S0526244265
Property Address: 9907 W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714
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Filed: 02/28/2020 13:57:50
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Hoskins, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV0l-19-10367
PARTIAL JUDGMENT

vs.
VERNON K. SMITH ill, an individual,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, as personal representative of the estate
of Victoria H. Smith, on Count One of his Complaint. Defendant Vernon K. Smith III shall
immediately vacate and surrender possession of the premises located at 2001 North Raymond
Street, Boise, Idaho 83704.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: 2/24/2020 04:51 PM

Date
District Judge

Partial Judgment - I
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE

With respect to the issues determined by the above partial judgment it is hereby CERTIFIED, in
accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P ., that the court has determined that there is no just reason for
delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct that the above
partial judgment is a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken
as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

Signed: 2/28/2020 01 :04 PM

Date
District Judge

Partial Judgment - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Signed: 2/28/2020 01 :58 PM

I hereby certify that on ______ I served a true and correct copy of the within instrument
to:

Randall Peterman
Alexander McLaughlin
Jack Relf
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Vernon Smith
vkslaw@live.com

Phil McGrane
Clerk of the District Court

By~

DeputyourtClerk

Partial Judgment - 3

Page 252

Electronically Filed
3/27/2020 3: 10 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
15053767 [013683-0002]

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CV0l-19-10367

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD

Plaintiff,
vs.
VERNON K. SMITH III, an individual,
Defendant.

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED APPELLANT AND HIS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
Notice is hereby given, that Plaintiff/Respondent Noah G. Hillen, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Hillen"), hereby requests, pursuant
to Rules 19, 25, and 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the inclusion of the following Reporter's
Transcript and material in the Clerk's Record on Appeal in addition to that required to be included
by the Idaho Appellate Rules and Defendant/Appellant Vernon K. Smith Ill's Notice of Appeal:
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1. Reporter's Transcript, compressed format:
a. Hearing before Judge Samuel Hoagland held on December 3, 2019, on
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Certify
Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b), reported by Christine Olesek; and
b. Hearing before Judge Samuel Hoagland held on January 14, 2020, on Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment
Under I.R.C.P. 54(b), reported by Christine Olesek.
2. Clerk's Record:
a. Plaintiffs Witness Disclosure, filed November 5, 2019;
b. Notice of Entry of Memorandum Decision and Order by Judge Hippler, filed
December 11, 2019;
c. Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings, filed December 17, 2019;
d. Objection and Response to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, filed
December 31, 2019;
e. Writ of Assistance, issued February 10, 2020; and
f.

Declaration of Alexander P. McLaughlin in Support of Memorandum of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed February 24, 2020.

I certify that a copy of this Request for Additional Transcript and Record has been
served upon Christine Olesek, Court Reporter, Ada County Courthouse, c/o TCA Department,
200 W. Front Street, Ste. 4172, Boise, Idaho 83702. The number of additional reporter's transcript
pages requested is approximately 37 pages.
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I further certify that a copy of this Request for Additional Transcript and Record
has been served upon the Clerk of the District Court and upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this 27th day of March.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD
to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vvs1900@gmail.com

Christine Olesek
Court Reporter
Ada County Courthouse
clo TCA Department
200 W. Front Street, Ste. 4172
Boise, Idaho 83 702

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt:

Ada County Clerk
Attn: Civil Division
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt:

Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Alexander P. McLaughlin
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Filed: 06/17/2020 10:22:01
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Thomas

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Supreme Court Case No. 47884
District Court Case No. CV0l-19-10367

Plaintiff- Respondent,
V.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

VERNON K. SMITH, III, an individual
Defendant- Appellant.

I, Thomas Larsen, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the
above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is a true, full and correct Record
of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties.
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript (if
requested), along with copies of

D
D
D
D
D

All Exhibits offered or admitted;
No Exhibits submitted;
Presentence Investigation;
Other Confidential Documents;
Confidential Exhibits (if applicable)
to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follow:
Vernon K. Smith
vkslaw@live.com

Alexander P. McLaughlin
apm@givenspursley.com
Jack W. Relf
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Randall A. Peterman
rap@givenspursley.com
Dated~igned: 6/17/2020 10:22 AM

PHIL McGRANE

~istri~----Deputy Clerk
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